

**Adaptation, Resilience and Transition:**  
**Report of the Formative Evaluation of Camp Management in the Burmese**  
**Refugee Camps in Thailand**

***Long Report***

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Prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency,  
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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BBC	Burma Border Consortium (former name of TBBC)
BDY	Ban Don Yang (1 of the 9 Burmese refugee camps; located in Kanchanaburi)
BWU	Burmese Women’s Union (a CBO)
CAN	Community Agriculture and Nutrition project (a project of TBBC)
CBOs	community-based organizations
CC	Camp Committee
CCA	Camp Coordination Agency
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management (an IASC cluster)
CCEC	Camp Committee Election Commission
CCSDPT	Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand
CEAB	Community Elders Advisory Board
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CL	Camp Leader
CMP	Camp Management Project
CMSP	Camp Management Support Program
CoC	Code of Conduct
DKBA	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
EC	European Commission
EC	Executive Committee
EFCG	Environmental Forest Conservation Group
EVI	extremely vulnerable individuals
GBV	gender-based violence
GRP	general refugee population
HRR	Humanitarian Response Review
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDPs	internally displaced people
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KCRC	Karen Christian Refugee Committee (later became KRC)
KHWA	Karen Health and Welfare Association (a CBO)
KnED	Karenni Education Department (a CBO)
KNHD	Karenni Health Department (a CBO)
KNPP	Karenni National People’s Party
KnRC	Karenni Refugee Committee
KNU	Karen National Union
KNWO	Karenni National Women’s Organization (a CBO)
KNYO	Karenni National Youth Organization (a CBO)
KRC	Karen Refugee Committee
KSNG	Karen Student Network Group (a CBO)
KSU	Karenni Student Union (a CBO)
KWO	Karen Women’s Organization (a CBO)
KYO	Karen Youth Organization (a CBO)
LAC	Legal Assistance Center project (a project of IRC, funded in part by UNHCR)
ML	Mae La (one of the nine Burmese refugee camps; located in Tak)
MRML	Mae Ra Ma Luang (1 of the 9 Burmese refugee camps; located in Mae Hong Son)
MLO	Mae La Oon (1 of the 9 Burmese refugee camps; located in Mae Hong Son)
MOI	Ministry of Interior (ministry of the Royal Thai Government)
MWA	Muslim Women’s Association (a CBO)

MYA	Muslim Youth Association (a CBO)
n/a	not available
NA	new arrival
NCCA	National Council of Churches of Australia
NEFCC	NuPo Environmental Forest Conservation Committee
NGO	non-governmental organization
NP	Nu Po (one of the nine Burmese refugee camps; located in Tak)
NSC	National Security Council (an agency of the Royal Thai Government)
OCDP	Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons (an agency of MOI)
Or sor	Transliteration of the Thai acronym for Territorial Defence Volunteer
OTOP	One Tambon One Product (a program of the Royal Thai Government)
PKLCC	Po Karen Literacy and Culture Committee (a CBO)
PSAE	Prevention of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation
RC	Refugee Committee
RTG	Royal Thai Government
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
Site 1	Ban Mai Nai Soi (1 of the 9 Burmese refugee camps; located in Mae Hong Son)
Site 2	Ban Mae Surin (1 of the 9 Burmese refugee camps; located in Mae Hong Son)
SL	Sections Leader
TBBC	Thailand Burma Border Consortium
TCC	Thai Camp Commanders
TH	Tham Hin (1 of the 9 Burmese refugee camps; located in Ratchaburi)
TORs	Terms of Reference
UM	Umpiem Mai (1 of the 9 Burmese refugee camps; located in Tak)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
US	United States
WCC	Women's Community Center (a CBO)
ZOA	Zuidoost-Azië (Dutch for Southeast Asia) (a Netherlands-based humanitarian NGO)



## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – ENGLISH**

### **Introduction**

This report summarizes the findings of a formative evaluation of camp management in the Burmese refugee camps in Thailand. The report is divided into the following sections: background, purposes, methodology, findings, lessons and recommendations. Carried out in 2011-2012, the evaluation was commissioned jointly by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and Act for Peace (Australia).

### **Background**

It appears that Myanmar has embarked on an important period of political and economic transition. As western governments begin to ease their sanctions, and investors position themselves to increase their activity in the country, most stakeholders are treating the current political aperture with both optimism and caution. Among other challenges in the years ahead, the complex process of repatriation and resettlement of Burmese refugees outside the country's borders must be planned and then managed effectively and efficiently. Geography, ethnicity, language, gender and religion are among the many sensitive factors that must be handled with care in reintegrating refugee populations into the Burmese nation. It is clear that throughout this transition period, and particularly over the next five to ten years, bolstering the qualities of adaptation and resilience need to be one of the highest priorities for success across all sectors and institutions of Myanmar society.

One adaptive and resilient system that has demonstrated its value and which could be of considerable relevance to the success of the repatriation and resettlement process is that of the camp management system in the Burmese refugee camps in Thailand. Evolving over the past 25 years, this community-based approach to camp management has involved refugees and refugee structures in the day-to-day management of the camps, sought to promote self-reliance among displaced peoples, and, in so doing, has provided its participants with experience and skills that could be helpful in Burma's longer term nation-building process.

Presently, the system manages nine camps serving 140,000 refugees belonging mostly to the Karen (primarily in seven camps) and Karenni (primarily in two camps) ethnic groups. Although the camp management system has recorded some impressive successes, it also has come under considerable stress, especially over the past five years. Beginning in 2008, a series of reviews by donors which are supporting programs in the camps, identified issues of concern and the need for changes to the system. Commissioned in 2011 by CIDA, AusAID and Act for Peace, the present evaluation sought to examine these concerns and assess the appropriateness of the camp management model in the present context.

### **Purposes**

The purposes of this formative evaluation were three-fold:

- 1) to facilitate a constructive dialogue among stakeholders on the issue of camp management in refugee camps situated on the Thai-Burma border;
- 2) to comprehensively and accurately describe the current camp management model that is in place; and
- 3) to identify areas where improvements and changes should be initiated.

More specifically, the terms of reference of the study directed the evaluation team to document the history and evolution of the model, to assess the effectiveness of the coverage of its responsibilities, to assess the

extent to which the work of the management structures is in compliance with international standards, and to foster dialogue between partners about the model, based on documented evidence.

## **Methodology**

The methodology employed by the evaluation team was focussed on utilization and emphasized stakeholder engagement. In addition to document review and key-person interviews with representatives of donor agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the Royal Thai Government (RTG), data were collected in the nine camps through a series of workshops and focus groups with a large sample of randomly selected refugees themselves, including special discussion groups for minorities, women and youth (girls and boys). An 11-member team of foreign and local researchers facilitated these discussions. Some 545 general residents of the camps were consulted, together with 308 refugee managers and representatives of community-based organizations working in the camps. In addition, the evaluation team interviewed 50 RTG officials inside and outside the camps, 57 shop owners inside and outside the camps, and 69 individuals located near the camps: owners of estates, large farms, resorts and restaurants, as well as general community members. Overall, the evaluation team gathered data through direct interactions with approximately 1,060 informants in and around the camps under study when representatives of the UN, international NGOs and Refugee Committees are included.

The evaluation has several limitations. In particular, with its strong focus on camp-level data collection, the evaluation team devoted relatively less time to the broader level of the coordination of humanitarian assistance across the camps. Indeed, the camp-level work proved to be more labour-intensive and complex than expected. Factors here included the geographic dispersion of the camps and the two Refugee Committees, the leadership change in a key organization, delays in certain approvals at the camp level, and the availability of local personnel fluent in Karenni as a result of delays. Nonetheless, in spite of these and other constraints, the evaluation team is confident that the findings and recommendations presented here are accurate and appropriate.

It is also important to recognize that this evaluation did not directly focus on a key dimension of camp management - the role and performance of the Royal Thai Government agencies and representatives. The RTG holds the ultimate authority and responsibility over the camps and their management. A condition for this evaluation to proceed was that the focus would be primarily on the refugee-based management structures and not on the role and performance of RTG agencies and representatives. Where issues related to the role and performance of various Thai officials are pertinent, they have been noted in the report. While some of the findings would seem to point to obvious recommendations to the RTG, we have refrained from doing so since it was not of the purview of this report to address recommendations to the RTG.

Finally, the evaluation validation process had to be curtailed due to budgetary constraints which led to replacing the validation mission that had been planned with a series of video and audio conferences with key stakeholder groups in Thailand: the DHAWG, the RCs and the OCDP/MOI. This final version of the report reflects much of the feedback received during these sessions. However, interested readers can also consult Annex 12 of this longer version of the report for a summary of the discussions that took place during these validation sessions.

## Findings

### *Understanding the Camp Management Model*

As it has evolved in the nine camps on the Thai border, the camp management model is composed of three clusters<sup>1</sup> of responsibility, each comprising a network of sub-component organizations. How the model functions overall is influenced by the capacity and performance of sub-component organizations in each of the clusters, as well as their effectiveness in coordinating within their cluster and across clusters.

In the “camp cluster” (our term), are the organizations concerned with the delivery of services to the camps themselves. At the core of this cluster are the two Refugee Committees (RCs) and nine Camp Committees (CCs). Under each of the CCs and reporting to them are section leaders supported by section committees. These structures are supported by international NGOs whose main programs involve health and sanitation, education; food, shelter and non-food support, as well as management support, provided by the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC); and protection, provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and more recently in five of the nine camps by a special International Rescue Committee (IRC) project, the Legal Assistance Centres (LAC). The NGOs operating in the camps are coordinated by the Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), which also acts as the interface between these NGOs and the Royal Thai Government (RTG).

A second cluster in the system is the “donor cluster” (again, our term). Here the donor countries, often through their embassies in Bangkok, participate in the Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group (DHAWG). The major donors include the United States and the European Union. The Working Group, in turn, coordinates and shares information with the CCSDPT and its programs, liaises with UNHCR, and also consults and coordinates with key actors in the Royal Thai Government (RTG). In contrast, however, funds flow directly from individual donor agencies through the TBBC or through NGO service providers to the camps.

The third cluster involves the Royal Thai Government (we call it the “RTG cluster”). The main actors here include the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Thai Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and MOI’s Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons (OCDP), which is tasked to approve CCSDPT member plans, and work with UNHCR and other bodies. Reporting to the MOI are the four Governors of the provinces in which the camps are located, with Deputy District Officers (the title for Thai Camp Commanders) reporting via their District Offices to their respective Governor’s Office. Thai Camp Commanders interact directly with and retain ultimate authority over Camp Committees and their sub-structures.

For most of the past two decades, this set of actors has evolved in their relationships and have, collectively, constituted a kind of eco-system. That eco-system has generally functioned in an adaptive and resilient manner, responding and adjusting to new players and needs as conditions have changed, and mobilizing resources to achieve the objectives of its constituent parts. For much of its history, this eco-system has operated generally effectively because, in our view, of two main factors: first, a common vision and set of values; and, second, mutual trust. At the centre of these positive working relationships was a commitment to the welfare of the refugees and the value and practice of transparency.

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<sup>1</sup> The use of the term ‘cluster’ in this instance should not be confused with the *cluster approach* introduced by the IASC in its response to the 2005 UN *Humanitarian Response Review* and discussed in Section 3.3.1 of this report.

## ***Perceptions of Refugees and Their Leaders in the Camps***

There is considerable consistency across camps in terms of ***how refugees perceive their lives in the camps***, both in what they appreciate and the challenges they face. Furthermore, there is also considerable consistency across categories of residents of the camps (women, minorities, youth) and between categories and the general population. In fact, the evaluation found that there does not seem, for the most part, to be systematic discrimination against minorities in the camps. Nor did women register significantly different perceptions about camp life from those of men. For their part, however, youth did express a higher degree of concern for their future prospects and lack of opportunity for further schooling, and greater concern with the issue of substance abuse.

With respect to the role of ***refugee management structures***, the general population is aware of the limitations of these committees to resolve many of the challenges faced in the camps. Indeed, refugees demonstrate a good sense of what their leaders are able to do and what is beyond the capacity of their leaders to change. Refugees also show quite a clear sense of the duties of their camp leaders. Furthermore, they know what they want in their leaders: residents of the camps generally seek leaders with a good level of education, the capacity to work in more than one language, strong character traits, and effective ways of relating to the population. Overall, for the most part, refugees are positive in their assessment of their management structures. While there are some expected differences in specific issues identified across camps, residents do not call into question the refugee camp management model per se.

Moreover, the refugees engaged for this evaluation display a good recollection and understanding of the ***election processes*** carried out in 2010. However, they observe that there are challenges to be addressed, notably giving “unregistered” refugees the right to vote. We also note the need for further improvements in women’s representation, and finding mechanisms to give voice to the concerns of key categories, especially minorities and youth.

For their part, ***refugee leaders*** have a clear understanding about their roles and responsibilities, which align well with the job descriptions which guide their efforts in the camp management system. Most of the major challenges they face are beyond their capacity to address solely at the camp management level. Instead, such issues must be addressed at the broader level of coordination of humanitarian assistance.

## ***Other Key Issues in Camp Management***

With regard to ***protection and access to justice***, refugees and their leaders are aware of the importance of work in this area. However, there is also some resistance to these efforts. One challenge is that the judiciary must be separated from the executive in the refugee justice system. A second is the need for security personnel to be supported by innovative programs with new ways of dealing with delinquent youth, an issue that is growing in prevalence.

In terms of ***camp-level coordination***, there is information sharing but a lack of consultation on program planning and priority setting in some sectors. Further, a more strategic, camp-wide look at unmet needs and gaps has only recently been a focus of monthly coordination meetings. Some international NGOs, such as those in the health sector, have not made it regular practice to consult CCs and RCs on decisions on program priorities or budget cuts.

With regard to ***service delivery and monitoring***, CCs and RCs are doing well in areas where they have direct responsibility, such as keeping track of population figures, warehousing and distribution of rations, maintaining basic infrastructure, and maintaining peace and order within the camps. It is less clear, however, that the CCs and RCs have sufficient technical capacity to monitor and ensure standards in specialized sectors such as education and health.

The refugee camp management system is generally perceived as positive by other **stakeholders**, especially in light of a number of changes in recent years, including improvements in the election processes. Given the many changes in leadership positions in the camp structures as a result of the elections and third-country resettlement, external stakeholders see an ongoing role for capacity building. For its part, UNHCR has been mainly engaging with these structures around the protection agenda, and, while supportive of these structures, believes that, as part of its protection mandate, there is a continued need for vigilance about the potential interference of non-state actors on them. To support the strengthening of these structures, an area where the UNHCR could make a valuable contribution is in advocating that RTG explicitly recognize these structures as legitimate governance and management structures of the refugee population, make explicit the responsibilities and the authority that have been devolved to them, and make explicit the terms that govern their relationships with the RTG.

The evaluation also examined the **impact of the refugee camps on neighbouring Thai communities**. Such impacts, either positive or negative, are not a major challenge for the camp management structures. Issues that arise between the camps and the local Thai communities seem to be effectively mediated between the CCs and community leaders by the Thai Camp Commanders. However, there are concerns by some representatives of other RTG agencies (Forestry Department, Police and Army) that the Thai Camp Commanders and Ministry of Interior are not actually effectively applying RTG policy regarding the camps, particularly with respect to movements of refugees in and out of many of the camps. Some Thai Camp Commanders note that some policies are a challenge to implement given that the camps are not set up as fenced-in prisons with security perimeters, and that the camps should not be set up as prisons since refugees are not criminal convicts.

The evaluation also examined the question of whether the camp management system is meeting **international standards and norms** for the humanitarian assistance of refugees. On the whole, the team found that these norms and principles are understood and are guiding the refugee management structures and other agencies working with the refugees in the camp management system. There are, though, some problems identified by stakeholders. One involves the large number of unregistered refugees (more than 50% in some of the larger camps), whose lack of official status renders them more vulnerable. There is also the case where TBBC rice was provided by RCs to combatants who, in exchange, provided security around camp perimeters; this is no longer happening, but the parties involved were not transparent about it when it was. Concerns regarding the practices and transparency and accountability of some Thai Camp Commanders were also raised with the evaluators by different parties.

The provision of explicit support to camp management is relatively recent. For the first twenty years, neither the UNHCR nor any of the NGOs took (or could take) any responsibility or provide any support to camp management, but only engaged with the communities as it related to direct service provision. The task of providing such support fell to TBBC which, because of its commitment to refugee empowerment and its strong relationships of trust with the RCs, was best positioned to undertake this work. Much progress has been made since the situation was first examined in 2003: Clear management and governance structures and processes are in place and standardized across the camps. Clear job descriptions exist for all positions within these structures, and extensive training and capacity building for all concerned have been provided. And Codes of Conduct have been adopted by both RCs for all refugees occupying positions within these structures. However, challenges remain with respect to management capacities, notably due to substantial turnover of former leaders occupying key positions as a result of resettlement and periodic elections. Further, new challenges will emerge as attention turns towards the eventual repatriation of the population. Going forward, therefore, it is imperative the donor community more explicitly acknowledge that camp management is a sector in its own right that must be guided strategically and supported financially.

One of the issues at the level humanitarian assistance coordination that has hurt the performance and credibility of the camp management system is a decline in *mutual trust* that had been critical to the effectiveness and the resilience of the response over the years. TBBC's knowledge of the provision of rice by RCs to combatants (in exchange for providing security around camp perimeters) was not initially shared with the donor group, and the level of trust between the parties fell markedly, triggering concerns and a series of reviews. This mutual trust must be, and is being, rebuilt. We believe that one of the contributing factors here is the general asymmetry of knowledge between TBBC and other long-term players on the ground, and the donors, whose personnel change frequently. Among other things, the donors need to increase their independent knowledge on the ground on a permanent basis.

## **Lessons**

Three overarching lessons arising from this assessment are worth noting:

- 1) *There is deep potential for self-governance and self-management in refugee communities.* The experience of the camp management system in the refugee camps along the Thai border shows that refugee management structures can work. This is true at the level of the individual camp. And it is also true, in this experience at least, at the supra-camp level, where refugee structures established common camp mechanisms and policies, provided guidance and leadership, and negotiated with outside stakeholders, including local governments, donor agencies and service providers. Moreover, the experience reviewed here showed that refugee management structures can adapt to changing conditions and needs over time. In fact, in many ways, they function very much as resilient eco-systems. To be sure, refugee management structures also experience stress and must be regularly revised, retooled and otherwise strengthened. At its most general level, enabling refugees to exert as much control as possible over their own lives and livelihoods through self-management is an important affirmation of the essential humanity of refugee populations.
- 2) *Shared values and vision, and mutual trust, form the foundation of effective refugee camp management.* Early on in the case reviewed here, efforts were made by the major stakeholders to develop a common vision and set of values upon which the camp management model would be built. One of these values, in particular, was transparency. Furthermore, there were equally serious efforts made by the parties to establish and maintain mutual respect and trust. In combination, these factors provided the bedrock upon which many gains were made by the camp management system. Over the past five years, it is evident that, because of both internal and external dynamics, the shared values and trust among the actors had weakened. This weakened state requires key changes and improvements in the system. However, if such changes are made in a forthright and timely manner, it is very likely that the camp management system will emerge stronger and will continue to provide value to refugees, government agencies and other development actors alike.
- 3) *Camp management and governance skills and experience may promote nation-building in the repatriation effort.* This is less of a lesson and more of an expectation. The building of leadership skills in political decision-making and in public administration through the hands-on experience of camp management could serve refugee populations and receiving communities well. Assuming that issues related to region and ethnicity can be managed in an orderly and peaceful manner as refugees return, it is likely that refugee leaders with camp management experience would be qualified to run for public office or take up appointments as government officials in their locality. In other words, camp management structures have functioned as “public administration schools.” And, for the broader refugee population on the Thai border, camp management structures have animated an experience of citizenship—narrowly defined, but quite

real nonetheless. Both of these experiences—of public leadership and of citizenship—will be carried into and will hopefully strengthen Burma’s transition process.

## **Recommendations**

In light of these findings and lessons, it is recommended that:

### ***At Camp Management Level***

- 1) All NGO service providers working in the camps consult fully with refugee management structures, as the legitimate governance structures of the refugee population, in decisions related to priority setting, program planning, program implementation and budget reductions. *Lead: NGO service providers.*
- 2) All agencies working in the camps should participate in the monthly coordination meetings at the camp level and strengthen the strategic role of these meetings in identifying gaps and emerging needs and how these can be addressed in a timely fashion. *Lead: Camp Committees.*
- 3) While continuing to require that the RCs and CCs meet the highest standards regarding the protection of each and all refugees and the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps, UNHCR actively advocate with the RTG that:
  - (1) the RTG explicitly recognize the RCs and CCs as legitimate governance and management structures of the refugee (*aka* displaced persons population); and
  - (2) the RTG make clear and explicit the responsibilities and authority that it has devolved to the RCs and CCs in the day-to-day running of the camps (*aka* temporary shelter areas) and the terms that govern the relationships between these structures and RTG agencies and representatives. *Lead: UNHCR.*
- 4) The RCs and CCs ensure that all adults in the camps (as determined by TBBC’s verified caseload numbers), registered or unregistered, be given the right to vote in the 2013 elections. (If the RTG continues to object to unregistered residents voting, then the camp structures should find other ways of ensuring that the voice and concerns of this constituency are heard). *Leads: Refugee Committees and Camp Committees.*
- 5) The RCs, CCs and election committees at both the camp and RC levels take the necessary measures to ensure that the current minimum quota of 33% women on camp management structures is met and, preferably, surpassed. This includes measures to offset, minimize or eliminate deterrents to women’s participation (e.g., long hours away from home).<sup>2</sup> *Leads: Refugee Committees and Camp Committees.*
- 6) The RCs and CCs institute mechanisms, including direct minority representation or minority advisory bodies, to ensure that the voices of ethnic and religious minorities are heard and that their special needs are given due consideration. *Leads: Refugee Committees and Camp Committees.*
- 7) The RCs and CCs should put in place mechanisms (e.g., a camp public forum) for consulting youth about their ideas and concerns, encouraging young people to participate in activities that would benefit youth and the community as a whole. *Leads: Refugee Committees and Camp Committees.*
- 8) UNHCR, RTG and IRC/LAC, in collaboration with the RCs, i) support a clearer identification and delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the various parties with respect to protection

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<sup>2</sup> Recommendations 5, 6 and 7 focus on the formal refugee management structures and do not explicitly speak of the role of CBOs. The evaluation team recognizes that there are a number of CBOs currently active in the camps and that, as civil society organizations of the refugee population, they play an important role in the provision of certain services, allow refugees to organize and build capacity and leadership in certain areas and, within democratic settings, often play an important role as critiques and watch-dogs of formal management and governance structures. The current CBOs in the camps are important resources and structures that the CCs and RCs should draw on, where appropriate, in responding to these recommendations.

and access to justice; and ii) strengthen the capacity of the camp justice system and camp security in their complementary roles of maintaining peace, order and the rule of law and dealing with petty crimes and infractions of camp rules.

Furthermore, that these parties endeavour to find the necessary resources to expand these ‘protection and access to justice’ activities to all nine camps from the current five.

*Leads: UNHCR, RTG and IRC/LAC.*

- 9) UNHCR, RTG and IRC/LAC continue their support of the RCs to revise and roll out an updated set of camp rules and regulations as soon as possible, and ensure that the roll-out includes an effective process of public education of the population in the camps about the nature and purpose of these rules and regulations and how they must be consistent with and remain subservient to overarching Thai law. *Leads: UNHCR, RTG and IRC/LAC.*

### ***At the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Level***

- 10) In the context of the transition process beginning in Myanmar, and the associated priority of refugee repatriation, the Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group (DHAWG) invest in a facilitation process that would identify and then rectify any dysfunctions in the workings of the complex of agencies operating at this level. *Lead: DHAWG and lead donor agency.*
- 11) The effectiveness and efficiency of the DHAWG itself be enhanced through the establishment of a small secretariat that would provide the donor community with ongoing support, coordination, continuity, timely information and independent analysis. *Lead: DHAWG and lead donor agency.*
- 12) The Refugee Committees be recognized as the legitimate representatives of refugees in the nine camps and be formally involved in the planning and priority setting processes of the DHAWG. *Lead: DHAWG Chair.*
- 13) DHAWG formally endorse the leadership role played by TBBC with respect to supporting and strengthening the refugee management structures, and ensure that adequate financial resources are earmarked for the capacity building and general operations of these structures and that an appropriate agency is engaged to provide oversight of the camp management dimension of the humanitarian assistance. *Lead: DHAWG and lead donor agency.*
- 14) UNHCR be requested by the DHAWG to take on a leadership role on behalf of the donor community in developing a coordinated approach in preparation for the repatriation of Burmese refugees. *Leads: DHAWG and UNHCR.*
- 15) In the context of transition planning for the repatriation of refugees, DHAWG commission a more detailed strategic analysis of ways and means in which the camp management model, and in particular, its experience, lessons, tools and capacities can make an optimum contribution to Burma’s nation-building efforts over the next five to ten years. *Lead: DHAWG and lead donor agency.*

We propose that the *Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand* take responsibility for animating and tracking action related to the nine recommendations at the camp management level. We further propose that the *DHAWG* as a whole take responsibility for tracking action related to the six recommendations at the humanitarian assistance coordination level and that it identify within its membership an agency or agencies to take the lead for each of the recommendations where such is not identified.

## **Conclusion**

The evaluation found that the camp management system has generally worked well and is a valuable model of participation and administration of refugee affairs. Its structures are generally regarded as legitimate and effective by the refugee population. But the system is under stress and steps must be taken to strengthen it at both the camp level and the broader coordination level, to strengthen the system and



improve the environment within which it operates. As a tool for the well-being and governance of the 140,000 refugees in the camps along the Thai border, the camp management system is worthy of further investment and improvement. It is also likely to prove to be a valuable touchstone for the nation-building efforts, including the repatriation process, by the people and institutions of Burma in the years ahead.

*Adaptation, Resilience and Transition: Report of the Formative Evaluation of Camp Management in the Burmese Refugee Camps in Thailand – Long Report*

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – FRENCH**

### **Adaptation, résilience et transition : Rapport sur l'évaluation formative de la gestion des camps dans les camps de réfugiés birmans en Thaïlande**

## **SOMMAIRE**

### **Introduction**

Le présent rapport résume les conclusions d'une évaluation formative de la gestion de camp dans les camps de réfugiés birmans en Thaïlande. Le rapport se divise en six parties : le contexte, l'objet, la méthodologie, les constatations, les leçons à tirer et les recommandations. Effectuée en 2011-2012, l'évaluation a été commandée conjointement par l'Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI), l'Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) et Act for Peace (Australie).

### **Contexte**

Le Myanmar semble être entré dans une importante période de transition politique et économique. Alors que les gouvernements occidentaux commencent à relâcher leurs sanctions, et que les investisseurs se positionnent pour augmenter leur niveau d'activité dans le pays, la plupart des intervenants traitent la présente ouverture politique à la fois avec optimisme et circonspection. Parmi d'autres défis, dans les années à venir, le processus complexe de rapatriement et de réinstallation des Birmans réfugiés à l'extérieur des frontières du pays doit être planifié, puis géré de façon effective et efficiente. La géographie, l'ethnicité, la langue, le sexe et la religion font partie des nombreux facteurs sensibles qu'on devra traiter avec soin dans la réintégration des populations réfugiées dans la nation birmane. Il est clair que tout au long de cette période de transition, et particulièrement au cours des cinq à dix prochaines années, le soutien des qualités d'adaptation et de résilience devra être l'une des plus grandes priorités attachées au succès recherché à travers tous les secteurs et toutes les institutions de la société du Myanmar.

Un système adaptatif et résilient qui a démontré sa valeur et qui pourrait être d'une pertinence considérable pour le succès du processus de rapatriement et de réinstallation, c'est celui du système de gestion des camps dans les camps de réfugiés birmans en Thaïlande. En évolution pendant les 25 dernières années, cette approche à base communautaire a mis à contribution les réfugiés et les structures de réfugiés dans la gestion du jour le jour des camps, a cherché à promouvoir l'auto-suffisance chez les personnes déplacées et, ce faisant, a donné à ceux qui y ont participé l'expérience et les compétences qui pourraient être utiles dans le processus à plus long terme de reconstruction de la nation en Birmanie.

Présentement le système gère neuf camps desservant 140 000 réfugiés appartenant pour la plupart aux groupes ethniques Karen (principalement dans sept camps) et Karenni (principalement dans deux camps). Si le système de gestion des camps a enregistré quelques succès impressionnants, il a aussi fait face à beaucoup de stress, particulièrement ces cinq dernières années. À compter de 2008, une série d'exams effectués par les donateurs qui soutiennent des programmes opérant dans les camps ont identifié des problèmes préoccupants et le besoin de changements au système. Commandée en 2011 par l'ACDI, AusAID et Act for Peace, la présente évaluation a cherché à examiner ces préoccupations et à évaluer la pertinence du modèle de gestion de camps dans le contexte actuel.

## **Objet**

L'objet de cette évaluation formative était triple :

- 1) faciliter un dialogue constructif parmi les intervenants sur la question de la gestion de camps dans les camps de réfugiés situés à la frontière Thaïlande/Birmanie ;
- 2) décrire de façon détaillée et exacte le modèle de gestion de camps qui est actuellement en place ;  
et
- 3) identifier les domaines où il y aurait lieu de faire des améliorations et d'instaurer des changements.

Plus précisément, le mandat de l'étude demandait à l'équipe d'évaluation de documenter l'histoire et l'évolution du modèle, d'évaluer l'efficacité de la couverture de ses responsabilités, d'évaluer dans quelle mesure le travail des structures de gestion respecte les normes internationales et de favoriser entre les partenaires le dialogue sur le modèle, sur la base d'une preuve documentée.

## **Méthodologie**

La méthodologie employée par l'équipe d'évaluation était centrée sur l'utilisation des résultats et a mis l'accent sur l'engagement des intervenants. En plus d'un examen de documents et d'entrevues auprès de personnes clés des représentants des organismes donateurs, d'organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) et du gouvernement royal de la Thaïlande (Royal Thai Government - RTG), des données ont été recueillies dans les neuf camps par le biais d'une série d'ateliers et de groupes de discussion réunissant un échantillon volumineux de réfugiés choisis de façon aléatoire, ainsi que de groupes de discussion spéciaux à l'intention des minorités, des femmes et des jeunes (filles et garçons). Une équipe de 11 membres composée de chercheurs étrangers et locaux a animé ces discussions. Quelque 545 résidents généraux des camps furent consultés, ainsi que 308 réfugiés gestionnaires et des représentants des organismes communautaires qui travaillaient dans les camps. En plus, l'équipe d'évaluation a interviewé 50 fonctionnaires du RTG à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur des camps, 57 petits commerçants à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur des camps, et 69 individus situés à proximité des camps : propriétaires de domaines, de fermes, de centres de villégiature et de restaurants, ainsi que des membres de la collectivité générale. Dans l'ensemble, l'équipe d'évaluation a recueilli des données par le truchement d'interactions directes avec environ 1 060 informateurs de l'intérieur et des alentours des camps à l'étude, un fois qu'on y inclut les représentants de l'ONU, des ONG internationales et des comités de réfugiés (RC).

L'évaluation a plusieurs limites. En particulier, étant donné l'importance de l'accent mis sur la cueillette de données au niveau du camp, l'équipe d'évaluation a consacré relativement moins de temps au niveau plus large de la coordination de l'aide humanitaire à travers les camps. De fait, le travail au niveau des camps s'est avéré plus exigeant en main-d'œuvre et plus complexe qu'on s'y attendait. Les facteurs, ici, étaient notamment la dispersion géographique des camps et les deux comités de réfugiés, le changement à la direction d'un organisme clé, des délais de certaines approbations au niveau des camps et, suite à ces délais, la disponibilité de personnel local s'exprimant couramment en karen. Néanmoins, malgré ces contraintes et d'autres, l'équipe d'évaluation est convaincue que les constatations et les recommandations présentées ici sont exactes et appropriées.

Il est également important de reconnaître que cette évaluation ne s'est pas penchée directement sur une dimension essentielle de la gestion des camps – le rôle et le rendement des organismes et représentants du RTG. Le RTG détient l'autorité et la responsabilité ultimes sur les camps et leur gestion. Une des conditions pour que la présente évaluation puisse procéder, ce fut que l'accent serait principalement mis sur les structures de gestion à base de réfugiés et non sur le rôle et la performance des organismes et des représentants du RTG. Dans les cas où le rôle et la performance de divers représentants thaï sont pertinents, ils ont été notés dans le rapport. Même si quelques-unes des constatations semblent indiquer

des recommandations évidentes à l'endroit du RTG, nous nous sommes abstenus de le faire puisqu'il n'était pas du ressort de ce rapport d'adresser des recommandations au RTG.

En terminant, le processus de validation de l'évaluation a dû être écourté à cause de contraintes budgétaires qui ont mené au remplacement de la mission de validation qui avait été prévue par une série de conférences vidéo et audio avec des parties prenantes essentielles en Thaïlande : le DHAWG, les RC et l'OCDP/MOI. Cette version finale du rapport reflète beaucoup du retour d'information reçu pendant ces séances. Toutefois, les lecteurs intéressés peuvent également consulter l'Annexe 12 de la version longue du rapport, où ils trouveront un sommaire des discussions qui ont eu lieu pendant ces séances de validation.

## **Constats**

### ***La compréhension du modèle de gestion des camps***

Tel qu'il a évolué dans les neufs camps sis à la frontière thaïlandaise, le modèle de gestion des camps se compose de trois agglomérats<sup>3</sup> de responsabilités, chacun composé d'un réseau d'organisations sous-composantes. La façon dont le modèle fonctionne dans son ensemble est influencée par la capacité et la performance d'organisations sous-composantes dans chacun des agglomérats, ainsi que par leur efficacité dans la coordination au sein de leur agglomérat et entre les agglomérats.

Dans « l'agglomérat de camps » (notre terminologie), il existe des organisations qui ont pour fonction la prestation de services aux camps eux-mêmes. Au cœur de cet agglomérat, il y a deux comités de réfugiés (RC) et neuf comités de camps (CC). Sous chacun des CC, et relevant d'eux, il y a des chefs de sections appuyés par des comités de sections. Ces structures sont soutenues par des ONG internationales dont les programmes principaux portent sur la santé et l'assainissement, l'éducation, l'alimentation, l'abri et le soutien non alimentaire, ainsi que le soutien de gestion, offert par le Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) ; et la protection, dispensée par le Haut-commissaire des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (UNHCR) et, plus récemment dans cinq des neuf camps, par un projet du Comité international de secours (IRC), les centres d'aide juridique (LAC). Les ONG qui opèrent dans les camps sont coordonnées par le comité de coordination des services aux personnes déplacées en Thaïlande (CCSDPT), qui agit également comme interface entre ces ONG et le gouvernement royal de Thaïlande (RTG).

« L'agglomérat des donateurs » (là encore, notre terminologie) constitue un deuxième agglomérat dans le système. Ici les pays donateurs, souvent par l'intermédiaire de leurs ambassades à Bangkok, participent au groupe de travail des agents donateurs d'aide humanitaire (DHAWG). Les principaux donateurs sont les États-Unis et l'Union européenne. Le groupe de travail, à son tour, coordonne et partage l'information avec le CCSDPT et ses programmes, fait la liaison avec le UNHCR et effectue une consultation et une coordination avec des intervenants clés du gouvernement royal thaïlandais (RTG). Par contre, les fonds vont toutefois directement des organismes donateurs individuels vers les camps, à travers le TBBC ou les ONG pourvoyeurs de services.

Le troisième agglomérat touche le gouvernement royal thaïlandais (nous l'appelons « l'agglomérat RTG »). Les principaux acteurs ici sont le conseil national de sécurité (National Security Council - NSC), le ministère de l'Intérieur (Ministry of the Interior - MOI), l'Armée thaïlandaise (Thai Army), le ministère des Affaires étrangères (Ministry of Foreign Affairs - MFA) et le bureau de coordination des personnes déplacées (Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons - OCDP) du MOI, qui a pour fonction d'approuver les plans des membres du CCSDPT et de travailler avec le UNHCR et d'autres

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<sup>3</sup> Ne pas confondre l'utilisation du terme "agglomérat (cluster)", dans ce cas-ci, avec la "cluster approach" introduite par l'IASC dans sa réponse à la *Humanitarian Response Review* de l'ONU en 2005 et discutée à la Section 3.3.1 du présent rapport.

organismes. Les quatre gouverneurs des provinces dans lesquelles les camps sont situés relèvent du MOI, alors que les agents adjoints de districts (Deputy District Officers – titre des commandants de camps thaïlandais) relèvent, par le biais de leurs bureaux de districts, des bureaux des gouverneurs respectifs. Les commandants de camps thaïlandais interagissent directement avec les comités de camps et leurs sous-structures, sur lesquels ils conservent l'autorité ultime.

Pendant la plus grande partie des deux dernières décennies, cet ensemble d'acteurs a évolué dans ses relations et a, collectivement, constitué une espèce d'écosystème. Cet écosystème a généralement fonctionné d'une façon adaptative et résiliente en réagissant et en s'ajustant aux nouveaux acteurs et aux nouveaux besoins à mesure que les conditions changeaient et en mobilisant les ressources qu'il fallait pour atteindre les objectifs de ses parties constituantes. Pour une grande part de son histoire, cet écosystème a fonctionné d'une façon généralement efficace à cause, à notre avis, de deux facteurs principaux : le premier, une vision commune et un ensemble de valeurs communes, et le deuxième, une confiance mutuelle. Au centre de ces relations de travail positives s'est trouvé un engagement envers le bien-être des réfugiés et la valeur et la pratique de la transparence.

### ***Les perceptions des réfugiés et de leurs leaders dans les camps***

Il y a à travers les camps une très grande uniformité quant à la façon dont les réfugiés perçoivent leur vie dans les camps, tant pour ce qu'ils apprécient que pour les défis auxquels ils font face. De plus, on trouve également beaucoup d'uniformité à travers les catégories de résidents des camps (femmes, minorités, jeunes) et entre les catégories et la population en général. En fait, l'évaluation a trouvé qu'il ne semble pas y avoir, pour la plupart, de discrimination systématique contre les minorités dans les camps. Et les femmes n'ont pas non plus enregistré des perceptions significativement différentes de celles des hommes concernant la vie des camps. Pour leur part, toutefois, les jeunes ont exprimé un niveau de préoccupation plus élevé quant à leurs possibilités d'avenir et le manque de possibilités de scolarisation et une préoccupation plus grande vis-à-vis le problème de la toxicomanie.

Quant au rôle des **structures de gestion des réfugiés**, la population en général est consciente des limites de ces comités quand il s'agit de résoudre de nombreuses difficultés auxquelles on fait face dans les camps. En effet, les réfugiés montrent qu'ils ont une bonne perception de ce que leurs chefs sont capables de faire et de ce qui est au-delà de leur capacité de changer. Les réfugiés montrent également un sens plutôt clair des tâches de leurs leaders de camps. De plus, ils savent ce qu'ils veulent chez leurs leaders : les résidents des camps cherchent généralement des leaders qui ont un bon niveau de scolarité, la capacité de travailler dans plus d'une langue, des traits de caractère solides et des façons efficaces d'entretenir des rapports avec la population. Dans l'ensemble, pour la plupart, les réfugiés sont positifs dans leur évaluation de leurs structures de gestion. Bien qu'il y ait quelques différences attendues dans des questions particulières identifiées à travers les camps, les résidents ne remettent pas en cause le modèle de gestion des réfugiés en lui-même.

De plus, les réfugiés ayant pris part à cette évaluation montrent qu'ils ont une bonne mémoire et une bonne compréhension des *processus des élections tenues* en 2010. Toutefois, ils font observer qu'il y a des défis à surmonter, et notamment celui de donner aux réfugiés « non inscrits » le droit de vote. Nous notons également le besoin d'autres améliorations dans la représentation des femmes et celui de trouver des mécanismes pour donner une voix aux préoccupations de catégories clés, et particulièrement les minorités et les jeunes.

Pour leur part, les *leaders des réfugiés* comprennent clairement leurs rôles et leurs responsabilités. Ceux-ci s'alignent bien avec les descriptions de tâches qui guident leurs efforts dans le système de gestion des camps. La plupart des principaux défis auxquels ils font face dépasse leur capacité de s'y attaquer

uniquement au niveau de la gestion des camps. Au lieu de cela, de tels problèmes doivent être traités au niveau plus large de la coordination de l'aide humanitaire.

### ***Autres questions clés concernant la gestion des camps***

Du côté de *la protection et de l'accès à la justice*, les réfugiés et leurs leaders sont conscients de l'importance du travail dans ce domaine. Toutefois, ces efforts rencontrent quelque résistance. Un des défis, c'est que le judiciaire doit être séparé de l'exécutif dans le système de la justice des réfugiés. Un autre défi, c'est la nécessité, pour le personnel de sécurité, d'être appuyé par des programmes innovateurs avec de nouvelles façons de traiter avec les jeunes délinquants, un problème qui va croissant.

En termes de *coordination au niveau des camps*, il y a un partage de l'information mais un manque de consultation sur la planification des programmes et l'établissement des priorités dans certains secteurs. De plus, ce n'est que tout récemment qu'un regard plus stratégique, au niveau du camp, sur les besoins et les lacunes restés sans réponse a eu droit de cité aux réunions de coordination mensuelles. Quelques ONG internationales, comme celles du secteur de la santé, n'ont pas fait une pratique régulière de consulter les CC et les RC sur les décisions touchant les priorités de programmes ou les coupures de budgets.

Pour ce qui est de *la prestation des services et de la surveillance*, les CC et les RC font bien dans les domaines où ils ont une responsabilité directe, comme de suivre le dénombrement de la population, l'entreposage et la distribution des rations, la maintenance de l'infrastructure de base et le maintien de la paix et de l'ordre à l'intérieur des camps. Il est cependant moins clair de savoir si les CC et les RC ont suffisamment de capacité technique pour exercer une surveillance et assurer l'application de standards dans des secteurs comme l'éducation et la santé.

Le système de gestion des camps de réfugiés est généralement perçu comme positif par les autres *intervenants*, particulièrement à la lumière d'un certain nombre de changements, ces dernières années, et notamment dans les processus de tenue des élections. Étant donné les nombreux changements dans les postes de leadership survenus dans les structures des camps suite aux élections et à la réinstallation dans un tiers pays, les intervenants externes voient là un rôle continu pour un renforcement des capacités.

Pour sa part, l'UNHCR s'est principalement engagé avec ces structures autour de l'agenda de protection, et, bien qu'il appuie ces structures, il croit que, dans le cadre de son mandat de protection, il y a un besoin continu de vigilance concernant l'interférence possible sur eux de la part d'acteurs non-étatiques. Pour soutenir le renforcement de ces structures, un domaine où UNHCR pourrait faire une contribution précieuse, c'est d'intercéder auprès du RTG pour qu'il reconnaisse explicitement ces structures comme des structures légitimes de gouvernance et de gestion de la population de réfugiés, qu'il rende explicite les responsabilités et l'autorité qui leur ont été dévolues et qu'il rende explicite les termes qui régissent leurs relations avec le RTG.

L'évaluation a également examiné *l'impact des camps de réfugiés sur les communautés thaïes avoisinantes*. Ces impacts, positifs ou négatifs, ne présentent pas un défi majeur pour les structures de gestion des camps. Les problèmes qui surviennent entre les camps et les communautés thaïes locales semblent trouver chez les commandants des camps thaïs une médiation effective entre les CC et les chefs de la communauté. Toutefois, certains représentants d'autres organismes du RTG (le ministère des forêts, la police et l'armée) s'inquiètent de ce que les commandants des camps thaïlandais et le ministère de l'Intérieur n'appliquent pas effectivement les politiques du RTG concernant les camps, particulièrement en ce qui a trait aux mouvements de réfugiés entrant et sortant de plusieurs des camps. Certains commandants de camps thaï notent que certaines politiques sont difficiles à appliquer étant donné que les camps ne sont pas établis comme des prisons ceinturées de clôtures avec périmètres de sécurité, et que les

camps ne devraient pas être établis comme des prisons puisque les réfugiés ne sont pas des criminels condamnés.

L'évaluation a aussi examiné la question de savoir si le système de gestion des camps répond *aux normes et aux standards internationaux* pour l'aide humanitaire aux réfugiés. Dans l'ensemble, l'équipe a trouvé que ces normes et ces principes sont compris et qu'ils guident les structures de gestion des réfugiés et les autres organismes qui travaillent avec des réfugiés dans le système de gestion des camps. Il y a néanmoins quelques problèmes identifiés par des intervenants. L'un de ces problèmes touche le grand nombre de réfugiés non inscrits (plus de 50 % dans certains des grands camps), dont l'absence de statut officiel les rend plus vulnérables. Il y a également le cas où du riz de TBBC a été fourni par les RC à des combattants qui, en échange, assuraient la sécurité autour du périmètre du camp ; cela ne se produit plus, mais les parties en cause n'étaient pas transparentes à ce sujet quand c'était le cas. Des préoccupations concernant les pratiques, et la transparence et la responsabilisation de certains commandants des camps thaïs, ont aussi été soulevées auprès des évaluateurs par différentes parties.

La fourniture de soutien explicite à la gestion des camps est relativement récente. Pendant les vingt premières années, ni le UNHCR, ni aucune des ONG n'ont assumé (ou n'auraient pu assumer) de responsabilité ou accordé de soutien à la gestion des camps. Ils n'ont fait que s'engager avec les communautés en ce qui avait trait à la prestation de services directs. La tâche de dispenser ce soutien incombait à TBBC qui, à cause de son engagement à la responsabilisation des réfugiés et de ses solides relations de confiance avec les RC, était le mieux positionné pour entreprendre ce travail. Il s'est fait beaucoup de progrès depuis que la situation a été examinée pour la première fois en 2003. Des processus et des structures clairs de gouvernance et de gestion sont en place et standardisés à travers les camps. Il existe des descriptions de tâches claires pour tous les postes au sein de ces structures, et un programme considérable de formation et de renforcement des capacités est fourni à tous les intervenants concernés. Et des codes de comportement ont été adoptés par les deux RC pour tous les réfugiés occupant des postes au sein de ces structures. Toutefois, des défis demeurent quant aux capacités de gestion, notamment à cause du roulement substantiel d'anciens leaders occupant des postes clés suite à la réinstallation de ceux-ci (dans des tiers pays) et aux élections périodiques. De plus, de nouvelles difficultés émergeront à mesure que l'attention se tournera vers l'éventuel rapatriement de la population. En allant de l'avant, donc, il est impératif que la communauté des donateurs reconnaisse explicitement que la gestion des camps est un secteur de plein droit qui doit être guidé stratégiquement et soutenu financièrement.

Un des problèmes au niveau de la coordination de l'aide humanitaire qui a nui à la performance et à la crédibilité du système de gestion des camps, c'est un déclin dans la *confiance mutuelle* qui avait été critique pour l'efficacité et la résilience de la réponse au cours des années. Que TBBC soit conscient de la fourniture de riz par les RC à des combattants (en échange de services de sécurité autour du périmètre des camps) et n'ait pas initialement informé le groupe des donateurs, a miné la confiance entre les parties de façon marquée, ce qui a déclenché des préoccupations et une série d'examen. Cette confiance mutuelle doit être reconstruite, et des efforts dans ce sens ont déjà été entrepris. Nous croyons aussi que l'un des facteurs contributifs, ici, c'est l'asymétrie générale des connaissances entre TBBC et d'autres acteurs à long terme sur le terrain, et les donateurs, dont le personnel change fréquemment. Parmi d'autres choses, les donateurs ont besoin d'améliorer leurs connaissances indépendantes sur le terrain sur une base permanente.

## **Leçons à dégager**

Trois grandes leçons qui se dégagent de cette évaluation valent la peine d'être notées :

- 1) *Il existe un potentiel profond, d'auto-gouvernance et d'autogestion dans les communautés de réfugiés.* L'expérience du système de gestion des camps dans les camps de réfugiés établis le long de la frontière thaïlandaise montre que les structures de gestion de réfugiés peuvent



fonctionner. C'est vrai au niveau du camp individuel. Et c'est également vrai, du moins dans la présente expérience, au niveau supérieur aux camps, où les structures de réfugiés ont établi des mécanismes et des politiques de camps communs, ont fourni des orientations et du leadership et ont négocié avec des intervenants extérieurs comme les gouvernements locaux, les organismes donateurs et les pourvoyeurs de services. De plus, l'expérience examinée ici a montré que les structures de gestion des réfugiés peuvent s'adapter à des conditions et à des besoins changeants au fil du temps. En fait, de plusieurs façons, elles fonctionnent d'une façon très semblable aux écosystèmes résilients. Bien sûr, les structures de gestion des réfugiés connaissent aussi le stress et elles doivent être régulièrement révisées, réoutillées et autrement renforcées. À son niveau le plus général, permettre aux réfugiés d'exercer le plus de contrôle possible sur leur propre vie et leurs moyens de subsistance par le biais de l'autogestion est une importante affirmation de l'humanité essentielle des populations de réfugiés.

- 2) *Les valeurs partagées et une vision commune, ainsi qu'une confiance mutuelle, forment la fondation d'une gestion efficace des camps de réfugiés.* Au tout début du cas examiné ici, des efforts ont été faits par les intervenants majeurs pour développer une vision et un ensemble de valeurs communs sur lesquels le modèle de gestion des camps serait édifié. Une de ces valeurs, en particulier, était la transparence. De plus, il y a eu des efforts également sérieux de faits par les parties pour établir et maintenir un respect et une confiance mutuels. En combinaison, ces facteurs ont fourni le fondement sur lequel de nombreux gains furent faits par le système de gestion des camps. Au cours de cinq dernières années, il est évident que, à cause de la dynamique tant interne qu'externe, les valeurs partagées et la confiance entre les acteurs s'étaient affaiblies. Cet état affaibli nécessite des changements et des améliorations clés dans le système. Toutefois, si de tels changements sont faits d'une façon honnête et avec rapidité, il est très probable que le système de gestion des camps en sortira plus fort et continuera à offrir de la valeur aux réfugiés, aux organismes gouvernementaux et autres acteurs du développement.
- 3) *Les compétences et l'expérience en gestion des camps et en gouvernance peuvent promouvoir l'édification d'une nation dans l'effort de rapatriement.* C'est moins une leçon et plus une attente. L'édification de compétences en leadership dans la prise de décision politique et dans l'administration publique par le biais de l'expérience active de la gestion de camps pourrait bien servir les populations de réfugiés et les communautés d'accueil. En supposant que les enjeux ayant rapport à la région et à l'ethnicité peuvent être gérés d'une façon ordonnée et pacifique à mesure que les réfugiés retourneront, il est probable que les leaders des réfugiés ayant une expérience de gestion des camps seraient qualifiés pour se présenter à des postes publics ou pour accepter des nominations comme fonctionnaires du gouvernement dans leur localité. Autrement dit, les structures de gestion des camps ont fonctionné comme des « écoles d'administration publique ». Et, pour la population plus large des réfugiés à la frontière de la Thaïlande, les structures de gestion des camps ont animé une expérience de citoyenneté – étroitement définie, mais néanmoins tout à fait réelle. Ces deux expériences – de leadership public et de citoyenneté—seront transportées dans le processus de transition de la Birmanie et, on l'espère, viendront renforcer celui-ci.

## **Recommandations**

À la lumière de ces constatations et de ces leçons, il est recommandé que :

### ***Au niveau de la gestion des camps***

- 1) Que toutes les ONG pourvoyeuses de services travaillant dans les camps consultent complètement les structures de gestion des réfugiés comme structures légitimes de gouvernance

de la population de réfugiés, dans les décisions ayant trait à l'établissement des priorités, à la planification des programmes, à la mise en œuvre de programmes et aux réductions de budgets. *Organisme responsable : ONG pourvoyeuses de services.*

- 2) Que tous les organismes qui travaillent dans les camps participent aux réunions de coordination mensuelles au niveau du camp et renforcent le rôle stratégique de ces réunions dans l'identification des lacunes et des besoins émergents, et de la façon dont ceux-ci peuvent être traités en temps opportun. *Organisme responsable : Comités de camps.*
- 3) Que, tout en continuant à exiger que les RC et les CC répondent aux normes les plus élevées concernant la protection de tous et chacun des réfugiés et concernant le caractère civil et humanitaire des camps, l'UNHCR intercède auprès du RTG pour qu'il :
  - 1) reconnaisse explicitement les RC et les CC comme structures légitimes de gouvernance et de gestion des réfugiés (aussi appelées populations de personnes déplacées); et
  - 2) énonce clairement et explicitement les responsabilités et l'autorité qu'il a dévolues aux RC et aux CC dans le fonctionnement au jour le jour des camps (aussi appelés aires d'abri temporaires) et les termes qui régissent les relations entre ces structures et les organismes et représentants du RTG.*Organisme responsable : UNHCR.*
- 4) Que les RC et les CC s'assurent que tous les adultes dans les camps (tel que déterminé par les chiffres vérifiés de TBBC sur les charges de cas), inscrits ou non inscrits, aient le droit de vote lors des élections de 2013. (Si le RTG continue à s'objecter au vote des non inscrits, les structures de camps devraient trouver d'autres façons de faire en sorte que les voix et les préoccupations de ces commettants puissent se faire entendre). *Organismes responsables : Comités de réfugiés et comités de camps.*
- 5) Que les RC, les CC et les comités d'élections, tant au niveau des camps qu'à celui des RC, prennent les mesures nécessaires pour garantir que le quota minimum actuel de 33 % de femmes sur les structures de gestion des camps soit atteint et, préférablement, dépassé. Cette recommandation inclut des mesures visant à compenser, minimiser ou éliminer les aspects dissuasifs à la participation des femmes (par exemple, les longues heures d'absence de la maison)<sup>4</sup>. *Organismes responsables : Comités de réfugiés et comités de camps.*
- 6) Que les RC et les CC instituent des mécanismes, y compris une représentation directe des minorités ou des organismes consultatifs des minorités, pour faire en sorte que la voix des minorités ethniques et religieuses soit entendue et que leurs besoins spéciaux soient dûment pris en considération. *Organismes responsables : Comités de réfugiés et comités de camps.*
- 7) Que les RC et les CC mettent en place des mécanismes (par exemple, un forum public de camp) pour consulter les jeunes sur leurs idées et leurs préoccupations et pour encourager ceux-ci à participer aux activités qui seraient bénéfiques aux jeunes eux-mêmes et à la communauté toute entière. *Organismes responsables : Comités de réfugiés et comités de camps.*
- 8) Que UNHCR, RTG et IRC/LAC, en collaboration avec les RC, i) soutiennent une identification et une délimitation plus claires des rôles et responsabilités des diverses parties en ce qui a trait à la protection et à l'accès à la justice, et ii) renforcent la capacité du système de justice des camps et la sécurité des camps dans leurs rôles complémentaires de maintien de la paix, de l'ordre et de la règle de droit et pour traiter des délits mineurs et des infractions aux règles des camps. De plus, que ces parties entreprennent de trouver les ressources nécessaires à l'expansion de ces

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<sup>4</sup> Les recommandations 5, 6 et 7 portent sur les structures formelles de gestion des réfugiés et ne mentionnent pas explicitement le rôle des CBO. L'équipe d'évaluation reconnaît qu'il y a un nombre de CBO présentement actives dans les camps et que, comme organisations de la société civile de la population des réfugiés, elles jouent un rôle important dans la prestation de certains services, permettent aux réfugiés de s'organiser et de bâtir une capacité et un leadership dans certains domaines et, au sein d'un décor démocratique, elles jouent souvent un rôle important comme critiques et surveillants des structures formelles de gestion et de gouvernance. Les CBO actuelles dans les camps sont des ressources et des structures importantes dont les CC et les RC devraient tirer parti, là où la chose est appropriée, dans leur réponse aux présentes recommandations.

activités de « protection et d'accès à la justice » des cinq camps actuels à l'ensemble des neuf camps. *Organismes responsables : UNHCR, RTG et IRC/LAC.*

- 9) Que UNHCR, RTG et IRC/LAC continuent à appuyer les RC pour réviser et sortir un ensemble mis à jour de règles et règlements des camps le plus tôt possible, et pour faire en sorte que la sortie inclue un processus effectif d'éducation publique de la population dans les camps concernant la nature et le but visé par ces règles et règlements et la façon dont ceux-ci doivent être conformes à la loi thaï et être au service de cette loi suprême. *Organismes responsables : UNHCR, RTG et IRC/LAC.*

### ***Au niveau de la coordination de l'aide humanitaire***

- 10) Que, dans le contexte du processus de transition qui commence au Myanmar, et de la priorité associée du rapatriement des réfugiés, le groupe de travail des agents humanitaires donateurs (Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group – DHAWG) investisse dans un processus de facilitation qui identifierait, pour ensuite la rectifier, toute dysfonction dans le fonctionnement du complexe d'organismes opérant à ce niveau. *Organisme responsable : DHAWG et l'organisme donateur responsable.*
- 11) Que l'efficacité et l'efficience de DHAWG lui-même soient rehaussées par l'établissement d'un petit secrétariat qui offrirait à la communauté des donateurs une continuité de soutien, de coordination, de permanence, d'information à temps opportun et d'analyse indépendante. *Organisme responsable : DHAWG et l'organisme donateur responsable.*
- 12) Que les comités de réfugiés soient reconnus comme les représentants légitimes des réfugiés dans les neuf camps et soient mis à contribution dans les processus de planification et d'établissement de priorités de DHAWG. *Organisme responsable : la présidence de DHAWG.*
- 13) Que DHAWG donne formellement son aval au rôle de leadership joué par TBBC à l'égard du soutien et du renforcement des structures de gestion des réfugiés et qu'il s'assure que des ressources financières adéquates soient réservées pour le renforcement des capacités et le fonctionnement général de ces structures et que l'organisme approprié soit engagé pour fournir une supervision de la dimension gestion de camp de l'aide humanitaire. *Organisme responsable : DHAWG et l'organisme donateur responsable.*
- 14) Que DHAWG demande à UNHCR d'assumer un rôle de leadership au nom de la communauté des donateurs dans le développement d'une approche coordonnée en préparation pour le rapatriement des réfugiés birmans. *Organismes responsables : DHAWG et UNHCR.*
- 15) Que, dans le contexte de la planification de la transition en vue du rapatriement des réfugiés, DHAWG commande une analyse stratégique plus détaillée des façons et des moyens par lesquels le modèle et, en particulier, son expérience, ses leçons, ses outils et ses capacités de gestion des camps peuvent apporter une contribution optimale aux efforts d'édification d'une nation birmane au cours des cinq à dix prochaines années. *Organisme responsable : DHAWG et l'organisme donateur responsable.*

Nous proposons que le *Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand/Comité de coordination des services aux personnes déplacées en Thaïlande* prenne la responsabilité d'animer et de suivre l'action reliée aux neuf recommandations au niveau de la gestion des camps. Nous proposons de surcroît que le DHAWG dans son ensemble assume la responsabilité d'exercer un suivi sur les mesures reliées aux six recommandations au niveau de la coordination de l'aide humanitaire et qu'il identifie parmi ses membres un ou plusieurs organismes pour assumer la responsabilité pour chacune des recommandations où on n'a pas identifié de meneur.

## **Conclusion**

L'évaluation a trouvé que le système de gestion des camps a, en général, bien fonctionné et que c'est un modèle valable de participation et d'administration des affaires des réfugiés. Ses structures sont généralement perçues comme légitimes et efficaces par la population des réfugiés. Mais le système est soumis à des tensions, et des mesures doivent être prises pour le renforcer au niveau des camps et au niveau plus large de la coordination, afin de renforcer le système et d'améliorer l'environnement dans lequel il opère. Comme outil pour le bien-être et la gouvernance des 140 000 réfugiés dans des camps longeant la frontière thaïlandaise, le système de gestion des camps mérite qu'on y investisse et qu'on l'améliore encore. Il est également probable qu'il s'avère être une pierre de base pour les efforts d'édification d'un pays, y compris le processus de rapatriement, par le peuple et les institutions de la Birmanie dans les années à venir.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – BURMESE

လိုက်လျောညီထွေပြောင်းလဲခြင်း၊ ခံနိုင်ရည်ရှိခြင်းနှင့် အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းခြင်း  
ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ ဒုက္ခသည်များ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အစဦး အကဲဖြတ်ချက် အစီရင်ခံစာ  
အစီရင်ခံစာ အကျဉ်းချုပ်

### နိဒါန်း

ဤအစီရင်ခံစာသည် ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းများ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်သော အကဲဖြတ်တွေ့ရှိချက်များကို အကျဉ်းချုပ် ဖော်ပြထားခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အစီရင်ခံစာကို နောက်ခံအကြောင်းအချက်၊ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်၊ အစီရင်ခံစာ ပြုစုရာ၌ အသုံးပြုသောနည်းစနစ်များ၊ တွေ့ရှိချက်များ၊ သင်ခန်းစာများနှင့် အကြံပြုတင်ပြချက်များဟူ၍ အပိုင်းများခွဲထားပါသည်။ (၂၀၁၁-၂၀၁၂) ခုနှစ်မှာ ပြုစုခဲ့သော ဤအကဲဖြတ်ချက်ကိုပြုစုရန် ကနေဒါနိုင်ငံ နိုင်ငံတကာဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးအေဂျင်စီ (Canadian International Development Agency-CIDA)၊ သြစတေးလျနိုင်ငံ နိုင်ငံတကာ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးအေဂျင်စီ (Australian Agency for International Development-AusAID)၊ သြစတေးလျနိုင်ငံအခြေစိုက် ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေး လုပ်ငန်းစဉ် အဖွဲ့ (Act for Peace - Australia)တို့က တာဝန်ပေးခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။

### နောက်ခံအကြောင်း

မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသည် အရေးကြီးသော နိုင်ငံရေးနှင့် စီးပွားရေးအသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုကာလသို့ ရောက်စပြုနေကြောင်း တွေ့ရပါသည်။ အနောက်နိုင်ငံအစိုးရများက ဒဏ်ခတ်ပိတ်ဆို့မှုများကို ဖြေလျှော့စပြုနေပြီး၊ ရင်းနှီးမြှုပ်နှံသူများကလည်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံတွင်းမှာ အင်တိုက်အားတိုက် လှုပ်ရှားကြရန် ပြင်နေကြသည်ဖြစ်ရာ၊ မြန်မာနိုင်ငံအရေးတွင် ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်နေသူ အများစုက လက်ရှိ နိုင်ငံရေး ဝင်ပေါက်ကို အကောင်းမြင်စိတ်နှင့်ရော၊ သတိမလွတ်သော စိတ်နှင့်ပါ ကြည့်မြင်နေကြလျက်ရှိသည်။ ရှေ့လာမည့်နှစ်များတွင် ကြုံတွေ့ရမည့် အခြားစိန်ခေါ်မှုများထဲတွင် ပြည်ပရောက် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား ဒုက္ခသည်များ၏ နေရပ်ရင်းပြန်ရေးနှင့် ပြန်လည်အခြေချရေးတည်းဟူသော ရှုပ်ထွေးခက်ခဲသည့် လုပ်ငန်းလည်း အပါအဝင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤလုပ်ငန်းအတွက် အစီအစဉ်ရေး ဆွဲထားရမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ထိထိရောက်ရောက်လည်း စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ ပထဝီဝင်နယ်မြေ၊ လူမျိုးစု၊ ဘာသာစကား၊ ကျား-မ၊ ဘာသာရေးပြဿနာတို့သည် အရေးကြီးသော ပြဿနာများဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ဒုက္ခသည်များကို ပြည်တွင်းသို့ ဝင်ရောက်ပေါင်း စည်းစေရာ၌ ဂရုတစိုက်ဖြေရှင်းရမည်လည်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေးကာလ တလျှောက်လုံးမှာ၊ လိုက်လျောညီထွေ ပြောင်းလဲနိုင်အောင်နှင့် ခံနိုင်ရည်ရှိအောင် ပံ့ပိုးပေးခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းသည် မြန်မာ့လူ့အဖွဲ့အစည်း၏ ကဏ္ဍစုံ၊ နေရာဌာနပေါင်းစုံမှာ အောင်မြင်မှုရရေးအတွက် အကောင်းဆုံးဦးစားပေး ဆောင်ရွက်သော လုပ်ငန်းများအနက် တခုဖြစ်သင့်ပါသည်။

အောင်မြင်ကြောင်းပြသခဲ့ပြီးလည်းဖြစ်၊ နေရပ်ရင်းပြန်ရေးနှင့် ပြန်လည်အခြေချရေးလုပ်ငန်း  
အောင်မြင်ရေးအတွက် အတော်အတန်လည်းအရေးပါနိုင်သော လိုက်လျောညီထွေပြောင်းလဲရေးနှင့်  
ခံနိုင်ရည်ရှိရေးလုပ်ငန်း စနစ်တခုကား ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံထဲရှိ မြန်မာ နိုင်ငံသားဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းများတွင်

ကျင့်သုံးနေသော ဒုက္ခသည်များ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်၏ စနစ်တရဖြစ်ပါသည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၂၅)နှစ်တာ ကာလအတွင်းမှာ တစတစ ပုံပေါ်လာခဲ့သည်ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းမှာ အခြေခံသော ဤ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်သည် နေ့စဉ် စခန်း စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုတွင် ဒုက္ခသည်များနှင့် ဒုက္ခသည်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများပါဝင်သော စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤစနစ်သည် အိုးအိမ်အခြေပျက်ခဲ့သူများအဖို့ ကိုယ့်အားကိုယ်ကိုယ်ရေးစိတ်ဓါတ် မြင့်မားလာအောင် စွမ်းဆောင်ပေးခဲ့သည်။ ဤသို့ စွမ်းဆောင်ပေးခြင်းနှင့် တပါတည်းမှာပင် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ ရေရှည် တိုင်းပြည်ပြန်လည်တည်ဆောက်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းမှာ အထောက်အကူဖြစ်စေနိုင်သည့် အတွေ့အကြုံနှင့် ကျွမ်းကျင်မှုတို့ကိုလည်း ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်သူများအား ပေးခဲ့လေသည်။

လောလောဆယ်၌ ဤစနစ်ဖြင့် ကရင် (စခန်း ၇-ခုတွင် အများစုဖြစ်သည်)နှင့် ကရင်နီ (စခန်း ၂-ခုတွင် အများစုဖြစ်သည်) လူမျိုးစုများ အများဆုံးပါဝင်သော ဒုက္ခသည်ပေါင်း (၁၄၀, ၀၀၀)နေထိုင်ရာ စခန်း (၉)ခုကို စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်လျက်ရှိသည်။ စခန်း စီမံ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်သည် သိသာထင်ရှားသော အောင်မြင်မှုအချို့ကို မှတ်တမ်းတင်နိုင်ခဲ့သော်ငြားလည်း အကြပ်အတည်းအတော် များ များကိုလည်းကြုံခဲ့ရသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် လွန်ခဲ့သော (၅)နှစ်အတွင်းကဖြစ်သည်။ (၂၀၀၈)ခုနှစ်ကစ၍ စခန်း၏လုပ်ငန်း အစီအစဉ်များကို အထောက်အပံ့ပေးသော အလှူရှင်များ၏ စိစစ်မှုများမှနေ၍ စနစ်မှာရှိနေသော အလေးဂရုပြုစရာပြဿနာများနှင့် ပြောင်းလဲရန်လိုအပ်ချက်များ ပေါ်ထွက်လာခဲ့သည်။ (၂၀၁၁)ခုနှစ်အတွင်းက CIDA AusAid နှင့် Act for Peace တို့၏တာဝန်ပေးချက်အရ ဤယခု အကဲဖြတ်ချက်က ဤပြဿနာများကို စိစစ်ကြည့်ရန်နှင့် လက်ရှိအခြေအနေမှာ စခန်းစီမံ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံ၏ သင့်လျော်မှုရှိ၊ မရှိဆိုသည်ကို အကဲဖြတ်ရန် ကြိုးပမ်းခြင်းဖြစ်ပါသည်။

### ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များ

ဤအစဦးအကဲဖြတ်ချက်၏ ရည်ရွယ်ချက်များကား (၃)ချက်ရှိပါသည်။ ၎င်းတို့မှာ

- ၁) ထိုင်းမြန်မာနယ်စပ် ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းများ၏ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်မှုရှိသူများ၏ အကျိုးရှိ သော ဆွေးနွေးပွဲတခု ဖြစ်မြောက်လာစေရန်
- ၂) အသားကျနေသော လက်ရှိ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံအကြောင်းကို ပြည့်ပြည့်စုံစုံနှင့် တိတိကျကျ ရှင်းပြရန်
- ၃) ပြုပြင်မှုနှင့် ပြောင်းလဲမှုများ စတင်လုပ်ဆောင်သင့်သည့် လုပ်ငန်းနယ်ပယ်များကို ဖော်ထုတ်ပြရန် တို့ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

ပို၍ တိတိကျကျ ဆိုရပါလျှင်၊ ဤလေ့လာချက်မှာပါရှိသော ရည်ညွှန်းစကားရပ်များနှင့် လျော်ညီစွာ အကဲဖြတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့သည် စခန်းအုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံ၏ သမိုင်းနှင့် တစတစဖြစ်ပေါ်လာပုံကို မှတ်တမ်းပြုခြင်း၊ စခန်းအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးတာဝန်များ ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၏ ထိရောက်မှု ပမာဏကို အကဲဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဆင့်ဆင့်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ လုပ်ငန်းများသည် နိုင်ငံတကာ စံချိန် များနှင့် မည်မျှအထိကိုက်ညီကြောင်း အကဲဖြတ်ခြင်း၊ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ လုပ်ဖော်ကိုင်ဖက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအချင်းချင်း စာရွက်စာတမ်း အထောက်အထားများဖြင့် ဆွေးနွေးသည့် ဆွေးနွေးပွဲကို ကျင်းပပေးခြင်းတို့ ပြုရပါသည်။

### အစီရင်ခံစာ ပြုစုရာ၌ အသုံးပြုသောနည်းစနစ်များ

အကဲဖြတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ အသုံးပြုသော နည်းစနစ်များသည် အဓိကအားဖြင့် စခန်းအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးပုံစံ ကျင့်သုံးပုံနှင့် သက်ဆိုင်သူများ၏ ပါဝင်မှုကို လေ့လာရာ၌ အသုံးပြုသော နည်းစနစ်များဖြစ်သည်။ စာရွက်စာတမ်းလေ့လာခြင်း၊ အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ အစိုးရ မဟုတ်သောအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ (NGOs) ထိုင်းအစိုးရအဖွဲ့တို့မှ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များဖြစ်သော အဓိကပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံ မေးမြန်းခြင်းတို့အပြင်၊ စံနမူနာအဖြစ် ကျဘမ်းရွေးချယ်ထားသော ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းသားများ(လူနည်းစု အုပ်စုများ၊ အမျိုးသမီး များနှင့် လူငယ်များ-မိန်းကလေးများနှင့် ယောက်ျားလေးများ-နှင့် သက်ဆိုင်သော အထူးဆွေးနွေးပွဲ အုပ်စုများအပါအဝင်) အများအပြားဖြင့် ဆွေးနွေးပွဲများ၊ အဓိကအုပ်စု ဆွေးနွေးပွဲများကို ကျင်းပခြင်းအားဖြင့်လည်း စခန်း(၉)ခုမှာ အချက်အလက်စု ဆောင်းခဲ့ပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံခြားသားနှင့် နယ်ခံ သုတေသနပညာရှင် (၁၁)ဦးပါသောအဖွဲ့က ဤဆွေးနွေးပွဲများကို ဦးစီးကျင်းပခဲ့ပါ သည်။ သာမန် စခန်းသား (၅၄၅)ဦးအပြင်၊ ဒုက္ခသည် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးများနှင့် စခန်းတွင်းမှာ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသော လူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းအခြေခံ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများမှ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်များအပါအဝင် လူပေါင်း (၂၄၀)တို့နှင့်လည်း တိုင်ပင်ဆွေးနွေးခဲ့ ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင်၊ အကဲဖြတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့သည် စခန်းတွင်းနှင့် စခန်းပြင်ပရှိ ထိုင်းအစိုးရ အရာရှိ(၆၀)၊ စခန်းတွင်းနှင့် စခန်းပြင်ပရှိ ဈေးဆိုင်ပိုင်ရှင် (၆၀)၊ စခန်းအနီးအနားပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ရှိ ခြံပိုင်ရှင်၊ လယ်ပိုင် ရှင်၊ အပန်းဖြေစခန်းပိုင်ရှင်၊ စားသောက်ဆိုင်ပိုင်ရှင်၊ သာမန်အရပ်သားတို့ပါဝင်သော လူ(၆၀)တို့ကိုလည်း တွေ့ဆုံမေးမြန်းခဲ့ပါ သည်။ ခြံ၍ပြောရပါလျှင် အကဲဖြတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့သည် လေ့လာမှုလုပ်ရာ၌ စခန်းတွင်း၊ စခန်းပြင်ရှိ သတင်းအချက်အလက်ပေးသူ (၉၆၀)နီးပါးခန့်နှင့် တိုက်ရိုက်ထိတွေ့ ဆက်ဆံခြင်း အားဖြင့် အချက်အလက်စုဆောင်းခဲ့ပါသည်။

အကဲဖြတ်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းမှာ အကန့်အသတ်ပေါင်း များစွာရှိပါသည်။ စခန်းအဆင့် အချက်အလက်စုဆောင်းရေးလုပ်ငန်းမှာ အ လွန်အားစိုက်ခဲ့သောကြောင့်၊ အထူးသဖြင့် ပိုမိုကျယ်ပြန့်သော အဆင့်ဖြစ်သည့် စခန်းများအားလုံးအတွက် လူသားချင်း စာ နာမှု အကူအညီ ညှိနှိုင်းရေးအဆင့်ကို လေ့လာရာ၌ အချိန်များများ မပေးနိုင်ခဲ့ချေ။ တကယ်တော့ စခန်းအဆင့်မှာ ဆောင်ရွက် သော လုပ်ငန်းသည် လုပ်အားပို၍ ကုန်ကျပြီး၊ လုပ်ရသည်မှာလည်း မျှော်လင့်ထားသည်ထက် ပို၍ ရှုပ်ထွေးခက်ခဲသည်။ ဤ သို့ဖြစ်ခြင်း၏ အကြောင်းအချက်များကား စခန်းများသည်၎င်း ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မီတီ(၂)ခု သည်၎င်း၊ တခုနှင့်တခု ပထဝီအနေ အထားအရ တကွတပြားစီဖြစ်နေခြင်း၊ အဓိကကျသောအဖွဲ့အစည်း(၂)ခုတွင် ခေါင်းဆောင်မှု အပြောင်းအလဲဖြစ်ခြင်း၊ စခန်းအ ဆင့်တွင် အတည်ပြုထောက်ခံချက် တခုခုရရန်ကြံကြာတတ်ခြင်း၊ အတည်ပြုထောက်ခံချက်ရရန် ကြံကြာမှုကြောင့် ကရင်နီဘာ သာ ကျွမ်းကျင်သော ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ ရရှိရန်မှာလည်း ကြံကြာခြင်းတို့ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤအကန့်အသတ် များအပြင် အခြားသော ကန့် သတ်ချက်များလည်း ရှိခဲ့သည့်တိုင်၊ ဤအစီရင်ခံစာမှာ ဖော်ပြထားသော တွေ့ရှိချက်များနှင့် အကြံပြုတင်ပြချက်များသည် တိ ကျမှန်ကန်မှုလည်းရှိ၊ ဆီလျော်မှုလည်း ရှိသည်ဟု အကဲဖြတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့က ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။

## တွေ့ရှိချက်များ

စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံကို နားလည်ခြင်း

စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံသည် ထိုင်းနယ်စပ်ရှိ စခန်း(၉)ခုမှနေ၍ တစတစပေါ်ပေါက်လာခြင်းဖြစ်သဖြင့်၊ ၎င်းသည် တာဝန် ဆောင် ရွက်သော အုပ်စု(၃)စုဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားသည်။ အုပ်စုတစုစီသည် အဖွဲ့ငယ်များဖြင့် ဖွဲ့စည်းထားခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ် မှုတစ်ခုလုံး၏ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုသည် အုပ်စုအသီးသီးမှာပါသော အဖွဲ့ငယ်များ၏ စွမ်းရည်နှင့် စွမ်းဆောင်မှုတို့အပေါ်မှာသာ မက၊ အုပ်စုတွင်းနှင့် အုပ်စုအချင်းချင်း ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၏ ထိရောက်မှုအပေါ်မှာပါ မူတည်သည်။

“စခန်းများ အုပ်စု (camp cluster)” (ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ စကားလုံးဖြစ်သည်)ထဲမှာ စခန်းတွင်း ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးရေးနှင့် ပတ်သက် သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းအစည်းများ ပါဝင်သည်။ ဤအုပ်စု၏ ဗဟိုချက်မ၌ ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီ (၂)ခု (RCs) နှင့် စခန်း ကော်မတီ (၉)ခု (CCs) ရှိသည်။ စခန်းကော်မတီ အသီးသီး၏ အောက်တွင် ရပ်ကွက်ကော်မတီက ထောက်ခံပေးထားသော ရပ်ကွက်လူ ကြီးများရှိသည်။ ဤအဆင့်ဆင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို နိုင်ငံတကာ NGO များက ထောက်ပံ့သည်။ ဤ NGO များ၏ အဓိက လုပ်ငန်းအစီအစဉ်များကား ကျန်းမာရေးနှင့် နေအိမ်ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်သန့်ရှင်းရေး၊ ပညာရေးတို့ဖြစ်သည်။ ထိုင်းမြန်မာနယ်စပ် ဒုက္ခ သည်များ ကူညီစောင့်ရှောက်ရေး ညွှန်ပေါင်းအသင်း (TBBC) က ရိက္ခာ၊ နေအိမ်နှင့် စားစရာမဟုတ်သော အခြားအထောက် အပံ့များအပြင်၊ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ အထောက်အပံ့လည်းပေးသည်။ ကုလသမဂ္ဂ ဒုက္ခသည်များဆိုင်ရာ မဟာမင်းကြီးက (UNHCR) ကာ ကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်မှု ပေးသည်။ မကြာသေးမီကပင် နိုင်ငံတကာ ကယ်ဆယ်ရေးကော်မတီ (IRC) ၏ အထူး စီမံချက်လုပ်ငန်းဖြစ်သော ဥပဒေရေးရာ အကျိုးဆောင်ဌာနများ (Legal Assistance Centres-LAC) စီမံချက်က စခန်း(၉)ခု ထဲမှ (၅)ခုကို အကူအညီပေးသည်။ စခန်းများမှာ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသော NGO များအချင်းချင်းကို ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံရောက် ဒုက္ခသည်များဆိုင်ရာ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုများအတွက် ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand-CCSDPT) က ညှိနှိုင်းပေးသည်။ ဤအဖွဲ့အစည်းသည် NGO များနှင့် ထိုင်းအစိုးရတို့ အကြားတွင် ကြားခံအဖွဲ့အစည်းအဖြစ်လည်း ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးသည်။

စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု စနစ်ထဲရှိ ဒုတိယအုပ်စုကား “အလှူရှင်များအုပ်စု (donor cluster)” (ဤစကားလုံးသည်လည်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ စကားလုံးဖြစ်သည်)ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤအုပ်စုထဲမှ အလှူရှင်တိုင်းပြည်များသည် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ အလှူရှင်များ၏ အ လုပ်အဖွဲ့ (Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group-DHAWG) ထဲမှာ ပါဝင်ကြ (ဘန်ကောက်မြို့ကို အဓိကနေရာ အဖြစ်ထားပြီး ဆောင်ရွက်လေ့ရှိသည်)သည်။ အဓိကအလှူရှင်နိုင်ငံများတွင် အမေရိကန်ပြည်ထောင်စုနှင့် ဥရောပသမဂ္ဂတို့ ပါ ဝင်သည်။ အလုပ်အဖွဲ့သည် CCSDPT နှင့်၎င်း၊ CCSDPT ၏ လုပ်ငန်းအစီအစဉ်များနှင့်၎င်း ညှိနှိုင်းခြင်း၊ သတင်းအချက်အ လက် ဖလှယ်ခြင်းပြုသည်။ UNHCR နှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်သည်။ ထို့ပြင် ထိုင်းအစိုးရအဖွဲ့ထဲမှ အရေးပါသော ပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များနှင့် ဆွေးနွေးတိုင်ပင်ခြင်း၊ ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းပြုသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းတခုချင်း ဆီမှ အလှူငွေများသည် TBBC သို့မဟုတ် ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးသော NGO များမှတဆင့် စခန်းများသို့ စီးဆင်းသည်။



တတိယ အုပ်စုတွင် ထိုင်းအစိုးရပါဝင်သည် (ကျွန်ုပ်တို့က “RTG” အုပ်စုဟု ခေါ်သည်)။ အဓိကအားဖြင့်ပါဝင်သောအဖွဲ့အစည်း များမှာ အမျိုးသားလုံခြုံရေးကောင်စီ (NSC) ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးဌာန (MOI) ထိုင်း ကြည်းတပ်မတော်၊ နိုင်ငံခြားရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာန (MFA) တို့အပြင်၊ (MOI) ၏ ဒုက္ခသည်များဆိုင်ရာ ညှိနှိုင်းရေးရုံး (Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons – OCDP) တို့ဖြစ်သည်။ OCDP ၏ တာဝန်ကား CCSDP ၏ အဖွဲ့ဝင်သတ်မှတ်ရေး အစီအစဉ်များကို အတည်ပြုပေးခြင်း၊ UNHCR အပါအဝင်အခြားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်းတို့ဖြစ်သည်။ ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းများရှိရာ ပြည်နယ်(၄)ခု၏ အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးများက ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီးဌာနသို့ အစီရင်ခံရပြီး၊ လက်ထောက် ခရိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးများ (ထိုင်း စခန်းတပ်မှူး များ၏ ရာထူးဖြစ်သည်)က မိမိတို့၏ ခရိုင်ရုံးများမှတစ်ဆင့် သက်ဆိုင်ရာ ပြည်နယ်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးမှူးရုံးသို့ အစီရင်ခံရသည်။ ထိုင်း စခန်းတပ်မှူးများသည် စခန်းကော်မတီနှင့်၎င်း၊ စခန်းကော်မတီ၏ လက်အောက်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့်၎င်း တိုက်ရိုက်ဆက်ဆံပြီး၊ ထိုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပေါ် အာဏာပိုင်သည်။

လွန်ခဲ့သော ဆယ်စုနှစ် (၂)ခု၏ တလျှောက်လုံးနီးပါးမျှ ဤအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ အချင်းချင်းဆက်ဆံရေးသည် တစတစပြောင်း လဲလာခဲ့ပြီး၊ ဂေဟစနစ်တမျိုးကို စုပေါင်း တည်ဆောက်ဖြစ်ခဲ့ကြသည်။ ဤဂေဟစနစ်သည် များသောအားဖြင့် လိုက်လျောညီထွေ ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲနိုင်စွမ်းရှိစွာနှင့် ခံနိုင်ရည်ရှိစွာ လည်ပတ်လှုပ်ရှားခဲ့ကာ၊ အခြေအနေပြောင်းလဲသည်နှင့်အမျှ အဖွဲ့အစည်း သစ်များ၊ လိုအပ်ချက်အသစ်များနှင့် ထိတွေ့ဆက်ဆံခြင်း၊ ၎င်းတို့နှင့် လိုက်လျောညီထွေ ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲခြင်းပြုခဲ့သည့်အပြင်၊ အရင်းအမြစ်များကို စနစ်အစိတ်အပိုင်းအသီးသီး၏ ရည်မှန်းချက်များအတွက် ခန့်ခွဲခြင်းပြုခဲ့သည်။ ကျွန်ုပ်တို့၏ အမြင်အရဆို လျှင်၊ ဤဂေဟစနစ်သည် ၎င်းဖွဲ့တည်ခဲ့သော ကာလအတော်များများ၌ အောက်ပါ အကြောင်းအချက် (၂)ချက်ကြောင့် ယေ ဘုယျအားဖြင့် ထိရောက်စွာ လည်ပတ်လှုပ်ရှားခဲ့သည်။ ပထမအကြောင်းအချက်ကား ဘုံတူညီသော အမြင်နှင့် ဘုံတူညီသော တန်ဖိုးထားမှုများ ရှိခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ ဒုတိယ အကြောင်းအချက်ကား အပြန်အလှန်ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချမှု ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤကောင်းမွန် သော အလုပ်ဆက်ဆံရေး၏ မဏ္ဍိုင်သည်ကား ဒုက္ခသည်များ အကျိုးကို ရှေ့ရှုခြင်းနှင့် ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာမှုရှိခြင်းတို့ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။

### ဒုက္ခသည်များနှင့် စခန်းခေါင်းဆောင်များ၏ အမြင်များ

မိမိတို့၏ စခန်းတွင်းဘဝကို မည်သို့မြင်သည် (သူတို့ သဘောကျနှစ်ခြိုက်သောအရာများသာမက သူတို့ကြုံတွေ့ရသော အခက်အခဲများနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍လည်း မည်သို့မြင်သည်) ဆိုသည်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ စခန်းအားလုံးမှာ တညီတညွတ်တည်းနီးပါး ရှိနေပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် စခန်းသား အမျိုးအစား(အမျိုးသမီးများ၊ လူနည်းစု အုပ်စုများ၊ လူငယ်များ)အားလုံး၏ အမြင်များကို နှိုင်းယှဉ်ကြည့်ရာ၌၎င်း၊ အမျိုးအစားတစ်ခု၏ အမြင်ကို အခြားအမျိုးအစားတစ်ခု၏ အမြင်နှင့် နှိုင်းယှဉ်ကြည့်ရာ၌၎င်း၊ စခန်းလူထု တစ်လုံး၏ အမြင်များကို တစ်ခုနှင့်တစ်ခု နှိုင်းယှဉ်ကြည့် ရာ၌၎င်း တညီတညွတ်တည်းနီးပါး ရှိနေကြောင်းတွေ့ရသည်။ အများအား ဖြင့် စခန်းများမှာ လူနည်းစု အုပ်စုများအပေါ် စနစ်တကျ ခွဲခြားဆက်ဆံမှု မရှိကြောင်း အကဲဖြတ်အဖွဲ့က တွေ့ရှိရသည်မှာ အမှန်ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ပြင်၊ စခန်းတွင်းဘဝနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ အမျိုးသမီးများက အမျိုးသားများနှင့် မတူကွဲပြားသော အမြင်ကို ဖော်ပြခြင်းမရှိချေ။ သို့ရာတွင် လူငယ်များကမူ မိမိတို့၏ အနာဂတ်အလားအလာပြဿနာ၊ ပညာဆက်သင်ရန် အခွင့် အလမ်း မဲ့မှုပြဿနာ၊ ထို့ပြင်

ဤပြဿနာတို့ထက် ပို၍ကြီးသော ထောက်ပံ့ပစ္စည်းများ အလွဲသုံးစားလုပ်မှုပြဿနာတို့ကို အလေးထားဖော်ပြခဲ့သည်မှာ အမှန်ပင်ဖြစ်သည်။

**ဒုက္ခသည်များ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု အဆင့်ဆင့်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏** အခန်းကဏ္ဍနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ စခန်းနေလူထုက ဤကော်မတီများ သည် စခန်းများမှာ ကြုံတွေ့ရသော အကြီးစား အခက်အခဲ အတော်များများကို ဖြေရှင်းပေးရာ၌ အကန့်အသတ်များရှိကြောင်း သိထားကြသည်။ ဒုက္ခသည်များက မိမိတို့၏ ခေါင်းဆောင်များသည် မည်သည့်ကိစ္စကို ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးနိုင်စွမ်းရှိခြင်းနှင့် မည် သည့်အရာများကို ပြောင်းလဲပေးနိုင်စွမ်းမရှိခြင်းတို့ကို ကောင်းစွာသိထားကြောင်း ဖော်ပြကြသည်။ စခန်းခေါင်းဆောင်တို့၏ တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများကို ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်းနားလည်ကြောင်းကိုလည်း ဖော်ပြကြသည်။ ထို့ပြင် မိမိတို့၏ ခေါင်းဆောင်များမှာ မိမိတို့ ရှိစေလိုသော အရည်အချင်းများကိုလည်း ဖော်ပြကြသည်။ စခန်းများရှိ စခန်းသားများသည် ပညာရေးအဆင့်အတန်း ကောင်းကောင်းရှိသော ၊ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်ရာ၌ ဘာသာစကား တမျိုးတည်းမက အသုံးပြုနိုင်သော၊ အကျင့်စရိုက်ကောင်း သော၊ အများပြည်သူတို့နှင့် ထိထိရောက်ရောက် ဆက်ဆံနိုင်သော ခေါင်းဆောင်များကို ရှာကြသည်။ ခြံ၍ပြောရပါလျှင်၊ ဒုက္ခ သည်တို့သည် အများအားဖြင့် မိမိတို့၏ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု အဆင့်ဆင့်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို အကဲဖြတ်ရာ၌ အကောင်းမြင်ကြသည်။ စခန်းအားလုံးမှာ ဖော် ထုတ်တွေ့ရှိရသော ပြဿနာအချို့တွင် မျှော်လင့်ထားသည့်အတိုင်း အမြင်ကွဲပြားမှုများရှိသော်လည်း စခန်းသားများသည် ဒုက္ခသည်များ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံကိုတော့မူ ပြဿနာရှိသည်ဟူ၍ သံသယ မထားကြချေ။

ထို့ပြင်၊ ဤအကဲဖြတ်မှုတွင် ပါဝင်ကြသော ဒုက္ခသည်များသည် (၂၀၁၁)ခုနှစ်တွင် ကျင်းပခဲ့သော **ရွေးကောက်ပွဲ အစီအစဉ်နှင့်** ပတ်သက်၍ မှတ်မိကြောင်းနှင့် နားလည်ကြောင်း ဖော်ပြခဲ့ကြသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် ဖြေရှင်းပေးစရာရှိသည့် ပြဿနာ များရှိကြောင်း ကိုလည်း ဖော်ပြခဲ့ကြသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့် ဒုက္ခသည်အဖြစ် “မှတ်ပုံတင်ထားခြင်းမရှိ”သူများကို မဲပေးခွင့်ပြုခြင်း ဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ ပြင် အမျိုးသမီးများ၏ ကိုယ်စားပြုခွင့် ကိစ္စတွင် နောက်ထပ်ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများလုပ်ရန်နှင့်၊ အဓိကကျသော အုပ်စုအမျိုးအ စားများ (အထူးသဖြင့် လူနည်းစုအမျိုးသားများနှင့် လူငယ်များ)အတွက် ပြောရေးဆိုခွင့်ရအောင် လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများ ရှာကြံ ရန် လိုအပ်ကြောင်းကိုလည်း ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ တွေ့ရှိရပါသည်။

**စခန်းခေါင်းဆောင်များကလည်း** စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်တွင် မိမိတို့၏ လုပ်ငန်းလမ်းညွှန်ဖြစ်သော အလုပ်တာဝန် ဖော်ပြချက် (job description)အတိုင်း၊ မိမိတို့၏ အခန်းကဏ္ဍနှင့် တာဝန်ဝတ္တရားများကို ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်း နားလည်ထားကြသည်။ သူတို့ ကြုံတွေ့ရသော အဓိက အခက်အခဲအတော်များများသည် စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဆင့်မျှဖြင့် မဖြေရှင်းနိုင်သော အခက်အခဲ များဖြစ် သည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့သော အခက်အခဲမျိုးကို ပို၍ မြင့်သော အဆင့်ဖြစ်သည့် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီ ညှိနှိုင်းရေး အဆင့်ဖြင့် ဖြေရှင်းရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

**စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုတွင် ရှိနေသော အခြားပြဿနာကြီးများ**

**ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်မှုနှင့် တရားမျှတမှု ရရှိရေးနှင့်**ပတ်သက်၍ဆိုလျှင်၊ ဒုက္ခသည်များနှင့် စခန်းခေါင်းဆောင်များက ဤ လုပ်ငန်းနယ်ပယ်မှာ ရှိသော လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်၏ အရေးပါမှုကို သိထားကြသည်။

သို့ဖြစ်စေကာမူ၊ ဤလုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များကို လုပ်ဆောင်ရာ၌ အခက်အခဲအချို့လည်းရှိနေပါသည်။ အခက်အခဲတစ်ခုကား ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းတရားစီရင်ရေးစနစ်တွင် တရားစီ ရင်ရေးအဖွဲ့ကို အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့နှင့် တသီးတခြားစီ ခွဲထားရေးဖြစ်သည်။ ဒုတိယ အခက်အခဲမှာ လုံခြုံရေး ဝန်ထမ်းများက ဆိုးသွမ်းလူငယ်များကိစ္စ (ဤကိစ္စသည် ကြီးထွားလာနေသော ကိစ္စဖြစ်သည်)ကို ဖြေရှင်းရာ၌ ဖြေရှင်းရေးနည်းလမ်းသစ်များ ပါသော မွမ်းမံအစီအစဉ်များဖြင့် ပံ့ပိုးပေးရေး ဖြစ်သည်။

**စခန်းအဆင့် ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍** ဆိုရလျှင်၊ သတင်းအချက်အလက် ဖလှယ်မှုများ ရှိသော်လည်း အချို့သော လုပ်ငန်းကဏ္ဍများတွင် လုပ်ငန်းအစီအစဉ်ရေးဆွဲခြင်းနှင့် ဦးစားပေးလုပ်ငန်းသတ်မှတ်ခြင်းကိစ္စများနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ တိုင်ပင်ဆွေး နွေးမှု မရှိချေ။ ထို့ပြင်၊ စခန်းအဆင့် လစဉ်ညှိနှိုင်းရေး အစည်းအဝေးများတွင် မကြာသေးမီ ကာလကမှသာ မဖြည့်ဆည်းရသေး သော လိုအပ်ချက်များနှင့် ကွာဟချက်များကို အလေးထားဆွေးနွေးခြင်းပြုခဲ့သည်။ ကျန်းမာရေးလုပ်ငန်းကဏ္ဍကဲ့သို့သော ကဏ္ဍများရှိ နိုင်ငံတကာ NGO အချို့သည် လုပ်ငန်းအစီအစဉ်၏ ဦးစားပေးလုပ်ငန်းများ သတ်မှတ်ခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် ဘတ်ဂျက် လျော့ချခြင်း နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ဆုံးဖြတ်ရာ၌ စခန်းကော်မတီနှင့် ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများကို ပုံမှန်လုပ်ရိုးလုပ်စဉ် အနေနှင့် တိုင် ပင်ဆွေးနွေးခြင်း မရှိချေ။

**ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးခြင်းနှင့် စောင့်ကြည့်ခြင်းလုပ်ငန်းနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍** ဆိုရလျှင်၊ စခန်းကော်မတီနှင့် ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီတို့သည် မိမိတို့ တိုက်ရိုက်တာဝန်ရှိသော လုပ်ငန်းနယ်ပယ်များဖြစ်သည့် လူဦးရေစာရင်းကို မပြတ်စောင့်ကြည့်ခြင်း၊ သိုလှောင်ရုံများ ဆောက်လုပ်ခြင်း၊ ရိက္ခာဝေခြင်း၊ အခြေခံအဆောက်အအုံများကို ပြုပြင်ထိန်းသိမ်းခြင်း၊ စခန်းများ၏ အေးချမ်း တည်ငြိမ်မှုကို ထိန်းသိမ်းခြင်းတို့တွင် ကောင်းစွာဆောင်ရွက်ကြောင်းတွေ့ရှိရသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် စခန်းကော်မတီနှင့် ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီတို့မှာ ပညာရေး၊ ကျန်းမာရေးကဲ့သို့သော အထူးကျွမ်းကျင်မှုဆိုင်ရာ လုပ်ငန်းကဏ္ဍများကို စောင့်ကြည့်ရန်နှင့် အဆင့်အတန်းထိန်း သိမ်းရန် လုံလောက်သော စွမ်းရည်များ ရှိ၊ မရှိနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ရှင်းရှင်းလင်းလင်းမသိရချေ။

ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်း စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ **အခြားသော ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်သူများက** အများအားဖြင့် အကောင်းမြင်ကြ ပါသည်။ အထူးသဖြင့်၊ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲအစီအစဉ်မှာ ပြုပြင်ပြောင်းလဲမှုများအပါအဝင် မကြာသေးခင်နှစ်များအတွင်းက လုပ်ခဲ့ သော ပြောင်းလဲမှုအများအပြားနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အကောင်းမြင်ကြပါသည်။ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများနှင့် တတိယနိုင်ငံများသို့ သွား ရောက် အခြေချခြင်းတို့ကြောင့် စခန်းခေါင်းဆောင်မှု အဆင့်နေရာများတွင် အပြောင်းအလဲ အများအပြားရှိသည်ဖြစ်ရာ၊ စွမ်း ရည်တည်ဆောက်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းကို ဆက်လက်လုပ်ပေးသင့်သည်ဟု ပြင်ပ မှ ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်သူများက မြင်ပါသည်။ UNHCR က တာဝန်ရှိသည့်အလျောက်၊ ၎င်း၏ ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်မှုပေးရေးအစီအစဉ်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ဤစခန်းအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် ဆက်ဆံနေလျက်ရှိသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် ၎င်းတို့ကို တရားဝင် စခန်းအုပ်ချုပ်ရေးနှင့် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ် အသိ အမှတ်မပြုသေးချေ။

**အနီးအနားပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ရှိ**

**ထိုင်းကျေးရွာများအပေါ်**

**ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းများ၏**

ရိုက်ခတ်ချက်များအကြောင်းကိုလည်း အကဲဖြတ် အဖွဲ့က စိစစ်ကြည့်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ကောင်းသည်ဖြစ်စေ၊ ဆိုးသည်ဖြစ်စေ ဤရိုက်ခတ်ချက်များသည် စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပေါ် အဓိက ကိစ္စတရပ်မဟုတ်ချေ။ စခန်းများနှင့် နယ်ခံထိုင်း ကျေးရွာများအကြားမှာ ပေါ်ပေါက်လာခဲ့သော ပြဿနာ များကို ထိုင်း စခန်းတပ်မှူးများ၏ ကမ္မကထပြုမှုဖြင့် စခန်းကော်မတီများနှင့် ထိုင်း ကျေးရွာလူကြီးများက ထိရောက်စွာ ဖြေရှင်း ပေးကြောင်းတွေ့ရသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် ထိုင်း စခန်းတပ်မှူးများနှင့် ပြည်ထဲရေးဝန်ကြီးဌာနတို့သည် စခန်းများနှင့်ပတ်သက်သော ထိုင်းအစိုးရ ပေါ်လစီကို တကယ်တမ်း ထိထိရောက်ရောက် ကျင့်သုံးခြင်းမရှိဟူ၍ အခြားသော ထိုင်းအစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ (သစ်တောဌာန၊ ရဲတပ်ဖွဲ့နှင့် စစ်တပ်)၏ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အချို့က ပြောဆိုသည်များ ရှိသည်။

အကဲဖြတ်အဖွဲ့သည် စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်အနေနှင့် ဒုက္ခသည်များအတွက် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီပေးခြင်းနှင့်ဆိုင် သော **နိုင်ငံတကာ စံချိန်များ၊ ထုံးစံများနှင့်** ကိုက်ညီခြင်းရှိ၊ မရှိကိုလည်း စိစစ်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ခြုံပြောရပါလျှင်၊ ဒုက္ခသည် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ် မှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသာမက၊ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်ထဲမှာ ဒုက္ခသည်များနှင့် ပူးပေါင်းကာ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသော အခြားအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကပါ နားလည်ထားကြပြီး၊ လမ်းညွှန်အဖြစ် ကျင့်သုံးနေကြသည်။ သို့ဖြစ်သည့်တိုင် ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်သူများ ဖော်ထုတ်ပြသော ပြဿနာအချို့ ရှိနေပါသည်။ ပြဿနာတစ်ခုကား မှတ်ပုံတင်ထားခြင်းမရှိသော ဒုက္ခသည်များ အများအပြားရှိ နေခြင်း (ကြီးသောစခန်းအချို့၌ လူဦးရေ၏ ၅၀% ကျော်ရှိသည်)နှင့် ထိုသူတို့မှာ တရားဝင် ဒုက္ခသည်အဆင့်မရှိမှုကြောင့် အားနည်းချက် ပိုရှိနေခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ TBBC ထောက်ပံ့ပေးသောဆန်ကို ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများက ရှေ့တန်းစစ်သားများ အားပေးနေသည်ဟူသော အမှုလည်း ရှိသေးသည်။ ဤအမှုမျိုး နောက်ထပ်ဖြစ်ပွားခြင်း မရှိသော်လည်း ဤအမှုမှာ ပါဝင် ပတ်သက်ခဲ့သူများသည် ထိုအချိန်က ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာမှု မရှိခဲ့ခြင်းဖြစ်သည်။ အချို့သော ထိုင်း စခန်းတပ်မှူးများ၏ လုပ်ရပ်များ နှင့်ပတ်သက်သော ပြဿနာများ၊ ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာမှုနှင့် တာဝန်ခံမှုပြဿနာများကိုလည်း လူအမျိုးမျိုးတို့က အကဲဖြတ်ရေးအဖွဲ့ သို့ တင်ပြခဲ့ကြသည်။

စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့သို့ တိကျသော အထောက်အပံ့များပေးခြင်းသည် များစွာမကြာလှသေးချေ။ UNHCR သည်၎င်း၊ အခြား NGO များသည်၎င်း စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့သို့ အထောက်အပံ့များပေးရန် တာဝန်ယူခြင်း (ယူနိုင်ခြင်း)မရှိခဲ့ကြချေ။ စခန်းလူထု များနှင့်သာ ဆက်ဆံခဲ့သည်။ အကြောင်းမှာ ဤအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် တိုက်ရိုက် အကူအညီပေးခြင်းနှင့်သာ သက်ဆိုင်သော ကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဤကဲ့သို့သော အကူအညီပေးရေးတာဝန်သည် TBBC ၏ ပခုံးပေါ်သို့ ကျရောက်လာခဲ့သည်။ ဒုက္ခသည်များ အားအခွင့်အာဏာ အပ်နှင်းရေးကို အလေးထားမှုကြောင့် TBBC သည် ဤလုပ်ငန်းတာဝန်ကို ဆောင်ရွက်ရန် အကောင်းဆုံး အနေအထားမှာ ရှိခဲ့သည်။ ပထမဦးဆုံး စမ်းသပ်ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့သော (၂၀၀၃)ခုနှစ်ကစ၍ တိုးတက်မှုများ အမြောက်အမြားရရှိခဲ့ သည်။ ရှင်းလင်းပြတ်သားသော စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ လုပ်ငန်းလုပ်ဆောင်ပုံ အစီအစဉ်များသည် စခန်းအားလုံးမှာ နေထားတကျနှင့် ပုံမှန်ဖြစ်လာခဲ့သည်။ ဤစခန်းအဖွဲ့အစည်းများရှိ ရာထူးအဆင့်အားလုံး အတွက် ရှင်းလင်း သော အလုပ်တာဝန် ဖော်ပြချက်များ (job descriptions) ရှိလာခဲ့သည်။ လုပ်ငန်းအလိုက် သက်ဆိုင်သူအားလုံးအတွက် သင် တန်းများနှင့် စွမ်းရည်တည်ဆောက်မှုများကို အကြီးအကျယ် ဖြည့်ဆည်းပေးခဲ့သည်။ ဒုက္ခသည် ကော်မတီ

(၂)ခုစလုံးက ဤ စခန်းအဖွဲ့အစည်းများတွင် ရာထူးအဆင့်အလိုက် တာဝန်ယူဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသော ဒုက္ခသည်များ အားလုံးအတွက် ကျင့်ဝတ် ဥပဒေ (code of conduct) ချမှတ်ခဲ့သည်။ သို့ရာတွင် စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု စွမ်းရည်နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အခက်အခဲများ ရှိနေပါသည်။ အဓိက အကြောင်းရင်းကား နေရာပြောင်းရွှေ့အခြေချသွားခြင်းနှင့် အချိန်အခါအလိုက်ကျင်းပသော ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများ၏ အကျိုးဆက်အဖြစ် အဓိက ခေါင်းဆောင်များ ထွက်သွားကြသောကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်။ ဒုက္ခသည်များကို နေရပ်ရင်းပြန်ပို့ရေး ဘက် သို့ အာရုံပြောင်းသွားခြင်းကြောင့်လည်း ပြဿနာသစ်များ ပေါ်လာလိမ့်မည်ဖြစ်သည်။ သို့ဖြစ်ရာ ရှေ့သို့ တက်လှမ်းရာ၌ အလှူရှင်အသိုင်းအဝိုင်း အနေနှင့် စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့သည် မဟာဗြဟ္မာအရ လမ်းညွှန်မှုနှင့် ဘဏ္ဍာရေးအရ ထောက်ပံ့မှုကို ခံယူသင့်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ၎င်းမှာ ကိုယ်ပိုင်အခွင့်အရေးရှိသည်ဟူသော အချက်ကို ကြေကြေလည်လည် အသိအမှတ်ပြုထားရန် လိုအပ်ပါသည်။

လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီ ညှိနှိုင်းရေး အဆင့်မှာ ရှိနေသော ပြဿနာများအနက် စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်၏ စွမ်းဆောင် မှုနှင့် ဂုဏ်ကို ထိခိုက်စေသောပြဿနာတစ်ခုကား ထိရောက်မှုလည်းရှိ၊ တာရှည်ခံနိုင်ရည်လည်းရှိသော လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များ အတွက် မရှိမဖြစ်လိုအပ်သော၊ နှစ်နှင့်ချီတည်ရှိခဲ့သည် အပြန်အလှန် ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချမှု လျော့ပါးလာခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်သည်။ စခန်း ကော်မတီများက ရှေ့တန်းစစ်သားများအတွက် ဆန်ပေးခြင်းကိစ္စအကြောင်း TBBC ရရှိသော သတင်းကို အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့သို့ အသိမပေးဘဲ ထားခဲ့ရာ၊ ဤအဖွဲ့အစည်းနှစ်ခု၏ အပြန်အလှန်ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချမှုသည် သိသိသာသာကြီးကျဆင်းသွားခဲ့သည်။ ဤသို့ဖြင့်၊ စိုးရိမ်မှုများနှင့် ပြန်လည်စိစစ်သုံးသပ်မှုများ တသိတတန်းကြီး ဖြစ်ပွားစေခဲ့သည်။ အပြန်အလှန် ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချမှုကို ပြန်လည်တည်ဆောက်ရမည်ဖြစ်သည်။ ပြန်လည်တည်ဆောက်နေလျက်လည်းရှိသည်။ ဤသို့ အပြန်အလှန်ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချမှု လျော့ပါးခြင်း၏ အကြောင်းအချက်တရပ်မှာ ယေဘုယျအားဖြင့် နှစ်ပေါင်းများစွာ လက်တွေ့ ကွင်းဆင်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြ သော TBBC အပါအဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် လူမကြာခဏ ပြောင်းနေသော အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းတို့၏ သိမြင်မှုချင်း ထပ် တူထပ်မျှမဖြစ်သောကြောင့်ဖြစ်သည်ဟု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့ ယုံကြည်ပါသည်။ အလှူရှင်များအနေနှင့် လုပ်ဆောင်သင့်သော လုပ်ဆောင် ချက်များအနက် တခုကား တကယ့်လက်တွေ့လုပ်ငန်း နှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အစဉ်သဖြင့် ကိုယ်တိုင်ကိုယ်ကျ ပိုမိုသိရှိလာအောင် လုပ်ဆောင်ခြင်းပင်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

### သင်ခန်းစာများ

ဤအကဲဖြတ်ချက်ထဲမှ မှတ်သားဖွယ်ရာ သင်ခန်းစာကြီး (၃)ရပ်တို့မှာ

- ၁) ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းများတွင် ကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးနှင့် ကိုယ်ပိုင်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုတို့ ဖြစ်ပေါ်မည့်အလားအလာ နက်နက် ရှိုင်း ရှိုင်းရှိနေသည်။ ထိုင်းနယ်စပ်တလျှောက်ရှိ ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်းများတွင် ကျင့်သုံးနေသော စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်၏ အတွေ့အကြုံများက ဒုက္ခသည်စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု အဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်သော စွမ်းရည်ရှိကြောင်း ပြသ နေပါသည်။ ဤအချက်သည် စခန်းတခုချင်းမှာ မှန်ကန်မှု ရှိနေကြောင်းတွေ့ရသည်။ ဤအတွေ့အကြုံအကြည့်လျှင် ဤအချက်သည် စခန်းပေါင်းချုပ် အဆင့်မှာလည်း မှန်ကန်ကြောင်းတွေ့ရပါသည်။ ဤအဆင့်တွင် ဒုက္ခသည်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများက ဘုံတူညီသော စခန်းလုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများနှင့် ပေါ်လစီများကို ချမှတ်ထားသည်။ လမ်းညွှန်မှုနှင့် ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုပေးသည်။ ထို့ပြင်၊ နယ်မြေအာဏာပိုင်များ၊ အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၊ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးသော

အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအပါအဝင် ပြင်ပရှိ ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်သူများနှင့်လည်း စေ့စပ်ဆွေးနွေးမှုများလုပ်သည်။ ထို့ပြင်၊ စီစဉ်သုံးသပ် ထားသော အတွေ့အကြုံများက ပြသနေသည်မှာ ဒုက္ခသည် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် ပြောင်းလဲနေသော အခြေအနေများ၊ ပြောင်းလဲနေသော လိုအပ်ချက်များနှင့် လိုက်လျောညီထွေရှိအောင် အချိန်ယူ ပြောင်းလဲနိုင်စွမ်းရှိ သည်ဟူ၍ ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အမှန်စင်စစ်၌ ဤအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် ကြံ့ခိုင်သော ဂေဟစနစ်များအဖြစ် များစွာအသုံး ဝင်ပါသည်။ ဤအဖွဲ့အစည်းများသည် အကြပ်အတည်းများနှင့်လည်း ကြုံတွေ့ရမည်မှာ သေချာသည်ဖြစ်ရာ၊ ပြုပြင်မွမ်းမံခြင်း သို့တည်းမဟုတ် အင်အားကောင်းအောင်တည်ဆောက်ခြင်းကို မှန်မှန်လုပ်သွားရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ အဆင့်အားလုံးလိုလိုမှာ ဒုက္ခသည်များအား မိမိတို့၏ ဘဝများနှင့် အသက်မွေးဝမ်းကျောင်းလုပ်ငန်းများကို မိမိတို့ ကိုယ်တိုင် စီမံလျက် ထိန်းချုပ်နိုင်သမျှထိန်း ချုပ်နိုင်အောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်းသည် ဒုက္ခသည်များ၏ လူသားပီသမှု ကို ပြသစေရာ၌ အရေးကြီးသော အချက် တရပ်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

၂) ဘုံတူညီသော တန်ဖိုးထားမှု၊ ဘုံတူညီသော အမြင်နှင့်၊ အပြန်အလှန်ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချမှုတို့သည် ထိရောက်သော ဒုက္ခသည်စခန်း စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု၏ အခြေခံဖြစ်သည်။ ယခုဤ ပြန်လည်စီစဉ်သုံးသပ်မှု မတိုင်မီ စောစွာကတည်းကပင် အဓိကအားဖြင့် ပါဝင်ပတ်သက်သူများက စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံ တည်ဆောက်ရာ၌ အခြေခံအဖြစ်ကျင့်သုံးမည့် ဘုံတူညီသော အမြင်နှင့် တန်ဖိုးထားမှုများ ဖြစ်ပေါ်တိုးတက်လာအောင် ကြိုးပမ်းလာခဲ့ကြသည်။ ဤတန်ဖိုးထားမှု များအနက် တစ်ခုကား ပွင့်လင်းမြင်သာမှုဖြစ်သည်။ ထို့ပြင်၊ ဤပါဝင်ပတ်သက်သူများက အပြန်အလှန်လေးစားမှုနှင့် အပြန်အလှန် ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချမှုကိုလည်း အလားတူကြိုးပမ်း စိုက်ထူခဲ့ကြသည်။ ဤအကြောင်းအချက်များ၏ အစု အပေါင်းသည် စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ် ဆွတ်ခူးခဲ့သော အောင်မြင်မှုများ၏ အခြေခံရာ မူများဖြစ်သည်။ လွန်ခဲ့သော (၅)နှစ်အတွင်းမှာ အတွင်းနှင့် အပြင်အကြောင်းတရားများကြောင့် ဘုံတူညီသော တန်ဖိုးထားမှုများနှင့် အချင်းချင်း အပြန်အလှန် ယုံကြည်စိတ်ချမှုတို့ ချိန့်သွားခဲ့သည်မှာ အထင်အရှားဖြစ်သည်။ ဤသို့ချိန့်သွားသောအခြေအနေ၌ စနစ်ထဲမှာ အဓိကကျသော ပြောင်းလဲမှုများနှင့် ပြုပြင်မှုများ လိုအပ်ပါသည်။ ဤပြောင်းလဲမှုများကို ထက်ထက်သန် သန်နှင့် အချိန်မှီအခါမှီလုပ်မည်ဆိုပါက စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်သည် ပိုမိုအားကောင်းလာမည်ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ဒုက္ခသည်များ၊ အစိုးရအဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် အခြားသော ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို ဆက်လက်၍ တန်ဖိုးတိုးစေလိမ့်မည်ဟု ယူ ဆရာပါသည်။

၃) စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုဆိုင်ရာနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ ကျွမ်းကျင်မှုများ၊ အတွေ့အကြုံများသည် နေရပ်ရင်းသို့ပြန်ရာ၌ တိုင်းပြည်တည်ဆောက်ရေးကို အကျိုးပြုနိုင်ဖွယ်ရှိပါသည်။ နိုင်ငံရေးဆုံဖြတ်ချက်ချခြင်းနှင့် ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးဆိုင်ရာ ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုအတတ်များကို စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုမှရရှိခဲ့သော ကိုယ်တွေ့အတွေ့အကြုံများဖြင့် တည်ဆောက်ခြင်း သည် ဒုက္ခသည်များကိုသာမက ဌာနေလူမှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများကိုလည်း ကောင်းစွာ အကျိုးပြုနိုင်ပါသည်။ နေရပ်ရင်း သို့ ဒုက္ခသည်များ ပြန်သွားသောအခါ၌ နယ်မြေဒေသနှင့် လူမျိုးစုဆိုင်ရာ ကိစ္စရပ်များကို အစီအစဉ်တကျနှင့် ငြိမ်းချမ်း စွာ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်နိုင်သည်ဆိုပါက စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအတွေ့အကြုံရှိခဲ့သော ဒုက္ခသည်ခေါင်းဆောင်များသည် မိမိတို့ နယ်မြေဒေသ၌ ပြည်သူ့ ကိုယ်စားလှယ်လောင်းများအနေနှင့် ယှဉ်ပြိုင်အရွေးခံရန်သော်၎င်း၊ အစိုးရအာဏာပိုင်များ အနေနှင့် ခန့်အပ်ခံရန်သော်၎င်း အရည်အချင်းပြည့်မီဖွယ်ရှိပါသည်။ တနည်းဆိုရလျှင်၊ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု အဖွဲ့များ

သည် “ပြည်သူ့အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အတတ်သင်ကျောင်းများ”အဖြစ် အသုံးဝင်ခဲ့ပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင်၊ ထိုင်းနယ်စပ်ရှိ ဒုက္ခသည် ထုကြီးတစ်ရပ်လုံးအဖို့ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့များက နိုင်ငံသားအတွေ့အကြုံတစ်ရပ် (ဤအတွေ့အကြုံသည် ကျဉ်း မြောင်းသော အတွေ့အကြုံဖြစ်သော်လည်း တကယ်စစ်မှန်သော အတွေ့အကြုံဖြစ်သည်)ကို အစချီပေးခဲ့ပါ သည်။ ဤအတွေ့အကြုံနှစ်ရပ်စလုံး(အများပြည်သူနှင့်ဆိုင်သော ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုအတွေ့အကြုံနှင့် နိုင်ငံသား အတွေ့ အကြုံ) ကို မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး ဖြစ်စဉ်ထဲသို့ ဆောင်ကျဉ်းသွားလိမ့်မည်ဖြစ်ပြီး၊ ဤဖြစ်စဉ်ကိုလည်း အား ဖြည့်ပေးနိုင်ဖွယ်ရှိပါသည်။

### အကြံပြုတင်ပြချက်များ

ဤတွေ့ရှိချက်များ၊ သင်ခန်းစာများနှင့်အညီ အောက်ပါတို့ကို အကြံပြုတင်ပြပါသည်။

စခန်း စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဆင့်၌

- ၁) စခန်းများမှာ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးနေသော NGO အားလုံးအနေနှင့် ဦးစားပေးလုပ်ငန်းသတ်မှတ်ခြင်း၊ လုပ်ငန်းအစီအစဉ် ရေး ဆွဲခြင်း၊ လုပ်ငန်းအစီအစဉ်ဖော်ဆောင်ခြင်း၊ ဘတ်ဂျက်လျှော့ချခြင်းတို့နှင့်စပ်လျဉ်းသော ဆုံးဖြတ်ချက်များ ချရာ၌ ဒုက္ခသည် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို စခန်းလူထု၏ တရားဝင်အုပ်ချုပ်ရေး အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ် သဘော ထားကာ အပြည့်အဝ တိုင်ပင်ဆွေးနွေးရန်။ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုပေးသော NGO များသို့
- ၂) စခန်းများမှာ လုပ်ငန်းဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းအားလုံးအနေနှင့် စခန်းအဆင့် လစဉ် ညှိနှိုင်းရေးအစည်း အဝေးတွင် ပါဝင်ကြပြီး၊ ကွာဟမှုများ၊ နောက်ထပ်ပေါ်ပေါက်လာသော လိုအပ်ချက်များနှင့် ၎င်းကိစ္စများကို အချိန်မှီ မည်သို့ဖြေရှင်းမည် ဆိုသည်များကို ဖော်ထုတ်ရာ၌ ဤအစည်းအဝေးများ၏ တခွင့်တပြင်လုံးဆိုင်ရာ အခန်းကဏ္ဍကို တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန်။ စခန်းကော်မတီများသို့
- ၃) UNHCR အနေနှင့် လက်ရှိ ဒုက္ခသည် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို စခန်းများ၏ တရားဝင် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးနှင့် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုဆိုင်ရာ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ် အသိအမှတ်ပြုပေးပြီး၊ ဤအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစွမ်းရည်ကို မြှင့်တင်ပေးရန်။ UNHCR သို့
- ၄) ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများ၊ စခန်းကော်မတီများအနေနှင့် စခန်းတွင်းရှိ အရွယ်ရောက်ပြီးသူအားလုံး (ရိက္ခာ အထောက် အပံ့ရသူများအဖြစ် သတ်မှတ်ထားသည့်လူဦးရေ အတိုင်း)အား မှတ်ပုံတင်ထားသည်ဖြစ်စေ၊ တင်မထားသည်ဖြစ်စေ (၂၀၁၃)ခုနှစ်၊ ရွေးကောက်ပွဲများတွင် မဲပေးခွင့်ပြုရန်။(အကယ်၍ ထိုင်းအစိုးရက မှတ်ပုံတင်မရှိသူများ မဲပေးခြင်းကို ကန့်ကွက်ပါက ဤပုဂ္ဂိုလ်များ၏ အသံနှင့် ပြဿနာများကို ကြားနာနိုင်စေမည့် အခြားနည်းလမ်းများကို ရှာကြံထား သင့်သည်။) ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများနှင့် အခြားကော်မတီများသို့
- ၅) စခန်း စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းများတွင် အနိမ့်ဆုံးအားဖြင့် အမျိုးသမီး ၃၃% ပါဝင်ရေး သတ်မှတ်ချက် ပြည့်မီအောင် (ဤသတ်မှတ်ချက်ထက် ကျော်လွန်သွားလျှင်ပိုကောင်းသည်) ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများ၊ စခန်းကော်မတီများ၊ (စခန်း အဆင့်နှင့် ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီအဆင့်ရှိ) ရွေးကောက်ပွဲကျင်းပရေးကော်မတီများက လိုအပ်သော အစီအစဉ်များကို ချမှတ်ထားရန်။ အစီအစဉ်များတွင် အမျိုးသမီးများ၏ပါဝင်မှုအတွက် အဟန့်အတားဖြစ်စေသော အကြောင်းအချက် များကို ထိန်းချုပ်ခြင်း သို့မဟုတ် အနည်းဆုံးဖြစ်ခြင်း သို့မဟုတ်

ရှင်းလင်းပစ်ခြင်းအစီအစဉ်များအပါအဝင်ဖြစ်သည်။

ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများနှင့်

စခန်းကော်မတီများသို့

- ၆) လူမျိုးလူနည်းစုနှင့် ဘာသာရေးလူနည်းစုတို့မှာ ပြောရေးဆိုခွင့် ရှိရေးအတွက်၊ ထို့ပြင် ၎င်းတို့၏ ထူးခြားသော လို အပ်ချက်များကို လိုအပ်သလို ထည့်သွင်းစဉ်းစားနိုင်ရေးအတွက် ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများနှင့် စခန်းကော်မတီများက လူနည်းစု တိုက်ရိုက်ကိုယ်စားပြုသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများနှင့် လူနည်းစု အကြံပေးအဖွဲ့များအပါအဝင် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းပေးရန်။  
ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများနှင့် စခန်းကော်မတီများသို့
- ၇) လူငယ်များ၏ အမြင်များ၊ ပြဿနာများနှင့် ပတ်သက်၍ တိုင်ပင်ဆွေးနွေးနိုင်ရေးအတွက်၊ ထို့ပြင် လူငယ်များအတွက် ၎င်း၊ စခန်းတစ်ခုလုံးအတွက်၎င်း အကျိုးရှိစေမည့် လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များတွင် လူငယ်တို့ပါဝင်လာအောင် အားပေးနိုင်ရေး အတွက် ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများနှင့် စခန်းကော်မတီများက လုပ်ထုံးလုပ်နည်းများ(သာဓကအားဖြင့်၊ စခန်းလူထု နှီးနှောဖလှယ်ပွဲ) ချမှတ်ထားရန်။ ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများနှင့် စခန်းကော်မတီများသို့
- ၈) ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီ၊ UNHCR ထိုင်းအစိုးရ၊ IRC/LAC တို့ ပူးပေါင်းဆောင်ရွက်လျက်၊ စခန်း (၉)ခုစလုံး အတွက် ကာကွယ်စောင့်ရှောက်မှုနှင့် တရားမျှတမှုခံစားခွင့်ကို တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန်နှင့် (အေးချမ်းမှု၊ တည်ငြိမ်မှု၊ တရားဥပဒေစိုးမိုးမှု တို့ကို ထိန်းသိမ်းရေးနှင့် ရာဇဝတ်မှုအသေးစားများ၊ စခန်း စည်းမျဉ်း ချိုးဖောက်မှုများကို ဖြေရှင်းရေးအတွက်) စခန်း တရားရေးအဖွဲ့နှင့် စခန်းလုံခြုံရေးအဖွဲ့တို့၏ စွမ်းရည်များကို တိုးမြှင့်ပေးရန်။ UNHCR ထိုင်းအစိုးရနှင့် IRC/LAC သို့
- ၉) UNHCR ထိုင်းအစိုးရ၊ IRC/LAC တို့အနေနှင့် စခန်း စည်းမျဉ်းစည်းကမ်းများကို စခန်းကော်မတီများက ပြင်ဆင် မွမ်းမံခြင်း၊ မြန်နိုင်သမျှ မြန်မြန် အသစ်ထုတ်ပြန်ခြင်းပြုနိုင်အောင် ဆက်လက်ကူညီပေးရန်။ UNHCR ထိုင်းအစိုးရနှင့် IRC/LAC သို့

#### လူသားချင်းစာနာမှု အကူအညီ ညှိနှိုင်းရေးအဆင့်၌

- ၁၀) မြန်မာနိုင်ငံမှာ စတင်နေသော အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းမှုနှင့် (၎င်းနှင့်ဆက်စပ်နေသော)ဒုက္ခသည်များ နေရပ်ရင်းပြန်ရေး လုပ်ငန်းကို ဦးစားပေးနေသော အခြေအနေ၌ လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုဆိုင်ရာ အလှူရှင်များ၏ အလုပ်အဖွဲ့ (DHAWG) အနေနှင့် ဤအဆင့်မှာ ဆောင်ရွက်နေကြသော အဖွဲ့အစည်းပေါင်းစုံ၏ လုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များကို ဖော်ထုတ်ပြီး၊ လွဲချော် မှုများကို ပြုပြင်ပေးမည့် အထောက်အကူပြုလုပ်ငန်းမှာ အာရုံစိုက် ဆောင်ရွက်ရန်။ (DHAWG) နှင့် ဦးဆောင် အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့သို့
- ၁၁) (DHAWG) အနေနှင့် အလှူရှင် အသိုင်းအဝိုင်းအဖို့ဆက်လက်အထောက်အကူပြုပေးမှု၊ ညှိနှိုင်းဆောင်ရွက်မှု၊ လုပ် ငန်းအရှိန်မပျက် လည်ပတ်မှု၊ အချိန်သင့်အခါသင့် သတင်းအချက်အလက်များ၊ ကိုယ်ပိုင် ပိုင်းခြားသုံးသပ်မှုများ ရှိစေ မည့် အတွင်းရေးမှူးအဖွဲ့ငယ်တဖွဲ့ကို ဖွဲ့စည်းထားခြင်းအားဖြင့် မိမိ၏ ထိရောက်စွာဆောင်ရွက်နိုင်စွမ်းကို တိုးမြှင့်ရန်။ (DHAWG) နှင့် ဦးဆောင် အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့သို့
- ၁၂) ဒုက္ခသည်ကော်မတီများကို စခန်း(၉)ခုစလုံး၏ တရားဝင် ကိုယ်စားလှယ်အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ် တရားဝင်အသိအ မှတ်ပြုပေးရန်။ ထို့ပြင် DHAWG ၏ အစီအစဉ်ရေးဆွဲခြင်းနှင့် ဦးစားပေးလုပ်ငန်း သတ်မှတ်ခြင်း လုပ်ငန်းများတွင် ၎င်းတို့ကို တရားဝင် ထည့်သွင်းရန်။ (DHAWG) နှင့် ဦးဆောင် အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့သို့



- ၁၃) (DHAWG) အနေနှင့် ဒုက္ခသည် စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှု အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို ထောက်ပံ့ခြင်း၊ အင်အားတောင့်တင်းအောင် ဆောင်ရွက်ပေးခြင်းတို့တွင် TBBC ၏ ဦးဆောင်မှုအခန်းကဏ္ဍကို တရားဝင် အတည်ပြုပေးရန်၊ ထို့ပြင် ဤအဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏ စွမ်းရည်တည်ဆောက်မှုနှင့် အထွေထွေလုပ်ဆောင်ချက်များအတွက် လုံလောက်သော ဘဏ္ဍာငွေများ သတ်မှတ်ပေးရန်နှင့် လူသားချင်းစာနာမှုအကူအညီနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအဖွဲ့အစည်းပေါ် သင့်တော်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းတခုအား ကြီးကြပ်စေရန်။ (DHAWG) နှင့် ဦးဆောင် အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့သို့
- ၁၄) မြန်မာနိုင်ငံသား ဒုက္ခသည်များ နေရပ်ရင်းပြန်ရေးအတွက် ကြိုတင်ပြင်ဆင်မှု နည်းလမ်းတရပ်ကို ညှိနှိုင်းချမှတ်ရာ၌ အလှူရှင်အသိုင်းအဝိုင်း၏ ကိုယ်စား ခေါင်းဆောင်မှုပေး ပေးပါမည့်အကြောင်း DHAWG က UNHCR အား မေတ္တာ ရပ်ခံရန်။ DHAWG နှင့် UNHCR သို့
- ၁၅) ဒုက္ခသည်များ နေရပ်ရင်းပြန်ရေးကိစ္စနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ အသွင်ကူးပြောင်းရေး အစီအစဉ်ရေးဆွဲနေသော အခြေအနေ၊ အချိန်အခါ၌ DHAWG အနေနှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းတခုကို ငှားရမ်းပြီး၊ လာမည့် (၅)နှစ်မှ (၁၀)နှစ်အတွင်း မြန်မာနိုင်ငံ၏ တိုင်းပြည်တည်ဆောက်ရေးလုပ်ငန်းများကို စခန်းစီမံ အုပ်ချုပ်မှုပုံစံ၊ စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုအတွေ့အကြုံ၊ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ရာ ၌ အသုံးပြုသော လက်သုံးကိရိယာများ၊ စွမ်းရည်များက အကောင်းဆုံး အကျိုးပြုနိုင်မည့် နည်းလမ်းများကို ပို၍အသေးစိတ်သောမဟာဗြူဟာမြောက် ပိုင်းခြားသုံးသပ်မှုတခု လုပ်စေရန်။ (DHAWG) နှင့် ဦးဆောင် အလှူရှင်အဖွဲ့သို့

ထိုင်းနိုင်ငံရောက် ဒုက္ခသည်များဆိုင်ရာ ဝန်ဆောင်မှုများအတွက် ညှိနှိုင်းရေးကော်မတီ (Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand-CCSDPT) က တာဝန်ယူကာ အကြံပြုချက် (၉)ချက်ကို စခန်း(၉)ခုမှာ စတင်အကောင်အထည်ဖော်စေသင့်သည်ဟု ကျွန်ုပ်တို့အကြံပြုပါသည်။ ထို့ပြင် ကနေဒါနိုင်ငံ နိုင်ငံတကာဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးအေဂျင်စီ (Canadian International Development Agency-CIDA) နှင့် သြစတေးလျနိုင်ငံ နိုင်ငံတကာ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးရေးအေဂျင်စီ (Australian Agency for International Development-AusAID) တို့က တာဝန်ယူကာ အချက်(၆)ချက်ကို လူသားချင်း စာနာမှုအကူအညီ ညှိနှိုင်းရေး အဆင့်မှာ စတင်အကောင်အထည်ဖော်စေရန်လည်း အကြံပြုပါသည်။

### နိဂုံးချုပ်

စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်သည် ယေဘုယျအားဖြင့် ကောင်းစွာလည်ပတ်လှုပ်ရှားခဲ့ကြောင်းနှင့် ဒုက္ခသည် ရေးရာကိစ္စများနှင့်ပတ်သက်၍ ပါဝင်ဆောင်ရွက်ခြင်း၊ စီမံအုပ်ချုပ်ခြင်းပြုရာ၌ အဖိုးထိုက်တန်သော စံနမူနာ ပုံစံတခုဖြစ်ကြောင်း အကဲဖြတ်အဖွဲ့က တွေ့ရှိခဲ့ပါသည်။ ဤစနစ်၏ အဖွဲ့အစည်းများကို ဒုက္ခသည်လူထုအများစုက တရားဝင်ပြီး၊ ထိရောက်စွာစွမ်းဆောင်နိုင်သော အဖွဲ့အစည်းများအဖြစ် မှတ်ယူထားပါသည်။ သို့ရာတွင် ဤစနစ်သည် အကြပ်အတည်းတွေ့နေသည်ဖြစ်ရာ၊ စခန်းအဆင့်မှာ သာမက၊ ညှိနှိုင်းရေးအဆင့်မှာပါ အင်အားပိုရှိလာအောင် တည်ဆောက်ပေးရမည်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။ စနစ်ကို အားပိုရှိလာအောင်နှင့် စနစ်လည်ပတ်လှုပ်ရှားရာ ပတ်ဝန်းကျင်ကို ပြုပြင်ပေးရန်ဖြစ်ပါသည်။

ထိုင်းနယ်စပ်တလျှောက် စခန်းများမှာ နေထိုင်နေကြသော ဒုက္ခသည် (၁၄၀, ၀၀၀)၏ ကောင်းကျိုးနှင့် အုပ်ချုပ်ရေးအတွက် လက်သုံးကိရိယာတခုအနေနှင့် စခန်းစီမံအုပ်ချုပ်မှုစနစ်ကို ပြုစုစောင့်ရှောက်ပေးခြင်းနှင့် ပိုမိုကောင်းအောင်ပြုပြင်ပေးခြင်းပြုသင့်ပါသည်။ ဤစနစ်သည် မြန်မာနိုင်ငံပြည်သူများနှင့် အဖွဲ့အစည်းများ၏

တိုင်းပြည်တည်ဆောက်ရေးလုပ်ငန်း(ဤလုပ်ငန်းတွင်  
ပြန်ရေးကိစ္စလည်းအပါအဝင်ဖြစ်သည်)အတွက် တန်ဖိုးရှိသော မှတ်ကျောက်တခု ဖြစ်လာဖွယ်လည်း ရှိပါသည်။





တၢ်အိၣ်ဖျိၣ်ဒီးပုၤလၢအဘၣ်ထွဲဘၣ်ဃးအခိၣ်နၢ်အကရူၢ်လၢအိၣ်လၢကီၢ်ကွီၣ်တၢ်အပူၤတဖၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်ဝဲ, DHAWG, RCs ဒီး OCDP/MOI တဖၣ် န့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်တီၣ်ဖျါထီၣ်တၢ်ဂ့ၢ်လၢတၢ်မၤအိၣ်အကတၢ်တဘျီအိၣ်အိၣ်တၢ်ဟ့ၣ်ကွီၣ်တၢ်ဟ့ၣ်ဖးဆၢကတၢ်လၢတၢ်မၤန့ၢ်အိၣ်လၢတၢ် အိၣ်ဖျိၣ်အဆၢကတၢ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. နီၤလဲၣ်ဂ့ၢ်ပုၤဖးတၢ်ဖိလၢအသးစဲတဖၣ်ကကွၢ်ဝဲလၢလံာ်ဘျးစဲ ၁၂ လၢအိၣ်ဖျါဝဲဖးထီၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်တၢ်တီၣ်ထီၣ်တၢ် ဂ့ၢ်လၢတၢ်ဂ့ၢ်အရူၢ်ဒိၣ်လၢတၢ်ကွဲးဖျါကွၢ်အိၣ်တဖၣ်လၢတၢ်ကတိၤသကိးအိၣ်လၢတၢ်အိၣ်ဖျိၣ်အဆၢကတၢ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ.

### တၢ်အစၢလၢတၢ်ဃုထံၣ်န့ၢ်အိၣ်တဖၣ် တၢ်နီၣ်ပၢ်တၢ်ပၢ်ဆၢကတၢ်အကူၢ်အကီၢ်

အဆၢကတၢ်အိၣ်အိၣ်ကဝီၤခွဲဖျါလၢအိၣ်လၢကီၢ်ကွီၣ်တၢ်အကီၢ်ဆၢတဖၣ်ဂ့ၢ်ထီၣ်ပသီထီၣ်ဝဲကယီၤကယီၤအဃိ, တၢ်ပၢ်ဆၢကဝီၤအကူၢ်အကီၢ်န့ၣ်တၢ်ဒုး အိၣ်ထီၣ်အိၣ်လၢကရူၢ်လၢတၢ်ကဟံးန့ၢ်မၤမုၢ်ဒါအကီၢ်ဒီးလၢပုၤတကရူၢ်ဘၣ်တကရူၢ်အပူၤန့ၣ်ပၣ်ဃုာ်ဒီးတၢ်ကရၢကရီၤအတၢ်ဘျးစဲလိာ်သးတနီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤအကူၢ်အကီၢ်အတၢ်ပညိၣ်တဖၣ်လဲၣ်လၢတၢ်ကဘၣ်မၤအိၣ်လဲၣ်န့ၣ်, ကဘၣ်တၢ်ပၢ်ဆၢကဝီၤအိၣ်လၢတၢ်ကရၢကရီၤတနီၤ လၢအိၣ်ဒီးအ တၢ်သုတၢ်ဘၣ်လၢတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤတၢ်အပူၤဒီး မၤတၢ်တုၤလီၤတီၤလီၤလၢ တၢ်ဒုးဘၣ်လိာ်ဖိးဒုတၢ်လၢကရူၢ်တဖၣ်တဖုအပူၤဒီးလၢကရူၢ်လဲၣ် လၢအ ပူၤ န့ၣ် လီၤ.

ပုၤကရူၢ်အိၣ်ထံးတဖုန့ၣ်ပကိးအိၣ်လၢ “ဒဲကဝီၤအကရူၢ်” န့ၣ်မ့ၢ်ကရၢတဖၣ်လၢအဘၣ်ဃးဒီးတၢ်ဆၢဃီတၢ်ဆူဒဲကဝီၤတဖၣ်လၢအနီၢ်ကကစၢ်ဒုၣ် န့ၣ် လီၤ. ပုၤအိၣ်သ့ၣ်မိၢ်ပုၤလၢပုၤကရူၢ်အိၣ်အပူၤန့ၣ်မ့ၢ်ပုၤမၤတၢ်လၢပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲအကမံးတံာ်ခဲကဒီး ဒဲကဝီၤခွဲဖျါအကမံးတံာ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤ လၢ အိၣ်လၢဒဲကဝီၤခွဲဖျါအကမံးတံာ်အဖီလၢဒီးကဘၣ်ဟံးဖျါထီၣ်တၢ်ဂ့ၢ်ဆူအဝဲသ့ၣ်အအိၣ်န့ၣ်မ့ၢ်ဒဲကဝီၤဒုခိၣ်တဖၣ်လၢဘၣ်တၢ်ဆိၣ်ထွဲ မၤ စၢၤ အိၣ် ကဝီၤဒုကမံးတံာ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤအကျါအကျဲအတၢ်ဆီလီၤသးတဖၣ်အိၣ်ဘၣ်တၢ်ဆိၣ်ထွဲမၤစၢၤအိၣ်လၢထံၣ်ဂ့ၢ်ကီၢ်ဂၤကရၢသ ဘျး တ ဖၣ် လၢအမၤတၢ်လၢတၢ်အိၣ်ဆူၣ်အိၣ်ဒုးဒီးတၢ်ကဆူကဆူ, တၢ်ကွီၣ်ဘၣ်ကွီၣ်သ့, တၢ်အိၣ်တၢ်အိၣ်, တၢ်သ့ၣ်ထီၣ်တၢ်အိၣ်ကဒုလီၤဒီးလၢတ ဆိၣ် ထွဲ မၤ စၢၤတၢ်အိၣ်တဖၣ်, ဃုာ်ဝဲဒီးတၢ်မၤစၢၤတၢ်ပၢ်ဆၢကဝီၤကျဲတၢ်တဖၣ်လၢအဘၣ်တၢ်ဆိၣ်ထွဲမၤစၢၤအိၣ်လၢထံၣ်ဘၣ်ဘၣ်စံၣ်, ဒီးတၢ်ဟ့ၣ်တၢ်အိၣ်ကဒုအ တၢ်အိၣ်ဆိးအလီၤအကျဲတဖၣ်လၢပူၤအနီၢ်ဒီးလဲၣ်လၢတၢ်ဖဲဘၣ်ကရၢသဘျုးလီၤဆီလၢအမၤစၢၤဒဲကဝီၤယဲၤဖျါလၢဒဲကဝီၤခွဲဖျါအကျါလၢအမ့ၢ် IRC/LAC န့ၣ်လီၤ. ကရၢသဘျုးအတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤလၢဒဲကဝီၤတဖၣ်အပူၤန့ၣ်ဘၣ်တၢ်မၤသကိးအိၣ်ဒီး CCSDPT အကမံးတံာ်တဖၣ် လၢအ ဒုး ဘျးစဲ တၢ်လၢကရၢသဘျုးတဖၣ်ဒီးကွီၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ် (RTG)အဘၣ်စၢၤန့ၣ်လီၤ.

ပုၤကရူၢ်ခဲဖုတဖုန့ၣ်ပကိးအိၣ်လၢ “ပုၤဟ့ၣ်မၤဘျုးစဲအကရူၢ်” န့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤဟ့ၣ်မၤဘျုးစဲအထံၣ်ကီၢ်တဖၣ်ညိၣ်န့ၢ်ဟ့ၣ်ခိၣ်ဖျါဝဲဂ့ၢ်ကီၢ်အမိၢ်သီဝဲဒးတ ဖၣ်(ထံၣ်ကီၢ်ပဒိၣ်ခါးစးလၢကီၢ်ဂၤကတီၢ်), လၢအန့ၣ်လီၤပၣ်ဃုာ်လၢပုၤဟ့ၣ်မၤစၢၤတၢ်လၢပုၤဂီၢ်အတၢ်လိာ်ဘၣ်ကရူၢ်မၤသကိးတၢ် (DHAWG) အ ပူၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤဟ့ၣ်မၤဘျုးစဲခိၣ်သ့ၣ်မိၢ်ပုၤတဖၣ်မ့ၢ်ဝဲကီၢ်အခဲကဒီးကီၢ်ယုၤရပူၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. ကရူၢ်မၤသကိးတၢ်အိၣ်န့ၣ်, တဂၤလၢ အကတီၢ်ဒုၣ်န့ၣ်မၤ သကိးတၢ်ဒီးနီၤ ဟ့ၣ်လီၤတၢ်ဂ့ၢ်တၢ်ကျဲတဖၣ်ဆူCCSDPT ဒီးဆူအနီၢ်ကစၢ်တၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤတၢ်ရဲၣ်တၢ်ကျဲတဖၣ်အပူၤဒီးကဲထီၣ်ပုၤခါးသးလၢတၢ်ရဲၣ် လိာ် သးဒီး UNHCRဒီးဃုာ်တၢ်ဟ့ၣ်ကွီၣ်ဟ့ၣ်ဖးဒီးမၤသကိးတၢ်ဒီးပုၤအကီၢ်ဒိၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်ကွီၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ် (RTG)န့ၣ်လီၤ. သန့ၣ်ကပုၤဟ့ၣ်မၤဘျုးစဲအကရၢ တဖၣ်ဟ့ၣ်လီၤကျိၣ်စုတၢ်မၤစၢၤလၢတၢ်ကမၤတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤလၢဒဲကဝီၤတဖၣ်အပူၤခိၣ်ဖျါထီၣ်ဘၣ်ဘၣ်စံၣ်အတၢ်ကရၢကရီၤဒီးကရၢသဘျုးအပူၤအဂၤတဖၣ် န့ၣ်လီၤ.

ပုၤကရူၢ်သၢဖုတဖုမ့ၢ်ဝဲကွီၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ်လၢပကိးအိၣ်လၢ “ကွီၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ်အကရူၢ်” န့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤမၤတၢ်အကီၢ်ဒိၣ်လၢတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤအပူၤတဖၣ်ပၣ်ဃုာ် ဝဲဒီးထံၣ်ကီၢ်တၢ်ဘၣ်တၢ်ဘၢအပူၤကွီၣ်လိာ်တၢ်ကရၢ(NSC),ကွီၣ်တၢ်ကီၢ်ပုၤကီၢ်တီၢ်ဝဲကျိၣ်(MOI), ကွီၣ်တၢ်သုးကီၢ်ချၢတၢ်မၤအသးကီၢ်တီၢ်ဝဲကျိၣ် (MFA)ဒီး MOI အဝဲဒးလီၤလၢပုၤဃုာ်မ့ၢ်ဖျါတဖၣ်အကီၢ် (OCDP) လၢကဘၣ်အၢၣ်လီၤတူၢ်လိာ်ဝဲCCSDP အပူၤမၤတၢ်ကရၢတဖၣ် အတၢ်မၤ တၢ်ရဲၣ်တၢ်ကျဲတဖၣ်, ဒီးမၤသကိးတၢ်ဒီး UNHCR ဒီးကရၢအပူၤအကတၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်ဟံးဖျါထီၣ်တၢ်ဂ့ၢ်ဆူMOI အအိၣ်န့ၣ်မ့ၢ်ဝဲကီၢ် ဆၣ် လွံာ် ဘၣ်လၢပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ် ခဲအိၣ်လၢအပူၤတဖၣ်, လၢဘၣ်တၢ်ပၢ်ဆၢကဝီၤလၢကီၢ်ရဲၣ်ခိၣ်ခဲ (Deputy District Officers) တဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤတဖၣ်အိၣ် ကဘၣ်တီၣ်ဖျါထီၣ်တၢ်ဂ့ၢ် ခိၣ်ဖျါအကီၢ်ရဲၣ်ဝဲဒးလီၤဒီးဆူပုၤဘၣ်မုာ်ဒါအဝဲဒးလၢတၢ်ဖိခိၣ်တဆီန့ၣ်လီၤ. ကီၢ်ရဲၣ်ခိၣ်တဖၣ် ကမၤသကိးတၢ်လီၤ လီၤဒီးလၢခဲကတၢ်ဟံးဃုာ်အတၢ်စိတၢ်ကမီၤလၢဒဲကဝီၤကမံးတံာ်တဖၣ်ဒီးအဝဲသ့ၣ်အတၢ်ဆီလီၤဟံးလီၤလၢအဖီလၢပတီၢ်ဖုၣ်န့ၢ်အိၣ်တဖၣ်အဖီခိၣ် န့ၣ်လီၤ.

အါတက့ၢ်လၢအပူၤကွီၣ်တၢ်ဆၢကတီၢ်အနီၢ်ခဲဆဲအတီၢ်ပူၤန့ၣ်,ပုၤမၤတၢ်အကရူၢ်တဖၣ်ဂ့ၢ်ထီၣ်ပသီထီၣ်ဝဲလၢတၢ်ရဲၣ်လိာ်မုာ်လိာ်သးအပူၤဒီးအိၣ်ဒီးတၢ်စုး ဖျိၣ်ရဲၣ်လိာ်အသးဒီးဒုးကဲထီၣ်ဝဲတၢ်မူအတၢ်အကျါအကျဲတကလုာ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်မူတၢ်အကျါအကျဲန့ၣ်တၢ်ပညိၣ်အိၣ်အကလုာ်ကလုာ်လၢတၢ် ကမၤဘၣ်လိာ်ကတၢ်, တၢ်ကုၤမၤကုၤဒဲအလီၤလီၤတဖၣ်, စံးဆၢကတၢ်ဒီးကျဲဘၣ်လိာ်ကုၤပုၤမၤတၢ်အသိတဖၣ်ဒီးဆီတလဲတၢ်အိၣ်သးလၢအလိာ် ဘၣ်တၢ်ဆီတလဲအိၣ်တဖၣ်, ဒီးထၢဖျိၣ်တၢ်ဖိတၢ်လဲလၢအဆိၣ်ထွဲမၤစၢၤတၢ်တဖၣ်လၢကမၤကဲထီၣ် လိာ်ထီၣ်အတၢ်ပညိၣ်လၢအဒုးအိၣ်ထီၣ်ဝဲ တဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်ကုၤကွၢ်ကုၤတၢ်မၤတၢ်အိၣ်မူတၢ်အကျါအကျဲလၢအပူၤကွီၣ်တဖၣ်အါတက့ၢ်မ့ၢ်တၢ်လၢတၢ်မၤအိၣ်တုၤလီၤတီၤလီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ.ပဟံးလီၤ တၢ်ဂ့ၢ်မိၢ်ပုၤခါးဘၣ်ဃးဒီးပတၢ်ထံၣ်လၢတၢ်မၤတၢ်အိၣ်မူတၢ်အကျါအကျဲတဖၣ်. တၢ်အိၣ်ထံးတၢ်မၤမ့ၢ်ဝဲ, တၢ်ထံၣ်စိတၢ်ဒီးတၢ်အလုၢ်အပူၤတဖၣ် ဒီးခဲခါတခါန့ၣ်မ့ၢ်ဝဲ,ကဲကဲအတၢ်န့ၢ်လိာ်သးန့ၣ်လီၤ. ပမ့ၢ်ကွီၣ်တၢ်ရဲၣ်လိာ် မုာ်လိာ်အတၢ်မၤသကိး တၢ် လၢအပူၤတဖၣ် န့ၣ်မ့ၢ်ဝဲတၢ်ဟ့ၣ်လီၤသးလၢ ပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲအတၢ်အိၣ်မူဂ့ၢ်ထီၣ်အကီၢ်ဒီးပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲအလုၢ်အပူၤဒီးတၢ်မၤလိာ်သးလၢတၢ်မၤတၢ်တီၤလီၤလီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ.



တၢ်ကွၢ်ကဒါသံသမိးက့ၤတၢ်အံၤကွၢ်ယုသုညါစှၢ်ကီးဝဲဘဉ်ဃးပုၤဘဉ်ကီၣ်ဘဉ်ခဲလၢဒဲကဝီၤပူၤတဖၣ်အတၢ်ဘဉ်ဒိၣ်ဘဉ်ထံးလိာ်သးဒီးကွီၣ်တၢ်အပူၤ တဝါလၢအိၣ်လၢခိၣ်ဃၢၤကဝီၣ်ကဟတဖၣ်. တၢ်ဘဉ်ဒိၣ်ဘဉ်ထံးလိာ်သးဒ်အံၤသ့ၣ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်မ့ၢ်တၢ်လၢအဂ့ၢ် မ့တမ့ၢ် တမ့ၢ်တၢ်လၢအဂ့ၢ်ခဲလၢခိၣ်န့ၣ် တမ့ၢ်တၢ်လၢတၢ်ဟးဒိၣ်လၢတၢ်ပၤဆုၤဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်ဆီလီၤဟ်လီၤတၢ်မၤအကျဲကပူၤတဖၣ်အပူၤန့ၣ်ဘဉ်. တၢ်ဂ့ၢ်မ့ၢ်အိၣ်ထီၣ်လၢဒဲကဝီၤဒီးကွီၣ်တၢ် အပူၤတဝါဖီအဘျီစၢၤန့ၣ်, ဒဲကဝီၤကဝံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်ဒီးပုၤတဝါအခိၣ်န့ၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်ကွီၣ်တၢ်ခိၣ်န့ၣ်လၢအပၤဆုၤဒဲကဝီၤပူၤတဖၣ်ကဘဉ်န့ၣ်လီၤမၤဗျုမၤ ဖိးက့ၤတၢ်လၢပုၤခံၣ်ဖုအဘျီစၢၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. နဲလဲၣ်ဂ့ၢ်ဂ့ၢ်, ကွီၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ် (RTG) ကရၢအဂ့ၢ်အဂၤ(သုၣ်ပုၤဝဲကျိၤ, ဂၤသးဒီးသး)ဘဉ်ယီၣ်ဝဲ လၢကွီၣ် တၢ်ခိၣ်န့ၣ်လၢအပၤဆုၤဒဲကဝီၤတဖၣ် (Camp commanders)ဒီးကွီၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ်လၢမၤတၢ်လၢတၢ်ကိပူၤတဖၣ် (MOI)တဖၣ်ကါဝဲကွီၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ် (RTG) အတၢ်သိၣ်တၢ်သိတဖၣ်လၢအဘဉ်ဃးဒီးဒဲကဝီၤတဖၣ်တုၤလီၤတၢ်လီၤဘဉ်လီၤဆီဒေၣ်တၢ်လၢပုၤဘဉ်ကီၣ်ဘဉ်ခဲအတၢ်ဟးထီၣ်ဟးလီၤလၢဒဲကဝီၤမအပူၤ အချၢတဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. ကွီၣ်တၢ်ခိၣ်န့ၣ်လၢအပၤဆုၤဒဲကဝီၤတနီၤစံးဝဲလၢတၢ်သိၣ်တၢ်သိတၢ်ဘျုးတနီၤမ့ၢ်တၢ်လၢအကီၤလၢတၢ်ကဘဉ်မၤအိၣ်မ့ၢ်လၢဒဲကဝီၤ တမ့ၢ်တၢ်လီၤလၢတၢ်ကဘဉ်န့ၣ်ဃာ်အိၣ်အမ့ၢ်ပုၤဃာ်ဖီအသိးအိၣ်ဒီးတၢ်န့ၣ်ဃာ်အိၣ်အကနူၤဝးတရံးဘဉ်ဘဉ်ဘာဘၢန့ၣ်ဘဉ်. ဒဲကဝီၤတဖၣ်တမ့ၢ်တၢ် လၢတၢ်ကဘဉ်ဖီအိၣ်အမ့ၢ်ဃာ်အသိးဘဉ်မ့ၢ်လၢပုၤဘဉ်ကီၣ်ဘဉ်ခဲတဖၣ်တမ့ၢ်ပုၤလၢအဘဉ်မၤကမၣ်တၢ်ဖီတဖၣ်ဒီးပုၤဃာ်ဖီတဖၣ်န့ၣ်ဘဉ်.

တၢ်ဟ့ၣ်တၢ်ဆိၣ်ထွဲမၤစၢၤလီၤတၢ်လီၤဆဲးဆူတၢ်ပၤဆွၢၤဒဲးကဝီၤအတၢ်ဖဲးတၢ်မၤန့ၣ်ကဲထီၣ်အသးဖဲတယံာ်ဒီးဘၣ်အံၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. လၢအပူၤကွၢ်အနီၣ်ခံဆဲးန့ၣ်, UNHCR ဒီးကရၢသဘူတဖၣ်တပံးန့ၢ်မၤအမူအဒါမ့တမ့ၢ်ဆိၣ်ထွဲမၤစၢၤတၢ်လၢတၢ်ပၤဆွၢၤဒဲးကဝီၤတၢ်မၤတဖၣ်အပူၤန့ၣ် ဘၣ်. မ့ၢ်တခီအဝဲသ့ၣ် မၤတၢ်ဒီးပုၤတၢ်တဖၣ်ထဲဒၣ်တၢ်လၢအဘၣ်သးဒီးအဝဲသ့ၣ်အတၢ်ဖဲးတၢ်မၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်မၤလၢအမ့ၢ်တၢ်ဆိၣ်ထွဲမၤစၢၤတၢ်လၢ တၢ်မၤန့ၣ်တၢ်လုာ်အိၣ်လုာ်အိၣ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်ဘၣ်တၢ်မၤအိၣ်လၢထီၣ်ဘၣ်ဘၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်ပုၤတဖုလၢအဂ့ၢ်ကတၢ်လၢကတၢ်တီၣ်ဖီၣ်တီၣ်က့ၢ်တၢ်မၤအံၤမ့ၢ်လၢအဝဲသ့ၣ်အၢၣ်လီၤအိၣ်လီၤသးလၢကမၤစၢၤဟ့ၣ်အါထီၣ်ပုၤဘၣ်ကီဘၣ်ခဲတဖၣ်အတၢ်စိတၢ်ကမီၤဒီးမၤဆူၣ်ထီၣ်အတၢ်ရဲလိာ်မုၢ်လီၤလၢအမ့ၢ်တၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤသးအါထီၣ်ဒီးပုၤဘၣ်ကီဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံာ်တဖၣ်အဂီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. စးထီၣ်လၢတၢ်သမံသမိးကွၢ်အိၣ်လၢ၂၀၀၃န့ၣ်န့ၣ်, တၢ်ဖဲးတၢ်မၤအတၢ်ဂ့ၢ်ထီၣ်ပသီထီၣ်အိၣ်ဝဲအါမးဒ်အမ့ၢ်, တၢ်ပၤဆွၢၤတၢ်လီၤတၢ်လီၤဆဲးဒီးတၢ်ဆိလီၤဟံလီၤတၢ်ပၤတၢ်ပြဲးတၢ်မၤတဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်မၤအအကျါအကျဲတဖၣ်အလီၤအကျဲဘၣ်ဝဲဒီးဘၣ်တၢ်မၤအိၣ်သးသိးသိးလၢဒဲးကဝီၤခဲလၢာ်အပူၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်ဒုးအိၣ်ထီၣ်တၢ်ဟံၣ်ဖျါတၢ်ဖဲးတၢ်မၤအကျဲလၢတၢ်ကဘၣ်မၤအိၣ်တဖၣ်လၢပုၤမၤတၢ်ဖိကဲးဂးဒီးအဂီၢ်လၢအ

အိတ်လတ်ဆီလီဟ်လီဟ်တမအကျကပူအံအပူ၊ တဟ်ဟ်တသိတ်လီလတ်အဘဉ်ဃးတမအါမံဒီးတဟ်ဟ်တသိတ်လီဘဉ်ဃးတသုတ်ထီတဟ်သုတ်ဘဉ်တဖဉ်ဆူပုလတ်အဘဉ်ထွဲတဖဉ်အဂီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ။ ပုမတမိအသကဲးပတ်တဟ်သိတ်တသိတ်ဘျုး (Codes of Conduct) တဖဉ်ဘဉ်တဟ်တဟ်လီၤအီၤလံလတ်ဘဉ်ကိဘဉ်ခဲကမံးတံးတဖဉ်ဒီးပုမတမိခဲလတ်လတ်အအိတ်လတ်ဆီလီဟ်လီဟ်တမအကျကပူအံအပူန့ၣ်လီၤဒ်လဲၣ်ဂုၤ၊ တတတတအိတ်ဒီးဝဲလတ်ကပုဆုတမံးတမအတတ်သုတ်ဘဉ်တဖဉ်အဖီခိၣ်လီၤဆီတဟ်ခိၣ်ဖျိလတ်နီၣ်လီၤလံလတ်အဟံးန့ၣ်ဝဲတမံးတမအကါဒိတ်တဖဉ်သုးလီၤသုးကျဆူကီၢ်သုတ်ဘဉ်ဒီးတဟ်ဘဉ်ဃုထီတဟ်တလီၤလီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ။ အါန့ၣ်အန့ၣ်၊ တတတတအသိတ်တဖဉ်ကဟံးဖျိထီၣ်ဝဲလတ်သးစါဆါလတ်ဆုကုပုဘဉ်ကိဘဉ်ခဲဆူအဂီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ။ လတ်န့ၣ်အသိတ်ကလဲဆူညါအဂီၢ်မုတ်လတ်အလီၤအိတ်ဝဲသုတ်ကတတ်လတ်ပုဟ်မုတ်မုတ်စါတမပုတတကဘဉ်အဂီၢ်လီၤဟ်ဖျါအါထီတဟ်လီၤတဟ်လီၤဆဲးလတ်ပုဆုကဲးကဝီၤမုတ်တမလတ်အကစါဒ်ဝဲကဘဉ်ဟံးစုန့ၣ်ကျအီၤလတ်အကျအကျဘဉ်ဘဉ်ဒီးဆီၣ်ထွဲမုတ်စါကျိၣ်စုန့ၣ်လီၤ။

တဟ်ဂုၤတဟ်ကျိၣ်အကျိၣ်တမလတ်အမုတ်မုတ်မုတ်လတ်လတ်မုတ်မုတ်ပုဂံၢ်ဝီအတတ်လိတ်ဘဉ်တဖဉ်အပတီၢ်န့ၣ်မုတ်မုတ်ဒိတ်လံဝဲတမံးတမဒီးတဟ်န့ၣ်တဟ်ပုဆုကဲးကဝီၤအတတ်မုတ်မုတ်ကျိၣ်အကျိၣ်န့ၣ်မုတ်မုတ်န့ၣ်လီၤသးဆဲးလီၤစုၤလီၤလတ်ကဒီးတကအဖီခိၣ်လတ်အမုတ်တဟ်လံတကါဒိတ်ကမံးဆါ ကုၤ တဟ်မုတ်တဟ် လီၤတဟ်လီၤဒီးတဟ်ကုၤကဒါကုၤအလီၤလီၤ လတ်န့ၣ်တဖဉ်အပူန့ၣ်လီၤ။ ထံၣ်ဘဉ်ဘဉ်စံၣ်ထီၣ်သုတ်ညါဝဲလတ်ပုဟ်မုတ်ထွဲကဝီၤက မံးတံးတဖဉ်နီၣ်လီၤန့ၣ်ဟုးသုဆူပုဒုးတဟ်ယတ်တဖဉ် (လတ်ဆီတလဲအဂီၢ်၊ ဟ်လီၤပုမံးတမိတဖဉ်လတ်ကဝီၤကန့ၣ်ဝဲတရံး) လတ်အခိၣ်ထံးန့ၣ်တဟ်တဒုးသုတ်ညါပုလတ်အဟုၣ်မုတ်စါစုတဖဉ်ဘဉ်ဒီး တဟ်န့ၣ်လီၤသးလတ်ပုတဖုတဖုအဘဉ်စါန့ၣ်တဟ်ထံၣ်အီၤလတ်အလီၤစုၤဝဲ၊ အသိတ်အိတ်ထီတဟ်ကီၢ်တဟ်ဒီးတဟ်ကဘဉ်ကုၤကုၤကျိၣ်အီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ။ တဟ်န့ၣ်လီၤသးကဲးကဲးကဘဉ်အိတ်ဝဲဒီးတဟ်ကဘဉ်သုတ်ထီၣ်ကုၤအီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ။ ပနံၣ်လတ်ဟ်မုတ်စါတဟ်ဂုၤအကျိၣ်တမလတ်အံၤန့ၣ်၊ တဟ်သုတ်ညါန့ၣ်ပုဟ်တဟ်တဒ်သိးထံးလီၤသးလတ်ထံၣ်ဘဉ်ဘဉ်စံၣ်ဒီးပုမတမိလတ်အမုတ်ဟ်ဝဲတဖဉ်လတ်အိတ်တဟ်လီၤန့ၣ်သုတ်တဖဉ်အဘဉ်စါဒီးပုဟ်မုတ်မုတ်စုတဖဉ်ဆီတလဲသးခဲအံၤခဲအံၤအဘဉ်စါန့ၣ်လီၤ။ တဟ်ဂုၤအဂုၤအကတဖဉ်အကျိၣ်န့ၣ်၊ ပုဟ်မုတ်မုတ်ဘဉ်တဟ်တဖဉ်ကဘဉ်မုတ်မုတ်အါထီၣ်အဝဲသုတ်တကဘဉ်တကအတတ်သုတ်ညါန့ၣ်ပုဟ်ဘဉ်ဃးတဟ်ကဲထီၣ်သးအလီၤဝဲန့ၣ်လတ်ခိၣ်ထံးကအိတ်ဂါအိတ်ကျိၣ်အဂီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ။



## တၢ်မၤလိတဖၣ်

တၢ်မၤလိတဖၣ်အိၣ်ဝဲသၢခါလၢအဟဲတၢ်တၢ်သမံသမိးအဝဲအံၤအပူၤလၢအမ့ၢ်တၢ်လၢအိၣ်ဒီးအလုၢ်အပူၤဒ်လၢတၢ်ဖီလၢ်အသိး.

၁. ပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲအပူၤတၢ်တဖၣ်အပူၤအိၣ်ဝဲဒီးတၢ်မၤတၢ်သုၣ်နီၣ်အကံၢ်အစီလၢအမ့ၢ်တၢ်ကွၢ်ထွဲလီၤနီၣ်ကစၢ်အသးဒီးတၢ်ပၤဆှၢရဲၣ်ကျဲၤလီၤနီၣ်ကစၢ်အသးန့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်လဲၤခီဖျိဘၣ်သးတၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤတၢ်မၤအကျိၤအကျဲလၢဒဲကဝီၤတဖၣ်လၢအိၣ်လၢကိၣ်ကိၣ်တၢ်အကီၢ်ဆၢတဖၣ်မ့ၢ်တၢ်လၢအဒုးန့ၣ်ဖျါဝဲလၢတၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်ဆီလီၤတၢ်မၤအကျဲကပူၤတဖၣ်န့ၣ်မၤတၢ်သုၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်အဝဲအံၤမ့ၢ်ဝဲတၢ်ဝဲလၢပမ့ၢ်ကွၢ်လၢဒဲကဝီၤတဖျါဘၣ်တဖျါအပတီၢ်အဖီခိၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ.တၢ်လဲၤခီဖျိအံၤမ့ၢ်ဝဲတၢ်ဝဲစ့ၢ်ကိးအစ့ၤကတၢ်လၢဒဲကဝီၤအပတီၢ်လၢတၢ်ဖီခိၣ်တပတီၢ်ဖဲလၢဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်ဆီလီၤဟံလီၤတၢ်မၤအကျဲကပူၤအံၤဒုးအိၣ်ထီၣ်ဝဲဒဲကဝီၤတၢ်မၤအကျိၤအကျဲတဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်ဘျၢတဖၣ်, ဟ့ၣ်မၤစၢၤဝဲလၢတၢ်ဟံးစုန့ၣ်ကျဲဒီးတၢ်ကဲခိၣ်ကဲန့ၣ်, ဒီးတၢ်ပီၣ်တၢ်ဒီးပုၤတၢ်ချၢခိၣ်န့ၣ်လၢအဘၣ်ထွဲဝဲတဖၣ်, ဃုာ်ဒီးတၢ်လီၤကဝီၤကိၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ်တဖၣ်, ကရၢလၢအဟ့ၣ်ကျိၣ်စုတၢ်မၤစၢၤတဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်ဟ့ၣ်မၤစၢၤတၢ်အတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤတဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. အါန့ၣ်အန့ၣ်, တၢ်ကွၢ်ကတၢ်လဲၤခီဖျိဖဲအံၤတဖၣ်ဒုးန့ၣ်ဝဲလၢပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲအတၢ်ပၤဆှၢတၢ်တၢ်ဆီလီၤဟံလီၤတၢ်မၤအကျဲကပူၤတဖၣ်န့ၣ်တၢ်မၤဘၣ်လီၢ်က့ၤအံၤသုးသိးလၢတၢ်အိၣ်သးအတၢ်ဆီတလဲသးတဖၣ်အဖီခိၣ်အသိးဒီးလိာ်ဘၣ်အါထီၣ်တၢ်ဆၢကတီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ.တကးဒဲးဘၣ်, လၢကျဲတဘျုးဘိအဖီခိၣ်န့ၣ်အဝဲသ့ၣ်ပညိၣ်အါဝဲလၢတၢ်အိၣ်မူအကျိၤအကျဲလၢအက့ၤကဒါက့ၤဒ်အလီၢ်လီၢ်တဖၣ်အသိးန့ၣ်လီၤ. လၢကလီၤတၢ်အဂီၢ်န့ၣ်, ဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်ပၤဆှၢတၢ်ဆီလီၤတၢ်မၤအကျဲကပူၤတဖၣ်န့ၣ်ဘၣ်လဲၤခီဖျိစ့ၢ်ကိးဝဲတၢ်ကိၣ်တၢ်ခဲဒီးတၢ်ကဘၣ်က့ၤက့ၤအီၤထီၣ်, က့ၤဘိက့ၤအီၤဒီးမၤဆူၣ်ထီၣ်က့ၤအီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်အပတီၢ်အကလုာ်ကလုာ်တဖၣ်အံၤန့ၣ်အါတက့ၢ်ဒုးသ့ထီၣ်ပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲတဖၣ်လၢကသ့ဝဲတၢ်ပၤဆှၢတၢ်တသ့ဝဲအသ့လၢအနီၣ်ကစၢ်အတၢ်အိၣ်မူအိၣ်ဝဲၤအဂီၢ်ဒီးတၢ်မၤတၢ်စုသ့အတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤတဖၣ်ခီဖျိလၢတၢ်ပၤဆှၢလီၤကစၢ်အသးမ့ၢ်တၢ်အၢၣ်လီၤအရ့ဒ်လၢပုၤကညီလိာ်ဘၣ်ဝဲလၢပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲထံဖီကိၢ်ဖီတဖၣ်အဂီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ.
၂. နီၤလီၤတၢ်လုာ်တၢ်ပုၤဒီးတၢ်တၢ်တၢ်လၢညါ, ဒီးတၢ်န့ၣ်လီၢ်သးကဲကဲဒဲ, ဒုးကဲထီၣ်တၢ်ပၤဆှၢပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲလၢဒဲကဝီၤအခိၣ်တဖၣ်တုၤလီၤတီၤလီၤ. တၢ်ကွၢ်ကဒါက့ၤတၢ်ဂ့ၢ်အံၤန့ၣ် ပုၤခိၣ်န့ၣ်လၢအဘၣ်ထွဲတဖၣ်ထဲးဂံၢ်ထဲးဘါလၢဒုးအိၣ်ထီၣ်တၢ်တၢ်လၢညါဒီးတၢ်လုာ်တၢ်ပုၤတဖၣ်လၢတၢ်ကသ့ၣ်ထီၣ်တၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤအကျိၤအဂီၢ်အဂီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. လီၤဆီဒဲတၢ်လၢတၢ်လုာ်တၢ်ပုၤအကျိၤတခါန့ၣ်မ့ၢ်ဝဲတၢ်မၤတၢ်ဖျါဖျါရဲၣ်တီၤတီၤလီၤ. အါန့ၣ်အန့ၣ်, တၢ်ထဲးဂံၢ်ထဲးဘါသ့ပုၤပုၤထဲးသိးသိးလၢအဘၣ်တၢ်မၤအံၤလၢပုၤတဖၣ်လၢကဒုးအိၣ်ထီၣ်ဒီးရဲၣ်သဲကတီၢ်တၢ်ဟံးဒီးတၢ်န့ၣ်လီၢ်သးကဲကဲဒဲန့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်ဟံးဖိၣ်တၢ်ဂ့ၢ်တဖၣ်အံၤန့ၣ်ဟ့ၣ်မၤစၢၤဝဲတၢ်အဂီၢ်ထဲးခိၣ်ဘိလၢကမၤန့ၣ်အါထီၣ်တၢ်အါမဲလၢတၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤတၢ်မၤအကျိၤအကျဲန့ၣ်လီၤ. လၢအပူၤကွံာ်ယံၢ်န့ၣ်န့ၣ်, အိၣ်ဖျါဝဲတြၢၢ်ကလံာ်လၢပုၤလၢတၢ်ကိၣ်ပုၤဒီးပုၤလၢတၢ်ချၢတဖၣ်အတၢ်လဲလိာ်သးထီၣ်, တၢ်နီၤလီၤတၢ်လုာ်တၢ်ပုၤဒီးတၢ်န့ၣ်လီၢ်သးလၢပုၤမၤတၢ်တဖၣ်အဖီခိၣ်စၢ်လီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. ဖဲလဲၣ်ဂုၤဂုၤတၢ်ဆီတလဲတဖၣ်တၢ်မ့ၢ်မၤအီၤလီၤလီၤပျီဖျိဒီးလၢတၢ်ဆၢကတီၢ်ဘၣ်ဘၣ်န့ၣ်, တၢ်အံၤလီၤကဲလၢတၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်မၤအကျိၤအကျဲကဘၣ်တၢ်မၤဘၣ်လီၢ်က့ၤအီၤဂုၤထီၣ်ဆူၣ်ထီၣ်ဒီးကဆဲးဟ့ၣ်မၤစၢၤတၢ်လုာ်တၢ်ပုၤဆူပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲတဖၣ်, ကိၣ်တၢ်ပဒိၣ်အတၢ်ကရၢကရိတဖၣ်ဒီးပုၤမၤတၢ်အဂုၤအဂုၤလၢအဂုၤထီၣ်ပသီထီၣ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ.
၃. တၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒီးအံၤထွဲကွၢ်ထွဲဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်သ့တၢ်ဘၣ်တဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်လဲၤခီဖျိလၢကမၤဂုၤထီၣ်တၢ်သ့ၣ်ထီၣ်ထံကီၢ်ခီဖျိလၢတၢ်ဂုၢ်ကျဲးစးဆှၢက့ၤပုၤဆူအကီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်အဝဲအံၤလၢတၢ်မၤလိအဂီၢ်စ့ၢ်ဒီးကအါဝဲလၢတၢ်မ့ၢ်လၢကွၢ်ဖီအဂီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်သ့ၣ်ထီၣ်တၢ်ကဲခိၣ်ကဲန့ၣ်အတၢ်သ့တၢ်ဘၣ်တဖၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်ထံရဲၣ်ကီၢ်သးအတၢ်ဆၢတၢ်ဒီးလၢတၢ်ပၤဆှၢကမ့ၢ်အပူၤခီဖျိတၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်လဲၤခီဖျိလၢကမၤစၢၤဘၣ်ပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲအထံဖီကိၢ်ဖီတဖၣ်သ့ဂုၤဒီးမၤန့ၣ်ဘၣ်ပုၤတၢ်တဖၣ်သ့ဂုၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. ဆဲကမိၣ်တယာ်လၢတၢ်ဂုၢ်သ့ၣ်တဖၣ်အံၤန့ၣ်ဘၣ်ထွဲဒီးတၢ်လီၢ်တၢ်ကျဲးဒီးကလုာ်သ့ၣ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်တၢ်ကဘၣ်ပၤဆှၢအံၤသ့သ့ဘၣ်ဂုၢ်ဘၣ်ဝီဒီးလၢတၢ်ဃုတၢ်ဖိးအပူၤဖဲလၢပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲတဖၣ်က့ၤကဒါက့ၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲအခိၣ်အနီၣ်တဖၣ်လၢအတၢ်လဲၤခီဖျိအိၣ်ဝဲလၢတၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤတၢ်မၤတဖၣ်အပူၤန့ၣ်, ကမ့ၢ်ပုၤသ့ၣ်တဖၣ်လၢအကြးဝဲဘၣ်ဝဲလၢကမၤတၢ်လၢကမ့ၢ်အဝဲလီၢ်အဂီၢ် မ့တမ့ၢ် မၤဝဲပဒိၣ်ပပုၤတၢ်မၤလၢအလီၢ်ကဝီၤပုၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. ပမ့ၢ်ဝဲလၢတၢ်ကတီၢ်အဂီၢ်တဖျါန့ၣ်, တၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်ဆီလီၤဟံလီၤတၢ်မၤအကျိၤအကျဲတဖၣ်န့ၣ်အတၢ်ပညိၣ်မ့ၢ်ဒ်သိး “ကမ့ၢ်အတၢ်ပၤဆှၢတၢ်အကိၣ်တဖၣ်” န့ၣ်လီၤ. ဒီးပုၤဘၣ်ကိၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲအပူၤထံဖီကိၢ်ဖီလၢအလဲၤအထီလၢကီၢ်ဆၢဒီတတီၤန့ၣ်, တၢ်ပၤဆှၢဒဲကဝီၤအတၢ်ဆီလီၤအကျိၤအဂီၢ်န့ၣ်မၤဟူးမၤဂဲၤပုၤထံဖီကိၢ်ဖီအတၢ်လဲၤခီဖျိ -ဒုးန့ၣ်ဖျါထီၣ်စ့ၢ်ကိၢ်ဖီ, ဘၣ်ဆၣ်သန့ကုၤလီၤတၢ်ဝဲ. တၢ်လဲၤခီဖျိခဲခါလၢ် - ပုၤကမ့ၢ်အတၢ်ကဲခိၣ်ကဲန့ၣ်ဒီးအပူၤထံဖီကိၢ်ဖီ - ကဘၣ်တၢ်မၤအံၤဒီးမ့ၢ်လၢလၢကမၤဆူၣ်ထီၣ်ကီၢ်ပယီၤအတၢ်လဲလိာ်သးတၢ်မၤအကျိၤအကျဲအဂီၢ်အဘါန့ၣ်လီၤ.

**တၢ်အုၣ်အသးလၢတၢ်အဂီၢ်တဖၣ်**

တၢ်အုၣ်အသးလၢတၢ်အဂီၢ်တဖၣ်တဖၣ်, တၢ်ဟ့ၣ်တၢ်အုၣ်အသးလၢအဂ့ၢ်/တၢ်ဟ့ၣ်က့ၣ်ဟ့ၣ်ဖးတဖၣ် -

**တၢ်ပၤဆၢဒဲးကဝီၤအပတီၢ်**

၁. ကရၢသဘၤကိးဖုဒဲးလၢအမၤတၢ်လၢဒဲးကဝီၤတဖၣ်အပူၤဟ့ၣ်က့ၣ်ဟ့ၣ်ဖးတၢ်လၢလၢပုၤပုၤဆူတၢ်ပၤဆၢဒဲးကဝီၤအတၢ်ဆီလီၤအက့ၢ်အဂီၢ်တဖၣ် နီၤအမ့ၢ်တၢ်ဆီလီၤဟံၣ်လီၤတၢ်ပၤတၢ်ပြဲၤလၢအတီၢ်လီၤလၢပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲအပူၤထံဖီကီၢ်ဖီ, တၢ်ဆၢတံၢ်တၢ်တဖၣ်လၢတၢ်မၤထီၣ်တၢ်လၢအကၢၤဒိၣ်တဖၣ်အဂီၢ်, တၢ်ရဲၣ်လီၤကျဲၤလီၤတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤ, တၢ်မၤတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤအတၢ်ရဲၣ်လီၤကျဲၤလီၤတဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်မၤစ့ၤလီၤစ့မိၢ်ပုၤတဖၣ်. ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲနီၣ် - ကရၢသဘၤလၢအဟ့ၣ်တၢ်မၤစၢၤ.
၂. ကရၢကိးဖုဒဲးလၢအမၤတၢ်လၢဒဲးကဝီၤတဖၣ်အပူၤကဘၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤပုၤဘၣ်လၢဒဲးကဝီၤပတီၢ်အတၢ်အိၣ်ဖိၣ်သကိးတလၢတဘျီဒီးမၤဆူထီၣ်န့ၣ်တၢ်အိၣ်ဖိၣ်တဖၣ်အတၢ်ရဲၣ်လီၤမူဒါလၢကဟံၣ်ဖျါထီၣ်တၢ်လီၤဖျါလီၤဟံၣ်တဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်လၢကဘၣ်မၤဘၣ်ကျဲၤအီၤဒီးတၢ်သ့ၣ်တဖၣ်အံၤတၢ်ကဘၣ်မၤအီၤဒီးလၢအဆၢကတီၢ်ဘၣ်လိာ်သးန့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲနီၣ်တဖၣ် - ဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်.
၃. ဖဲလၢတၢ်လိာ်ဘၣ်ဒဲးပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်လၢကမၤတၢ်ဘၣ်လိာ်သးဒီးတၢ်ကဟုကယၢ်အတၢ်မၤအတီၢ်ပတီၢ်အိၣ်ကတၢ်လၢပုၤတကၢၤဘၣ်တကၢၤအဖီမိၣ်, လၢပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲတဖၣ်အဖီမိၣ်, ပုၤကမုၢ်တဖၣ်အဖီမိၣ်, လၢပုၤဂ့ၢ်ဝီၤအတၢ်လိာ်ဘၣ်အဖီမိၣ်တဖၣ်အဂီၢ်န့ၣ်, UNHCR တဲသကိးတၢ်ဒီးကီၢ်တဲၣ်အပူၤဘၣ်မုၢ်ဘၣ်ဒါတဖၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်,
  - ၁) ကီၢ်တဲၣ်အပူၤဘၣ်မုၢ်ဘၣ်ဒါတဖၣ်ထီၣ်သ့ၣ်ညါပုၤကွၢ်ထွဲဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်ဒီးအမ့ၢ်တၢ်ပၤပြဲၤတၢ်ဒီးတၢ်ဆီလီၤဟံၣ်လီၤတၢ်မၤအက့ၢ်အကွၢ်ဘၣ်သးတၢ်ပၤဆၢဒဲးကဝီၤအပူၤနီၣ်ဂံၢ်တဖၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်တၢ်လၢအဖိးသဲးတီၢ်ဝဲလီၤဝဲ (aka ပုၤစံၣ်မ့ၢ်ဖျါအနီၣ်ဂံၢ်)ဒီး
  - ၂) ကီၢ်တဲၣ်အပူၤဘၣ်မုၢ်ဘၣ်ဒါတဖၣ်ကမၤဝဲရဲၣ်ဒီးလီၤတၢ်လီၤဆဲးလၢမူဒါတဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်မိၢ်တၢ်မိၤလၢတၢ်ဟ့ၣ်လီၤလၢပုၤကွၢ်ထွဲဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်လၢအမၤလၢတန့ၢ်ဘၣ်တန့ၢ်လၢဒဲးကဝီၤတဖၣ်အပူၤ(aka တၢ်အိၣ်ကတၢ်တလီၢ်အလီၢ်ကဝီၤ) ဒီးတၢ်ပၤဆၢတၢ်ဘၣ်ထွဲလိာ်သးလၢတၢ်ဆီလီၤဟံၣ်လီၤတၢ်မၤအက့ၢ်အကွၢ်ဒီးကီၢ်တဲၣ်အပူၤဘၣ်မုၢ်ဘၣ်ဒါတဖၣ်ကရၢကရိးဒီးအပူၤခၢၣ်စးတဖၣ်အဘၣ်စၢၤ. ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲနီၣ် - UNHCR
၄. ပုၤကွၢ်ထွဲဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်မၤလီၤတၢ်လၢပုၤနီၣ်ဒိၣ်လၢဒဲးကဝီၤတဖၣ်အပူၤ(ဘၣ်တၢ်ဟံၣ်လီၤကျဲၤမုဆူလၢထီၣ်ဘၣ်ဘၣ်စံၣ်အတၢ်ဟံၣ်ဖျါလီၤတၢ်လီၤဆဲးအနီၣ်ဂံၢ်တဖၣ်), ပုၤလၢအဆဲးလီၤမံၤလၢဒဲးကဝီၤစရိပူၤ မုတမ့ၢ် ပုၤလၢတဆဲးလီၤမံၤတဖၣ်,တၢ်ကဘၣ်ဟ့ၣ်အဝဲသ့ၣ်တၢ်ခွဲးတၢ်ယၢ်လၢကထၢန့ၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲအဂီၢ်လၢ၂၀၁၂န့ၣ်အတၢ်အုၣ်တဖၣ်. (ကီၢ်တဲၣ်ပုၤမၤတၢ်တဖၣ်မ့ၢ်တဖၣ်ပုၤလၢတဆဲးလီၤမံၤတဖၣ်အခွဲးလၢကထၢန့ၣ်ဘၣ်ခဲဘၣ်န့ၣ်, ဒဲးကဝီၤအတၢ်ဆီလီၤတၢ်မၤအကျဲၤပူၤတဖၣ်ကဘၣ်အုၣ်ကျဲၤလၢအကၢၤတဖၣ်လၢတၢ်ဟံၣ်ဖျါထီၣ်တၢ်အံၤတၢ်ဘၣ်ယိၣ်ဘၣ်ဘီအဝဲအံၤန့ၣ်ကဘၣ်တၢ်သ့ၣ်ညါအီၤန့ၣ်လီၤ.
၅. ပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်, ဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်ဒီးကမံးတံၢ်လၢတၢ်အုၣ်ထီၣ်အီၤလၢဒဲးကဝီၤပူၤဒီးလၢပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်အတီၢ်ပတီၢ်တဖၣ်ကဟံးန့ၣ်ဝဲနီၣ်ထီၣ်တဖၣ်လၢကမၤလီၤတၢ်ဝဲလၢအဆဲးတၢ်နီၤလီၤန့ၣ်ပိာ်မုၢ်အစ့ၤကတၢ် ၃၃%လၢတၢ်ပၤဆၢဒဲးကဝီၤအတၢ်ဆီလီၤတၢ်မၤအကျဲၤပူၤန့ၣ်တြးဝဲဘၣ်ဝဲဒီးတၢ်ဘၣ်သးဒိၣ်န့ၣ်တၢ်ဂၤ, ဂုၤန့ၣ်ဒီးပုၤဂၤမၤန့ၣ်လီၤ. တၢ်အဝဲအံၤပုၤဘၣ်တၢ်ထီၣ်ကွၢ်စီၤကွၢ်တၢ်ကၢၤကီၢ်လိာ်ကုၤအသး, တၢ်မၤစ့ၤလီၤမုတမ့ၢ်မၤဟံၣ်မၤကွၢ်တၢ်တြးပိာ်မုၢ်အတၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤမၤသကိးတၢ်(အဒိ, ကဘၣ်အိၣ်ယံၤဒီးအဟံၣ်လၢတဘျီန့ၣ်ရဲၣ်အတီၢ်ပူၤ). ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲနီၣ်တဖၣ် - ပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်.
၆. ပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်အတၢ်ဒုးအိၣ်ထီၣ်တၢ်မၤအကျဲၤအကျဲၤတဖၣ်ပုၤဘၣ်သ့ၣ်ဒီးတၢ်ကဲထီၣ်ခၢၣ်စးအမိၢ်ပုၤတဖၣ်လၢကလူၤသမံးသမိးကွၢ်တၢ် မုတမ့ၢ် ဟ့ၣ်က့ၣ်ဟ့ၣ်ဖးတၢ်ဒီးကမၤလီၤတၢ်ဝဲလၢကလုာ်ဖျါတဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်ဘျီတၢ်ဘါအဆဲးတဖၣ်အကလုာ်ကဘၣ်တၢ်န့ၣ်ဟူၤအီၤဒီးအတၢ်လိာ်ဘၣ်လီၤလီၤဆီဆီတဖၣ်ကဘၣ်တၢ်ဆီကမိၣ်န့ၣ်အီၤဒီးဟ့ၣ်အီၤအဂီၢ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲနီၣ်တဖၣ် - ပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်.
၇. ပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်ကဘၣ်ဖၢန့ၣ်လီၤတၢ်မၤအကျဲၤအကျဲၤတဖၣ်အလီၢ်(အဒိ, ဒဲးကဝီၤပုၤကမုၢ်အတၢ်အိၣ်ဖိၣ်)လၢကဟ့ၣ်က့ၣ်ဟ့ၣ်ဖးပုၤသးစၢ်ဘၣ်သးအဝဲသ့ၣ်အတၢ်ဆီကမိၣ်ဒီးအတၢ်ဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ဂီၤတဖၣ်, ဟ့ၣ်ဆူထီၣ်ပုၤသးစၢ်တဖၣ်အသးလၢကန့ၣ်လီၤပုၤဘၣ်လၢတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤတဖၣ်အပူၤလၢကကဲထီၣ်တၢ်ဘျီတၢ်ဖိၣ်လၢပုၤသးစၢ်ဒီးပုၤတဝဲလၢန့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲနီၣ်တဖၣ် - ပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်.
၈. UNHCR, RTG ဒီးIRC/LAC တဖၣ်အတၢ်မၤသကိးတၢ်ဒီးပုၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲကမံးတံၢ်တဖၣ်လၢအမ့ၢ်, ၁) ဆိၣ်ထွဲမၤစၢၤပုၤထံဖီကီၢ်ဖိတဖၣ်လီၤတၢ်လီၤဆဲးဒီးဟံၣ်ဖျါထီၣ်ပုၤတဖၣ်တဖၣ်အတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤအမူအဒါလီၤတၢ်လီၤဆဲးဘၣ်သးဒီးတၢ်ကဟုကယၢ်ဒီးတၢ်မ့ၢ်တၢ်တီ, ၂) မၤဂ့ၢ်ထီၣ်ဒဲးကဝီၤအတၢ်စံၣ်ညီၣ်တၢ်မ့ၢ်တၢ်တီအကျဲၤအကျဲၤအတၢ်သ့တၢ်ဘၣ်တဖၣ်ဒီးဒဲးကဝီၤအတၢ်ဘၣ်တၢ်ဘၢလၢတၢ်မၤအမူအဒါလၢပုၤပုၤလၢကဟံးစၢ်ဂၢၢ်ကျဲၤတၢ်အုၣ်တဖၣ်အပူၤ,တၢ်နီၣ်လီၤ,တၢ်သိၣ်တၢ်သီအတၢ်ဘျီတဖၣ်ဒီးကွၢ်ဆၢၣ်မဲၢ်ဒီးတၢ်မၤကမၢ်တၢ်ဆဲးဆဲးဖိတဖၣ်ဒီးတၢ်လုာ်သ့ၣ်ခါပတၢ်တၢ်သိၣ်တၢ်သီအတၢ်ဘျီတဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. အါန့ၣ်အန့ၣ်ပုၤအဖုသ့ၣ်တဖၣ်အံၤကတုၢ်ကျဲးစးအုၣ်တၢ်ဖိတၢ်လံၤလၢအလိာ်ဘၣ်ဝဲတဖၣ်လၢကမၤဒိၣ်ထီၣ်ဝဲ တၢ်ကဟုကယၢ်တၢ်တဖၣ်ဒီးကျဲၤလၢတၢ်မၤန့ၣ်တၢ်မ့ၢ်တၢ်တီတဖၣ်အတၢ်ဖဲတၢ်မၤလၢဒဲးကဝီၤန့ၣ်လၢလၢအဆဲးအံၤန့ၣ်ယံၤဖျါန့ၣ်လဲန့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲနီၣ် - UNHCR,RTG ဒီး IRC/LAC

၁၀. တၢ်အဆိၣ်ထံးလၢအဟံၣ်ဖျါဘၣ်ဃးတၢ်စးထီၣ်တၢ်လဲလိာ်သးအတၢ်မၤအကျါအကျဲလၢကီၢ်ပယီၤပူၤဒီးတၢ်ဆၢကွၢ်ပှၤဘၣ်ကီၢ်ဘၣ်ခဲအတၢ်ဘၣ်ထွဲလိာ်သးလၢအရွဲဒိၣ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်, ပှၤဟ့ၣ်မၤဘၣ်စုလၢပှၤဂ့ၢ်ဝီအတၢ်လိာ်ဘၣ်တၢ်မၤသးကိးတၢ်ကရူၢ် ( DHAWG) ဟ့ၣ်မၤစၢၤတၢ်လၢတၢ်မၤညီထီၣ်တၢ်အတၢ်မၤအကျါအကျဲတဖၣ်ဒီးသိးကဟံၣ်ဖျါထီၣ်ဒီးမၤဘၣ်လိာ်ကွၢ်တၢ်သဘံၣ်ဘၣ်အိၣ်ထီၣ်လၢကရူၢ်လၢအမၤတၢ်လၢတၢ်ဖံးတၢ်မၤအကျါအကျဲတခါအံၤအပူၤအတၢ်မၤကမၣ်တၢ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်လီၤ. ပှၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲန့ၢ်-DHAWG ဒီးပှၤဟ့ၣ်မၤဘၣ်ကျိၣ်စုအဆိၣ်န့ၢ်ကရူၢ်တဖၣ်.

၁၂. ပုၤဘဉ်ကိဘဉ်ခဲကမ်းတံၢ်တဖၣ်မ့ၢ်ပုၤသ့ၣ်တဖၣ်လၢတၢ်သ့ၣ်ညါအိၣ်အမ့ၢ်ခါၣ်စးလၢအဖိးသဲစးတဖုလၢပုၤဘဉ်ကိဘဉ်ခဲတဖၣ်အဂီၢ်  
 ဒီးမ့ၢ်ပုၤတဖုလၢန့ၣ်လီၤမၤသးကးဃုာ်တၢ်လၢ DHAWG တၢ်ရဲၣ်လီၤကျဲၤလီၤတၢ်ဒီးတၢ်ဆီလီၤတၢ်မၤအကျါအကျဲလၢအခူဒိၣ်တဖၣ်  
 န့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲၣ်-*DHAWG* အပုၤတၢ်ဆုၣ်နီၤ.

[illegible][illegible]

၁၅. တက်ထိုင်အသီးဘဉ်ဃးတံရံၣ်လီၤကျဲၤလီၤတံလဲလိာ်သးအတံမၤအကျိၤအကျဲၤလၢတံဆုၤကွၢ်ပှၤဘဉ်ကီၤဘဉ်ခဲတဖၣ်န့ၣ်. အတံဘဉ်ထွဲလိာ်သးလၢအရ့ၣ်တဖၣ်န့ၣ်, DHAWG မၤတံၣ်ဝံၣ်နီၤဖးတံရံၣ်လီၤကျဲၤလီၤတံလဲလိာ်သးအကျဲၤတဖၣ်ဒီးအခီပညိၣ်တဖၣ်လၢတံၣ်ပၤဆုၤခဲတဝီၤအကွၢ်အကီၤအပူၤ, ဒီးလီၤဆီၣ်တံအတံလဲၤခီဖျိ, အတံမၤလိတဖၣ်, အတံဝီၤတံလိတဖၣ်ဒီးတံသုတံဘဉ်တဖၣ်လၢကမ့ၢ်တံမၤစၢၤအဂ့ၢ်ကတံဆုၤကီၤပယီၤအတံသုၣ်ထီၣ်ဆီလီၤထံကီၤလၢဆူမံၣ်ညါယံၣ်န့ၣ်တုၤအနီၣ်တဆံန့ၣ်လီၤ. ပုၤကဲခိၣ်ကဲန့ၣ်-DHAWG ဒီးကရၢဟ့ၣ်မၤဘဉ်ကျိၣ်စ့အခိၣ်န့ၣ်တဖၣ်.

## တၢ်ကတိၤလၢခံကတၢၢ်

*E.T. Jackson and Associates*

*Adaptation, Resilience and Transition: Report of the Formative Evaluation of Camp Management in the Burmese Refugee Camps in Thailand – Long Report*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY – THAI

### การปรับตัว การฟื้นตัว และการเปลี่ยนผ่าน รายงานการประเมินผล<sup>5</sup>ของระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิง ในศูนย์พักพิงผู้ลี้ภัยชาวพม่าในประเทศไทย

#### บทสรุปสำหรับผู้บริหาร

#### คำนำ

รายงานฉบับนี้สรุปข้อมูลที่ได้จากการประเมินผลของระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงในศูนย์พักพิงผู้ลี้ภัยชาวพม่าในประเทศไทย รายงานนี้แบ่งออกเป็นหมวดต่างๆ คือ ภูมิหลัง วัตถุประสงค์ วิธีการประเมินผล ข้อมูลจากการประเมินผล บทเรียน และ ข้อเสนอแนะ การประเมินผลนี้ดำเนินการระหว่าง พ.ศ. 2554-2555 โดยได้รับมอบหมายจาก Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) ร่วมกับ Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) และ Act for Peace (Australia)

#### ภูมิหลัง

ประเทศพม่าได้ก้าวเข้าสู่ระยะสำคัญของการเปลี่ยนผ่านทางการเมืองและเศรษฐกิจ ในขณะที่รัฐบาลของชาติตะวันตกเริ่มผ่อนคลายมาตรการคว่ำบาตร และนักลงทุนเตรียมพร้อมที่จะเพิ่มการลงทุนในประเทศนี้ องค์กรและหน่วยงานที่เกี่ยวข้องส่วนใหญ่กำลังจับตามองการเปิดช่องทางการเมืองในปัจจุบันด้วยความระมัดระวังและความคาดหวังว่าสถานการณ์จะดีขึ้น ประเทศพม่ายังต้องรับมือกับความท้าทายต่างๆ ระหว่างช่วงเวลาหลายปีต่อจากนี้ไป หนึ่งในความท้าทายเหล่านั้น คือ กระบวนการอันซับซ้อนของการส่งผู้ลี้ภัยชาวพม่ากลับประเทศ และไปตั้งถิ่นฐานใหม่ ซึ่งต้องวางแผนและจัดการอย่างมีประสิทธิภาพและรัดกุม ปัจจัยด้านภูมิประเทศ ชาติพันธุ์ ภาษา เพศสภาพและศาสนาเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของหลายปัจจัยที่ละเอียดอ่อน และต้องจัดการด้วยความระมัดระวัง เพื่อให้ประชากรผู้ลี้ภัยบูรณาการเข้าสู่สังคมของชาวพม่า เห็นได้ชัดว่าตลอดระยะการเปลี่ยนแปลงนี้และโดยเฉพาะช่วงห้าถึงสิบปีต่อจากนี้ไป การส่งเสริมคุณภาพของการปรับตัว และการฟื้นตัว จะเป็นหนึ่งในงานที่สำคัญเป็นอันดับต้นๆ เพื่อความสำเร็จของทุกภาคส่วน และทุกสถาบันของสังคมพม่า

ระบบหนึ่งของการปรับตัวและการฟื้นตัวที่ได้แสดงคุณค่าให้เห็นกันมาแล้ว และอาจมีผลอย่างยิ่งต่อความสำเร็จของกระบวนการส่งผู้ลี้ภัยกลับประเทศและไปตั้งถิ่นฐานใหม่ คือระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงในศูนย์พักพิงผู้ลี้ภัยชาวพม่าในประเทศไทย วิธีการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงเป็นระบบที่ค่อยๆ พัฒนาขึ้นมาตลอด 25 ปีที่ผ่านมา โดยให้ผู้ลี้ภัยและโครงสร้างผู้ลี้ภัยมีส่วนร่วมในการบริหารงานในแต่ละวันของศูนย์พักพิง ส่งเสริมให้ผู้ลี้ภัยรู้จักพึ่งพาตนเอง และดังนั้น จึงทำให้ผู้มีส่วนร่วมในการบริหารงานได้รับประสบการณ์และฝึกทักษะ ซึ่งจะช่วยส่งเสริมกระบวนการสร้างชาติพม่าได้ในระยะยาว

<sup>5</sup> ต้นฉบับภาษาอังกฤษของรายงานฉบับนี้ กล่าวถึงการประเมินผลช่วงพัฒนา หรือ *formative evaluation* กล่าวคือ การประเมินผลที่ดำเนินการระหว่างการปฏิบัติงานในโครงการหนึ่ง โดยมีวัตถุประสงค์เพื่อให้ทราบบทเรียน และเสนอแนวทางปรับปรุงโครงการส่วนที่เหลือ

ในปัจจุบัน ระบบนี้ใช้จัดการศูนย์พักพิงเก่าแห่ง และให้บริการผู้ลี้ภัย 140,000 คน ส่วนใหญ่เป็นชาวกะเหรี่ยง (เป็นประชากรส่วนใหญ่ในศูนย์เจ็ดแห่ง) และชาวคาเรน (เป็นประชากรส่วนใหญ่ในศูนย์สองแห่ง) แม้ว่าระบบบริหารนี้ประสบความสำเร็จอย่างน่าประทับใจในบางด้าน แต่ก็ต้องเผชิญกับแรงกดดันไม่น้อยโดยเฉพาะระหว่างห้าปีที่ผ่านมา ตั้งแต่ พ.ศ. 2551 เป็นต้นมา ผู้บริจาคที่สนับสนุนโครงการต่างๆ ในศูนย์พักพิง ได้ทำการทบทวนระบบ และพบประเด็นที่เป็นข้อกังวล และความจำเป็นต้องการเปลี่ยนแปลงในระบบ จึงเป็นที่มาของการประเมินผลครั้งนี้ ซึ่งได้รับมอบหมายตั้งแต่ พ.ศ. 2554 จาก CIDA, AusAID และ Act for Peace มีจุดมุ่งหมายเพื่อตรวจสอบข้อกังวลเหล่านี้ และประเมินความเหมาะสมของรูปแบบการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงในบริบทปัจจุบัน

### วัตถุประสงค์

การประเมินผลครั้งนี้มีวัตถุประสงค์สามประการ

- 1) เพื่อสนับสนุนให้ทุกฝ่ายที่เกี่ยวข้องสามารถแลกเปลี่ยนความคิดเห็นอย่างสร้างสรรค์เกี่ยวกับประเด็นการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงผู้ลี้ภัยที่ตั้งอยู่ตามแนวชายแดนประเทศไทย-พม่า
- 2) เพื่ออธิบายรูปแบบการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงที่ใช้อยู่ในปัจจุบันอย่างละเอียด และถูกต้อง
- 3) เพื่อระบุว่ามีความใดบ้างที่ควรดำเนินการปรับปรุง และเปลี่ยนแปลง

ยิ่งกว่านั้น เงื่อนไขอ้างอิง (Terms of reference) ของการศึกษานี้ยังกำหนดให้คณะผู้ประเมินจัดทำเอกสารบันทึกประวัติและวิวัฒนาการของรูปแบบการบริหารนี้ ให้ประเมินว่ารูปแบบการบริหารนี้ครอบคลุมความรับผิดชอบต่างๆ อย่างครบถ้วนหรือไม่ ให้ประเมินว่าโครงสร้างการบริหารนี้ดำเนินการตามมาตรฐานสากลเพียงใด และให้สนับสนุนการเสวนาระหว่างองค์กรภาคีเกี่ยวกับรูปแบบการบริหารนี้ โดยใช้หลักฐานที่บันทึกได้เป็นข้อมูลประกอบ

### วิธีการประเมินผล

วิธีการที่คณะผู้ประเมินใช้ในการทำงานมุ่งเน้นการมีส่วนร่วมของทุกฝ่ายที่เกี่ยวข้อง นอกจากตรวจสอบเอกสาร และสัมภาษณ์บุคคลที่ให้ข้อมูลสำคัญได้แก่ผู้แทนขององค์กรผู้บริจาค องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชน และรัฐบาลไทยแล้ว ยังได้ทำการรวบรวมข้อมูลจากศูนย์พักพิงทั้งเก้าแห่ง โดยใช้วิธีจัดการประชุมเชิงปฏิบัติการและจัดประชุมกลุ่มย่อย โดยสุ่มตัวอย่างเลือกผู้ลี้ภัยจำนวนมากให้เข้าร่วมในกิจกรรม รวมถึงจัดประชุมกลุ่มย่อยเป็นพิเศษกับชนกลุ่มน้อย กลุ่มสตรี และกลุ่มเยาวชน (ทั้งหญิงและชาย) และมีคณะทำงานประกอบด้วยนักวิจัยต่างชาติ และนักวิจัยท้องถิ่น จำนวน 11 คน เป็นผู้ดำเนินการกระบวนการในการประชุมกลุ่มย่อยเหล่านี้ กระบวนการดังกล่าวผ่านการทำงานร่วมกับประชากรทั่วไปในศูนย์พักพิง 545 คน รวมทั้งคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง และผู้แทนจากองค์กรชุมชน 308 คน ที่ทำงานในศูนย์พักพิง นอกจากนี้ คณะผู้ประเมินได้สัมภาษณ์เจ้าหน้าที่ของรัฐบาลไทย 50 คน ที่ทำงานภายในและภายนอกศูนย์พักพิง เจ้าของร้านค้า 57 คน ทั้งภายในและภายนอกศูนย์พักพิง และบุคคลต่าง ๆ 69 คน ที่อาศัยอยู่ใกล้ศูนย์พักพิง ซึ่งประกอบด้วยเจ้าของที่ดิน ไร่นา ขนาดใหญ่ สถานที่พักในแหล่งท่องเที่ยว และร้านอาหาร รวมถึงสมาชิกชุมชนทั่วไป สรุปได้ว่าคณะผู้ประเมินได้รวบรวมข้อมูลโดยอาศัยวิธีปฏิสัมพันธ์โดยตรง

กับผู้ให้ข้อมูลประมาณ 1,060 คน ที่อาศัยอยู่ภายใน และรอบศูนย์พักพิงในการศึกษาค้างนี้ เมื่อนับรวมผู้แทนจากองค์การสหประชาชาติ องค์การพัฒนาเอกชนระดับสากล และคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย

การประเมินผลมีข้อจำกัดหลายด้าน โดยเฉพาะเมื่อการประเมินมุ่งเน้นที่การรวบรวมข้อมูลในระดับศูนย์พักพิง คณะผู้ประเมินจึงใช้เวลาน้อยกว่าเพื่อรวบรวมข้อมูลในระดับการประสานงานความช่วยเหลือตามหลักมนุษยธรรมระหว่างศูนย์พักพิง อันที่จริง งานรวบรวมข้อมูลในระดับศูนย์พักพิงกลายเป็นงานที่ใช้เวลามากกว่า และซับซ้อนกว่าที่คาดการณ์ไว้แต่แรก ปัจจัยที่เป็นปัญหาในที่นี้ประกอบด้วยความห่างไกลกันของแต่ละศูนย์พักพิงและคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยสองคณะ การเปลี่ยนผู้นำในองค์กรสำคัญแห่งหนึ่ง ความล่าช้าในการขออนุมัติในระดับศูนย์พักพิง และการหาบุคลากรท้องถิ่นที่รู้ภาษาคาเรนนี้ อันเป็นผลมาจากความล่าช้าดังกล่าว แต่แม้ว่ามีข้อจำกัดเหล่านี้ และข้อจำกัดอื่นๆ คณะผู้ประเมินก็มั่นใจว่าข้อมูลที่รวบรวมได้ และข้อแนะนำที่เสนอในรายงานฉบับนี้ถูกต้อง และเหมาะสม

ประเด็นสำคัญที่ต้องยอมรับ คือ การประเมินครั้งนี้ไม่ได้มุ่งเน้นโดยตรงที่มีผลสำคัญของการบริหารจัดการศูนย์พักพิง กล่าวคือ บทบาทและการปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานและผู้แทนของรัฐบาลไทย รัฐบาลไทยเป็นผู้มีอำนาจและความรับผิดชอบสูงสุดในศูนย์พักพิง และในการบริหารจัดการศูนย์พักพิงเหล่านี้ เงื่อนไขข้อหนึ่งของการประเมินครั้งนี้ คือ การประเมินต้องมุ่งเน้นเป็นอันดับแรกถึงโครงสร้างการบริหารจัดการของผู้ลี้ภัย และไม่ใช่มุ่งเน้นที่บทบาทและการปฏิบัติงานของหน่วยงานและผู้แทนของรัฐบาลไทย รายงานนี้จะกล่าวถึงบทบาทและการปฏิบัติงานของเจ้าหน้าที่ของรัฐบาลไทยเฉพาะส่วนที่เกี่ยวข้องกันเท่านั้น และแม้ว่าข้อมูลจากการประเมินบางข้อดูเหมือนจะเป็นข้อแนะนำที่เสนอให้แกรัฐบาลไทย แต่คณะผู้ประเมินไม่ได้เสนอข้อแนะนำเหล่านั้น เพราะการเสนอข้อแนะนำแกรัฐบาลไทยอยู่เหนือขอบข่ายหน้าที่ของรายงานนี้

ประเด็นสุดท้าย คือ กระบวนการรับรองผลการประเมินครั้งนี้จำเป็นต้องถูกตัดทอนลง เนื่องจากข้อจำกัดด้านงบประมาณ และทำให้ต้องทดแทนกระบวนการรับรองตามแผนเดิม ด้วยการประชุมทางไกลหลายครั้งผ่านทางอุปกรณ์ภาพและเสียง กับกลุ่มองค์กรที่เกี่ยวข้องในประเทศไทย คือ DHAWG, คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และ ศูนย์ดำเนินการเกี่ยวกับผู้พลพ/กระทรวงมหาดไทย รายงานฉบับสมบูรณ์นี้ได้รับรวบรวมข้อมูลป้อนกลับที่ได้รับจากการประชุมเหล่านี้ไว้ด้วย ผู้อ่านที่สนใจสามารถอ่านข้อมูลได้จาก ภาคผนวก 12 ที่แนบท้ายรายงานฉบับเต็ม ซึ่งเป็นรายงานสรุปการหารือต่างๆ ระหว่างกระบวนการรับรองผล

## **ข้อมูลจากการประเมินผล**

### **ความเข้าใจรูปแบบการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง**

ระบบบริหารที่พัฒนาขึ้นในศูนย์พักพิงทั้งเก้าแห่งตามชายแดนไทยนี้ประกอบด้วยกลุ่มความรับผิดชอบ (clusters of responsibility)<sup>6</sup> สามกลุ่ม แต่ละกลุ่มมีเครือข่ายขององค์กรระดับย่อย รูปแบบการบริหารจะทำงานได้ดีหรือไม่ก็ขึ้นอยู่กับขีดความสามารถและประสิทธิภาพการทำงานขององค์กรระดับย่อยในแต่ละกลุ่ม รวมถึงประสิทธิภาพในการประสานงานภายในกลุ่ม และระหว่างกลุ่ม

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<sup>6</sup> ความหมายของคำว่า “กลุ่ม (clusters)” ที่ใช้ในกรณีนี้ไม่เกี่ยวข้องกับ cluster approach ที่เริ่มใช้โดย IASC ในการตอบสนองต่อ 2005 UN Humanitarian Response Review และที่อธิบายไว้ในหมวด 3.3.1 ของรายงานฉบับนี้

ใน “กลุ่มศูนย์พักพิง”(camp cluster) เมืองหรือต่าง ๆ ที่ทำงานด้านบริการช่วยเหลือศูนย์พักพิง หน่วยประสานงานหลักของกลุ่มนี้คือคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย (Refugee Committees - RCs) สองคณะ และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง (Camp Committees - CCs) แก่คณะ มีหัวหน้ากลุ่มหรือป้อม(section leaders) ที่ทำงานภายใต้ และรายงานต่อคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง โดยได้รับการสนับสนุนจากคณะกรรมการ/กลุ่มหรือป้อม(section committees) โครงสร้างเหล่านี้ได้รับการสนับสนุนจากองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนสากล ซึ่งจัดทำโครงการความช่วยเหลือด้านสาธารณสุขและ การศึกษาขององค์กรไทยแลนด์ เบอร์มา บอร์ดอร์คอนซอร์ติเยียม (TBBC) ให้ความช่วยเหลือด้านอาหาร ที่พักอาศัย ความช่วยเหลืออื่นๆ และงานบริหาร ในขณะที่ UNHCR ดูแลเรื่องความคุ้มครองแต่ในระยหลังนี้ International Rescue Committee (IRC) ได้จัดทำโครงการพิเศษ คือ ศูนย์ความช่วยเหลือด้านกฎหมาย หรือ Legal Assistance Centres (LAC) ในศูนย์พักพิงห้าแห่ง จากทั้งหมดเก้าแห่ง องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนที่ทำงานในศูนย์พักพิงได้รับความช่วยเหลือประสานงานจากกรรมการประสานงานองค์กรช่วยเหลือผู้ลี้ภัยในประเทศไทย หรือ กปชล.ซึ่งทำหน้าที่เป็นคนกลางประสานงานระหว่างองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนเหล่านี้ และรัฐบาลไทย

กลุ่มที่สองในระบบบริหารนี้คือ “กลุ่มผู้บริจาค”(donor cluster) ประเทศผู้บริจาคซึ่งบ่อยครั้งทำงานผ่านสถานทูตของตน ในกรุงเทพฯ จะเป็นสมาชิกของคณะทำงาน Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group (DHAWG) ผู้บริจาคหลักประกอบด้วยประเทศสหรัฐอเมริกา และประเทศในสหภาพยุโรป คณะทำงานนี้ทำหน้าที่ประสานงาน และแบ่งปันข้อมูลกับ กปชล.และโครงการต่างๆ ของ กปชล.ติดต่อกับ UNHCR และปรึกษาหารือ และประสานงานกับผู้มีบทบาทสำคัญในรัฐบาลไทย แต่ผู้บริจาคแต่ละองค์กรจะให้ความช่วยเหลือด้านเงินทุนโดยตรงแก่ศูนย์พักพิง โดยผ่านทาง TBBCหรือองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนที่ให้บริการ

กลุ่มที่สามคือรัฐบาลไทย (เราจะเรียกว่ากลุ่ม RTGหรือ “RTG cluster”) หน่วยงานหลักที่มีบทบาทในกลุ่มนี้คือสมาคมมั่นคงแห่งชาติ (สมช.) กระทรวงมหาดไทย (มท.) กองทัพไทย กระทรวงการต่างประเทศ และสำนักงานศูนย์ดำเนินการเกี่ยวกับผู้พลัดถิ่น ซึ่งอยู่ภายใต้สังกัดกระทรวงมหาดไทย และมีหน้าที่อนุมัติแผนโครงการขององค์กรสมาชิกของ กปชล.และทำงานร่วมกับ UNHCRและหน่วยงานอื่นๆ ผู้ว่าราชการของจังหวัด ซึ่งเป็นที่ตั้งของศูนย์พักพิงจะรายงานต่อกระทรวงมหาดไทย โดยมีปลัดอำเภอ (ตำแหน่งของ) หัวหน้าพื้นที่พักพิงรายงานต่อสำนักผู้ว่าราชการ โดยผ่านทางที่ว่าการอำเภอของตน หัวหน้าพื้นที่พักพิงที่เป็นคนไทยนี้ เป็นผู้ควบคุมดูแลโดยตรงและมีอำนาจสูงสุดเหนือคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง และโครงสร้างระดับย่อยของศูนย์

เกือบตลอดสองทศวรรษที่ผ่านมา ผู้มีบทบาทกลุ่มนี้ได้พัฒนาความสัมพันธ์ของตน และได้ร่วมกันสร้างระบบหนึ่งเหมือนกับระบบนิเวศ (eco-system) ระบบนิเวศนี้ทำงานโดยทั่วไปในลักษณะที่ปรับตัวและยืดหยุ่น โดยตอบสนอง และปรับตัวให้เหมาะสมกับผู้มีบทบาทรายใหม่ และความต้องการใหม่ๆ เมื่อสถานการณ์เปลี่ยนแปลง และขับเคลื่อนทรัพยากรเพื่อให้เป็นไปตามวัตถุประสงค์ขององค์กรต่างๆ ในโครงสร้าง ระบบนิเวศนี้ทำงานได้ผลเป็นส่วนใหญ่ โดยคณะผู้ประเมินเชื่อว่าเนื่องจากปัจจัยหลักสองประการคือ (1) การมีวิสัยทัศน์และค่านิยมร่วมกัน และ (2) ความไว้วางใจซึ่งกันและกัน ศูนย์กลางของความสัมพันธ์ด้านบวกในการทำงานนี้คือความมุ่งมั่นที่จะดูแลสวัสดิภาพของผู้ลี้ภัย และค่านิยมและแนวทางปฏิบัติที่เน้นความโปร่งใส

#### **ทรงสนะของผู้ลี้ภัย และผู้นำในศูนย์พักพิง**

##### **ทรงสนะของผู้ลี้ภัยเกี่ยวกับชีวิตของตนในศูนย์พักพิง**



ค่อนข้างคล้ายคลึงกันในทุกศูนย์พักพิง ทั้งในด้านความเข้าใจสถานการณ์และความท้าทายที่เขาเผชิญอยู่ นอกจากนี้ ยังมีความคิดเห็นในลักษณะเดียวกันในกลุ่มผู้พักพิงต่างๆ ในศูนย์พักพิง (กลุ่มสตรี ชนกลุ่มน้อย กลุ่มเยาวชน) และระหว่างกลุ่มต่าง ๆ และประชากรทั่วไป อันที่จริง การประเมินนี้พบข้อมูลที่ชี้ว่าไม่มีการเลือกปฏิบัติอย่างเป็นระบบต่อชนกลุ่มน้อยในศูนย์พักพิง กลุ่มสตรีก็ไม่มีพรคนะที่แตกต่างอย่างมีนัยสำคัญจากกลุ่มผู้ชายเกี่ยวกับชีวิตในศูนย์ แต่กระนั้น เยาวชนก็แสดงความกังวลใจในระดับสูงกว่าเกี่ยวกับความหวังในอนาคต และการขาดโอกาสศึกษาต่อ และมีห่วงใยมากกว่ากลุ่มอื่นในเรื่องปัญหา ยาเสพติด

สำหรับบทบาทของ**โครงสร้างบริหารจัดการผู้ลี้ภัย** ประชากรทั่วไปไปรับรู้ว่าคณะกรรมการเหล่านี้มีขีดจำกัดในการจัดการกับปัญหาหลาย ๆ อย่างที่เขาเผชิญอยู่ในศูนย์พักพิง ผู้ลี้ภัยแสดงความเข้าใจว่าผู้นำของเขาสามารถทำอะไรได้บ้าง และอะไรบ้างที่ผู้นำของเขาไม่มีอำนาจที่จะเปลี่ยนแปลงแก้ไขได้ ผู้ลี้ภัยแสดงความเข้าใจในหน้าที่ของผู้นำศูนย์พักพิงของเขา และรู้ว่าเขาต้องการให้ผู้นำของเขามีคุณสมบัติอย่างไร กล่าวคือ ผู้พักพิงทั่วไปต้องการหัวหน้าที่มีการศึกษาระดับสูง มีความสามารถ ใช้ภาษาได้มากกว่าหนึ่งภาษา มีอุปนิสัยเข้มแข็ง และมีวิธีการติดต่อสื่อสารกับสมาชิกในศูนย์พักพิงอย่างมีประสิทธิภาพ ผู้ลี้ภัยส่วนใหญ่ประเมินผลคณะกรรมการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงของตนในแง่บวก แม้ว่าผู้ลี้ภัยบางคนมีความคาดหวังต่างกันบางอย่าง ประเด็น แต่ก็ไม่ได้แสดงความไม่มั่นใจในตัวรูปแบบการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง

นอกจากนี้ ผู้ลี้ภัยที่เข้าร่วมในการประเมินผลครั้งนี้ ยังมีความทรงจำที่ดี และความเข้าใจเกี่ยวกับ**กระบวนการเลือกตั้ง**ที่จัดขึ้นเมื่อ พ.ศ. 2553 แต่ตั้งข้อสังเกตว่ามีปัญหาที่ท้าทาย และสมควรแก้ไข ประเด็นหลักคือควรให้ผู้ลี้ภัย “ไม่จดทะเบียน” มีสิทธิออกเสียงในการเลือกตั้ง คณะผู้ประเมินยังเห็นความจำเป็นต้องให้สตรีมีตัวแทนมากขึ้น และต้องหาหลักไถ่ที่จะทำให้ผู้ลี้ภัยกลุ่มสำคัญสามารถแสดงความคิดเห็นเกี่ยวกับข้อกังวลของเขาได้ โดยเฉพาะชนกลุ่มน้อย และกลุ่มเยาวชน

#### **สำหรับผู้นำศูนย์พักพิง**

คนเหล่านี้เข้าใจบทบาทและความรับผิดชอบของตนอย่างชัดเจน ซึ่งตรงกับรายละเอียดตำแหน่งงานที่เป็นกรอบการทำงานของเขาในระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิง ความท้าทายส่วนใหญ่ๆ ที่เขาเผชิญอยู่เป็นปัญหาที่เกินขีดความสามารถของเขาที่จะแก้ไขได้ในระดับผู้บริหารศูนย์พักพิง และปัญหาเหล่านั้นต้องได้รับการแก้ไขในระดับการประสานงานความช่วยเหลือตามหลักมนุษยธรรมที่กว้างกว่า

#### **ประเด็นสำคัญอื่น ๆ ในการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง**

**ความคุ้มครอง และการเข้าถึงความยุติธรรม** – ผู้ลี้ภัย และผู้นำผู้ลี้ภัย เข้าใจดีว่าจำเป็นต้องปรับปรุงในด้านนี้ แต่ก็มีความรู้สึกต่อต้านความพยายามเหล่านี้ ความท้าทายอย่างหนึ่งคือ ผู้ทำหน้าที่ตุลาการจะต้องไม่ใช่ผู้บริหารในระบบศาลยุติธรรมของผู้ลี้ภัย ความท้าทายที่สองคือ ควรมีโครงการใหม่ๆ เพื่อสนับสนุนเจ้าหน้าที่รักษาความปลอดภัยให้มีวิธีใหม่ๆ ในการจัดการกับเยาวชนที่ทำผิดกฎหมาย ซึ่งเป็นปัญหาที่พบเห็นมากขึ้น

**การประสานงานระดับศูนย์พักพิง** – มีการแบ่งปันข้อมูล แต่ยังคงขาดการหารือเกี่ยวกับการวางแผนโครงการ และการจัดลำดับความสำคัญในบางภาคส่วน นอกจากนี้ การพิจารณาเชิงยุทธศาสตร์ที่ศูนย์พักพิงเกี่ยวกับความต้องการ และช่องว่างที่ยังไม่ได้รับการตอบสนองจึงจะเป็นหัวข้อหลักของการประชุมประสานงานประจำเดือนเมื่อไม่นานมานี้เอง องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนสากล เช่นองค์กรที่ให้ความช่วยเหลือด้านสาธารณสุขไม่ได้หารือกับคณะกรรมการศูนย์ และคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยอย่างสม่ำเสมอเกี่ยวกับการตัดสินใจจัดลำดับความสำคัญของโครงการ หรือการตัดลดงบประมาณ

**ให้บริการและการตรวจสอบ** – คณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง และคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยปฏิบัติงานได้ดีในด้านการเป็นความรับผิดชอบโดยตรงของคณะกรรมการเหล่านี้ เช่นการติดตามตรวจสอบจำนวนประชากร การจัดเก็บ และการแจกจ่ายเครื่องอุปโภคบริโภค การบำรุงรักษาโครงสร้างพื้นฐาน และการรักษาความสงบเรียบร้อยภายในศูนย์พักพิง แต่ไม่เห็นได้ชัดเจนนักว่า คณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง และคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยมีความสามารถด้านวิชาการเพียงพอที่จะตรวจสอบ และปฏิบัติตามมาตรฐานในบางส่วนที่ต้องใช้ความชำนาญเฉพาะทาง เช่นการศึกษา และสาธารณสุข

**องค์กรที่มีส่วนเกี่ยวข้อง**อื่น ๆ ของระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงผู้ลี้ภัยในด้านบวก โดยเฉพาะหลังจากที่มีการเปลี่ยนแปลงมากมายในระยะหลังนี้ รวมถึงการปรับปรุงกระบวนการเลือกตั้ง เนื่องจากความเปลี่ยนแปลงมากมายที่เกิดขึ้นในตำแหน่งผู้นำในโครงสร้างศูนย์พักพิง อันเป็นผลมาจากการเลือกตั้ง และการเดินทางไปตั้งถิ่นฐานในประเทศที่สาม องค์กรภายนอกที่เกี่ยวข้องจึงมองเห็นบทบาทต่อเนื่องในการเสริมสร้างขีดความสามารถ UNHCR ได้ทำงานร่วมกับโครงสร้างเหล่านี้ในวาระเกี่ยวกับความคุ้มครอง แต่ยังไม่ยอมรับว่าเป็นโครงสร้างการปกครอง และการบริหารของผู้ลี้ภัยอย่างเป็นทางการ

ในส่วนของ UNHCR โดยหลักแล้ว องค์กรนี้เกี่ยวข้องกับโครงสร้างเหล่านี้ในด้านความคุ้มครอง และแม้ว่า UNHCR สนับสนุนโครงสร้างเหล่านี้เพราะเป็นส่วนหนึ่งของหน้าที่ให้ความคุ้มครองที่องค์กรได้รับมอบอำนาจให้ทำ แต่ก็เชื่อว่ามี ความจำเป็น ต้องเฝ้าระวังมิให้ฝ่ายต่างๆ ที่ไม่ใช่ภาครัฐ เข้ามาแทรกแซงในโครงสร้างเหล่านี้ UNHCR สามารถช่วยเสริมประสิทธิภาพให้โครงสร้างเหล่านี้ได้ ซึ่งเป็นการสนับสนุนที่สำคัญยิ่งที่ UNHCR สามารถมอบให้ได้ ด้วยการรณรงค์เรียกร้องให้รัฐบาลไทย ยอมรับอย่างชัดเจน ว่าโครงสร้างเหล่านี้เป็นระบบการปกครองและการบริหารจัดการที่ถูกต้องตามกฎหมายของประชากรผู้ลี้ภัย และให้กำหนดให้ชัดเจนขอบเขตความรับผิดชอบและอำนาจที่มอบหมายให้คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิงดำเนินการในการจัดการศูนย์พักพิง และกำหนดเงื่อนไขอย่างชัดเจนเกี่ยวกับความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างโครงสร้างเหล่านี้ และหน่วยงานและผู้แทนของรัฐบาลไทย

การประเมินผลยังสำรวจผลกระทบจากศูนย์พักพิงผู้ลี้ภัยต่อชุมชนไทยใกล้เคียง ผลกระทบดังกล่าวไม่ว่าด้านบวก หรือด้านลบ ไม่ถือว่าเป็นความท้าทายสำคัญสำหรับโครงสร้างการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง ดูเหมือนว่าหัวหน้าพื้นที่พักพิงที่เป็นคนไทยสามารถไกล่เกลี่ยปัญหาที่เกิดขึ้นระหว่างศูนย์พักพิงและชุมชนไทย ระหว่างคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิงและหัวหน้าชุมชนได้อย่างมีประสิทธิภาพ แต่ผู้แทนบางคนของหน่วยงานของรัฐบาลไทย (กรมป่าไม้ กรมตำรวจ และกองทัพ) แสดงความห่วงใยว่า หัวหน้าพื้นที่พักพิงที่เป็นคนไทยและกระทรวงมหาดไทย ไม่ได้ปฏิบัติตามนโยบายของรัฐบาลไทยที่เกี่ยวกับศูนย์พักพิงอย่างรัดกุม โดยเฉพาะเกี่ยวกับการควบคุมของผู้ลี้ภัยทั้งการเข้าและออกจากศูนย์พักพิงหลายแห่ง ประเด็นนี้ หัวหน้าพื้นที่พักพิงที่เป็นคนไทยบางคนแสดงความคิดเห็นว่าเรื่องนี้ปฏิบัติได้ยาก เนื่องจากศูนย์พักพิงไม่ได้สร้างขึ้นให้มีลักษณะเหมือนคุกที่มีรั้วล้อมรอบ และมีบริเวณความมั่นคงรอบนอก อีกทั้งศูนย์พักพิงก็ไม่ควรมีลักษณะเหมือนคุก เพราะผู้ลี้ภัยไม่ใช่นักโทษคดีอาญา

การประเมินผลยังได้ตรวจสอบว่า ระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงนี้สอดคล้องกับ**มาตรฐานและบรรทัดฐานสากล**ในการให้ความช่วยเหลือผู้ลี้ภัยตามหลักมนุษยธรรมหรือไม่ คณะผู้ประเมินพบในภาพรวมว่าคณะกรรมการและหน่วยงานอื่น ๆ ที่ทำงานร่วมกับผู้ลี้ภัยในระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงเข้าใจบรรทัดฐาน และหลักการเหล่านี้ และใช้เป็นเกณฑ์ในการทำงานของโครงสร้างการบริหารผู้ลี้ภัย แต่ก็มีปัญหาบางอย่างที่องค์กรที่เกี่ยวข้องพบเห็น ปัญหาหนึ่งคือมีผู้ลี้ภัยจำนวนมากที่ไม่จดทะเบียน (มากกว่า 50% ในศูนย์พักพิงขนาดใหญ่บางแห่ง) คนเหล่านี้ขาดสถานะทางกฎหมายอย่างเป็นทางการ จึงอยู่ในสภาพเปราะบางมากขึ้นอีก นอกจากนี้ ยังมีกรณีที่คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยแจกจ่ายข้าวของTBBC ให้แก่กองกำลังติดอาวุธ โดยกองกำลังเหล่านี้ตอบแทนด้วยการรักษาความปลอดภัยในบริเวณรอบศูนย์พักพิง เหตุการณ์นี้ไม่ได้เกิดขึ้นอีกในปัจจุบัน แต่ทุกฝ่ายที่เกี่ยวข้องไม่ได้ดำเนินการด้วยความโปร่งใสในเวลาที่เกิดเหตุการณ์เช่นนี้หลาย ๆ ฝ่ายได้หยิบยกปัญหาความกังวลเกี่ยวกับแนวทางปฏิบัติ ความโปร่งใส และความรับผิดชอบของหัวหน้าพื้นที่พักพิงฯ ที่เป็นคนไทยบางคน

การให้การสนับสนุนการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงอย่างชัดเจนเกิดขึ้นเมื่อไม่นานมานี้ ตลอด 20 ปีแรก ทั้ง UNHCR และองค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนอื่นๆ ไม่ได้รับผิดชอบ (และไม่สามารถรับผิดชอบ) หรือช่วยเหลือด้านการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง เพียงแต่เข้าร่วมทำงานกับชุมชนที่เกี่ยวข้องโดยตรงกับการช่วยเหลือ หน้าที่ให้การสนับสนุนดังกล่าวตกเป็นของ TBBC ซึ่งอยู่ในฐานะที่เหมาะสมที่สุดที่จะทำงานนี้ เพราะเป็นองค์กรที่พยายามให้อำนาจแก่ผู้ลี้ภัย และมีความสัมพันธ์อันดีและได้รับความไว้วางใจจากคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย กระบวนการนี้สืบหน้าไปมากนับตั้งแต่การสำรวจสถานการณ์เป็นครั้งแรกเมื่อ พ.ศ. 2546 กล่าวคือ มีโครงสร้างการบริหารและการปกครอง และกระบวนการที่ชัดเจนและเป็นมาตรฐานเดียวกันในทุกศูนย์พักพิง มีรายละเอียดตำแหน่งงานสำหรับทุกตำแหน่งภายในโครงสร้างเหล่านี้ มีการจัดอบรมทักษะ และเสริมสร้างขีดความสามารถให้ทุกคนที่เกี่ยวข้อง คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยทั้งสองคณะยอมรับ และปฏิบัติตามหลักจริยธรรมต่อผู้ลี้ภัยทุกคนที่ทำงานในตำแหน่งต่างๆ ภายในโครงสร้างเหล่านี้ แต่ยังคงมีความท้าทายในด้านขีดความสามารถในการบริหารจัดการ เนื่องจากมีการเปลี่ยนตัวผู้นำที่เคยดำรงตำแหน่งสำคัญหลายคน เพราะคนเหล่านี้เดินทางไปตั้งถิ่นฐานในประเทศที่สาม และเนื่องจากการเลือกตั้งที่จัดขึ้นเป็นระยะ นอกจากนี้ เราจะเห็นความท้าทายใหม่ๆ เกิดขึ้น เมื่อผู้ลี้ภัยจะต้องถูกส่งตัวกลับประเทศในที่สุด เมื่อมองไปข้างหน้า จำเป็นที่กลุ่มผู้บริจาคต้องยอมรับอย่างชัดเจนมากขึ้นว่าการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงเป็นภาคส่วนหนึ่งที่ต้องได้รับการสนับสนุนในด้านยุทธศาสตร์ และการสนับสนุนด้านการเงิน

ปัญหาหนึ่งในระดับการประสานงานความช่วยเหลือตามหลักมนุษยธรรม ซึ่งมีผลกระทบในด้านลบต่อการทำงาน และความน่าเชื่อถือของระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงคือ **ความไว้วางใจต่อกันที่ลดลง** ซึ่งเป็นปัจจัยสำคัญสำหรับประสิทธิภาพ และการฟื้นตัวในการตอบสนองระหว่างหลายปีที่ผ่านมา การที่ TBBC รู้ข้อมูลว่าคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยได้จัดส่งข้าวให้แก่กองกำลังติดอาวุธ (เพื่อแลกเปลี่ยนกับการรักษาความปลอดภัยในบริเวณรอบศูนย์พักพิง) แต่ไม่ได้แจ้งข้อมูลให้กลุ่มผู้บริจาคทราบตั้งแต่แรก ทำให้ระดับความไว้วางใจระหว่างฝ่ายต่างๆ ลดลงอย่างเห็นได้ชัด กระตุ้นให้เกิดความกังวล และการทบทวนสถานการณ์หลายครั้ง ความไว้วางใจกันนี้เป็นสิ่งจำเป็นและกำลังถูกเสริมสร้างขึ้นใหม่ คณะผู้ประเมินเชื่อว่าปัจจัยหนึ่งที่มีผลต่อกรณีนี้คือ ความไม่ทันท่วงทีของความรู้และความเข้าใจระหว่าง TBBC และองค์กรอื่นๆ ที่ปฏิบัติงานระยะยาวในพื้นที่ กับผู้บริจาค ซึ่งมีการเปลี่ยนบุคลากรบ่อยครั้ง นอกจากการปรับเปลี่ยนด้านอื่นๆ แล้ว ผู้บริจาคจำเป็นต้องเพิ่มข้อมูลความรู้ของตนเองเกี่ยวกับสถานการณ์ในพื้นที่อย่างถาวร

## **บทเรียน**

บทเรียนสำคัญที่ได้จากการประเมินผลครั้งนี้ และสมควรนำมาพิจารณาเมื่ออยู่สามประการ

- 1) ในชุมชนผู้ลี้ภัย มีศักยภาพสูงมากในการปกครองและบริหารจัดการตนเอง- ประสิทธิภาพของระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงในศูนย์พักพิงผู้ลี้ภัยตามชายแดนประเทศไทย แสดงให้เห็นว่าโครงสร้างการบริหารจัดการผู้ลี้ภัยนั้นใช้งานได้ ใช้งานได้จริงในศูนย์พักพิงแต่ละแห่ง และในระดับเหนือศูนย์พักพิงซึ่งโครงสร้างผู้ลี้ภัยได้จัดตั้งกลไก และนโยบายที่เหมือนกันในทุกศูนย์พักพิง ได้ให้คำแนะนำ และทิศทาง และได้เจรจาต่อรองกับหน่วยงานที่เกี่ยวข้องภายนอกศูนย์พักพิง รวมถึงองค์กรปกครองส่วนท้องถิ่น องค์กรผู้บริจาค และผู้ให้ความช่วยเหลือ ยิ่งกว่านั้น การประเมินผลยังแสดงให้เห็นว่า โครงสร้างการบริหารจัดการผู้ลี้ภัยสามารถปรับเปลี่ยนให้เหมาะสมกับสถานการณ์ และความต้องการที่เปลี่ยนไปตามกาลเวลา อันที่จริง โครงสร้างเหล่านี้ทำงานเหมือนกับระบบนิเวศที่ยืดหยุ่นในหลายๆ ทาง แต่โครงสร้างการบริหารจัดการผู้ลี้ภัยก็เคยประสบกับแรงกดดัน และจำเป็นต้องได้รับการทบทวน เปลี่ยนแปลง และเสริมประสิทธิภาพเป็นระยะอย่างสม่ำเสมอ ในระดับพื้นฐานที่สุด การช่วยให้ผู้ลี้ภัยพยายามควบคุมชีวิต และกิจกรรมหาเลี้ยงชีพของตนให้มากที่สุดด้วยการบริหารจัดการตนเอง ถือว่าเป็นการยืนยันคุณสมบัติที่เป็นแก่นแท้ของมนุษย์ของประชากรผู้ลี้ภัย
- 2) ค่านิยม และวิถีทัศน์ร่วมกัน และความไว้วางใจต่อกัน เป็นองค์ประกอบของรากฐานของการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงที่มีประสิทธิภาพ- ก่อนที่จะมีการประเมินผลครั้งนี้ องค์กรที่มีส่วนเกี่ยวข้องเคยพยายามพัฒนาวิถีทัศน์ และค่านิยมร่วมกัน ซึ่งจะเป็รากฐานในการพัฒนารูปแบบการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง หนึ่งในค่านิยมดังกล่าวคือความโปร่งใส นอกจากนี้ องค์กรเหล่านี้ยังได้พยายามอย่างจริงจังที่จะสร้าง และดำรงความเคารพ และความไว้วางใจต่อกัน เมื่อนำมาผสมผสานกัน ปัจจัยเหล่านี้กลายเป็นฐานอันมั่นคงที่ทำให้ระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงได้รับประโยชน์ ช่วงห้าปีที่ผ่านมา เห็นได้ชัดว่า เนื่องจากพลวัตทั้งภายในและภายนอกได้บั่นทอนค่านิยม และความไว้วางใจต่อกันระหว่างผู้ปฏิบัติงาน สภาพที่อ่อนแอลงเช่นนี้ทำให้ระบบสมควรได้รับการเปลี่ยนแปลงและปรับปรุง ถ้าการเปลี่ยนแปลงนี้กระทำอย่างเฉียบขาด และทันเวลา เป็นไปได้ว่าระบบบริหารจัดการศูนย์อพยพจะแข็งแกร่งกว่าเดิม และมีคุณค่าสำหรับผู้ลี้ภัย หน่วยงานของรัฐ และองค์กรพัฒนาอื่นๆ
- 3) ทักษะ และประสิทธิภาพในการบริหาร และการปกครองศูนย์พักพิง สามารถส่งเสริมการร่วมพัฒนาชาติในการส่งตัวผู้ลี้ภัยกลับประเทศ- ข้อนี้เป็นความคาดหวังมากกว่าเป็นบทเรียน การเสริมทักษะความเป็นผู้นำในด้านการตัดสินใจทางการเมือง และในการบริหารงานราชการอาศัยประสบการณ์ที่ได้รับจากการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง สามารถใช้ในการบริการประชากรผู้ลี้ภัยและชุมชนปลายทางได้ ถ้าปัญหาที่เกี่ยวข้องกับพื้นที่และชาติพันธุ์สามารถจัดการได้อย่างลงตัวและโดยสันติวิธีเมื่อผู้ลี้ภัยกลับประเทศ มีความน่าจะเป็นว่าผู้นำผู้ลี้ภัยที่มีประสบการณ์ในการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงมีคุณสมบัติที่เหมาะสมที่จะลงแข่งขันในการเลือกตั้งผู้ดำรงตำแหน่งทางการเมือง หรือทำงานเป็นข้าราชการในท้องถิ่นของตน อีกนัยหนึ่งคือ โครงสร้างการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงได้ทำหน้าที่เหมือน “โรงเรียนสอนวิชารัฐประศาสนศาสตร์” สำหรับประชากรผู้ลี้ภัยทั่วไปที่อยู่ตามชายแดนประเทศไทย โครงสร้างการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงได้ทำให้เกิดประสบการณ์ของความเป็นพลเมือง – ที่แม้จะมีค่านิยมเพียงแคบๆ แต่ทำให้รู้สึกได้จริง ประสบการณ์ทั้งสองนี้ – คือภาวะผู้นำชุมชน และความเป็นพลเมือง – จะถูกนำเข้าสู่กระบวนการเปลี่ยนผ่านของประเทศพม่า และเราหวังว่าจะเพิ่มประสิทธิภาพให้แก่กระบวนการนี้

### ข้อแนะนำ

จากข้อมูล และบทเรียนที่ได้จากการประเมินผลนี้ คณะผู้ประเมินขอเสนอข้อแนะนำต่อไปนี้

### ในระดับการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง

- 1) ให้องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนทุกองค์กรที่ให้บริการความช่วยเหลือในศูนย์พักพิง หรือทุกแห่งที่มีโครงการสร้างการบริหารจัดการผู้ลี้ภัย ในฐานะที่เป็นโครงสร้างปกครองอย่างเป็นทางการของประชากรผู้ลี้ภัย การตัดสินใจเกี่ยวกับการจัดลำดับความสำคัญ การวางแผนโครงการ การดำเนินงานในโครงการ และการตัดงบประมาณ – ผู้ที่มีบทบาทหลัก: องค์กรพัฒนาเอกชนที่ให้บริการความช่วยเหลือ
  - 2) ทุกองค์กรที่ปฏิบัติงานในศูนย์พักพิงควรเข้าร่วมในการประชุมประสานงานประจำเดือนในระดับศูนย์พักพิง และทำให้การประชุมเหล่านี้มีบทบาทมากขึ้นในเชิงยุทธศาสตร์ในการระบุช่องว่าง และความต้องการใหม่ ๆ และพิจารณาว่าควรแก้ไขปัญหาลำดับใดอย่างไรให้ทันต่อเหตุการณ์ – ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: คณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง
  - 3) ในขณะที่กำหนดให้คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง ปฏิบัติตามมาตรฐานขั้นสูงสุดในการให้ความคุ้มครองแก่ผู้ลี้ภัยทุกคน และรักษาสถานภาพของศูนย์พักพิงให้เป็นที่พักอาศัยของพลเรือนและเป็นที่ให้ความช่วยเหลือตามหลักมนุษยธรรมต่อไป UNHCR ควรรณรงค์เรียกร้องให้รัฐบาลไทยสนับสนุนในประเด็นต่อไปนี้
    1. ให้รัฐบาลไทยแสดงการยอมรับอย่างชัดเจนว่าคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง เป็นโครงสร้างการปกครอง และการบริหารจัดการผู้ลี้ภัย (หรือ ประชากรผู้หนีภัยจากการสู้รบ) ที่ถูกต้องตามกฎหมาย
    2. ให้รัฐบาลไทยกำหนดให้ชัดเจน ขอบเขต และอำนาจหน้าที่ ที่มอบหมายให้คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง ดำเนินการในการจัดการศูนย์พักพิง (หรือ บริเวณศูนย์พักพิงชั่วคราว) และให้กำหนดเงื่อนไขอย่างชัดเจนเกี่ยวกับความสัมพันธ์ระหว่างโครงสร้างเหล่านี้และหน่วยงาน และผู้แทนของรัฐบาลไทย
- ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: UNHCR
- 4) ให้คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิงดำเนินการให้ผู้ใหญ่ทุกคนในศูนย์พักพิง (โดย TBBC คำนวณจากจำนวนผู้ได้รับแจกจ่ายอาหาร) ไม่ว่าจะจดทะเบียนหรือไม่จดทะเบียน มีสิทธิออกเสียงในการเลือกตั้งที่จะจัดขึ้นใน พ.ศ. 2556 (ถ้ารัฐบาลไทยยังไม่ต้องการให้ผู้พักพิงที่ไม่จดทะเบียนมีสิทธิออกเสียง ให้โครงสร้างศูนย์พักพิงหาวิธีอื่นที่ช่วยให้บุคคลในเขตเลือกตั้งนี้สามารถแสดงความคิดเห็น และข้อกังวลได้) - ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง
  - 5) ให้คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย คณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง และคณะกรรมการเลือกตั้ง ทั้งในระดับศูนย์พักพิง และคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย ดำเนินมาตรการที่จำเป็นเพื่อให้มั่นใจได้ว่า 33% ของโครงสร้างการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงเป็นผู้แทนสตรี และถ้าเป็นไปได้ควรมีมากกว่านี้ มาตรการเหล่านี้ รวมถึงวิธีการลด หรือกำจัดอุปสรรคต่างๆ ที่ขัดขวางไม่ให้สตรีมีส่วนร่วมในโครงสร้างบริหาร (เช่น ต้องทิ้งบ้านเป็นเวลานานหลายชั่วโมง)<sup>7</sup> - ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง

<sup>7</sup> ข้อแนะนำที่ 5, 6 และ 7 ให้ความสำคัญที่สุดต่อโครงสร้างการบริหารจัดการผู้ลี้ภัยอย่างเป็นทางการ และไม่ระบุบทบาทขององค์กรชุมชนอย่างชัดเจน คณะผู้ประเมินยอมรับว่าในปัจจุบันเมืองนครชุมชนจำนวนหนึ่งปฏิบัติงานอยู่ในศูนย์พักพิง และในฐานะที่เป็นองค์กรประชาสังคมของผู้ลี้ภัย จึงมีบทบาทสำคัญในการเสนอบริการบางอย่างให้แก่ผู้ลี้ภัย เปิดโอกาสให้ผู้ลี้ภัยจัดการตนเอง และเสริมสร้างขีดความสามารถ และภาวะผู้นำใน

- 6) ให้คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิงจัดตั้งกลไก- รวมถึงคณะผู้แทน หรือคณะที่ปรึกษาของชนกลุ่มน้อย – เพื่อให้มั่นใจได้ว่าสามารถรับฟังความคิดเห็นของชนกลุ่มน้อยทางชาติพันธุ์และศาสนา และให้ความต้องการพิเศษของบุคคลเหล่านี้ได้รับการพิจารณา - *ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง*
  - 7) คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง ควรจัดให้มีกลไกต่างๆ (เช่นเวทีสาธารณะประจำศูนย์พักพิง) เพื่อหารือกับเยาวชนเกี่ยวกับความคิด และข้อกังวลของเขา และสนับสนุนให้เยาวชนเข้าร่วมในกิจกรรมที่มีประโยชน์ต่อเยาวชน และชุมชนโดยรวม - *ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: คณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย และคณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง*
  - 8) ให้ UNHCR รัฐบาลไทย และ IRC/LAC ร่วมมือกับคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย ในการ (1) สนับสนุนการระบุ และกำหนดบทบาท และความรับผิดชอบให้ชัดเจนมากขึ้น สำหรับองค์กรต่างๆ เกี่ยวกับความคุ้มครอง และการเข้าถึงความยุติธรรม และ (2) เสริมสมรรถภาพของระบบศาลยุติธรรมในศูนย์พักพิง และระบบความมั่นคง ตามบทบาทของตน เพื่อรักษาความสงบเรียบร้อยและหลักนิติธรรม และเพื่อจัดการกับความผิดละเมิด และการฝ่าฝืนกฎระเบียบของศูนย์พักพิง
- นอกจากนี้ ให้องค์กรเหล่านี้พยายามหาทรัพยากรที่จำเป็น เพื่อขยายขอบเขตกิจกรรมส่งเสริม “ความคุ้มครองและการเข้าถึงความยุติธรรม” ให้ครอบคลุมศูนย์พักพิงทั้งเก้าแห่ง จากที่ดำเนินการอยู่เพียงในห้าแห่งในปัจจุบัน - *ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: UNHCR รัฐบาลไทย และ IRC/LAC*
- 9) ให้ UNHCR รัฐบาลไทย และ IRC/LAC สนับสนุนคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยต่อไป ในการทบทวนและบังคับใช้กฎข้อบังคับที่ทบทวนใหม่สำหรับศูนย์พักพิงโดยเร็วที่สุด และดำเนินการให้มั่นใจได้ว่า การบังคับใช้กฎข้อบังคับใหม่นี้จะประกอบด้วยกระบวนการที่มีประสิทธิภาพในการให้ความรู้แก่ประชากรในศูนย์พักพิง เกี่ยวกับลักษณะและจุดประสงค์ของกฎข้อบังคับเหล่านี้ และชี้แจงเหตุผลว่าทำไมกฎข้อบังคับเหล่านี้จึงต้องสอดคล้อง และต้องยึดกฎหมายไทยเป็นหลัก - *ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: UNHCR รัฐบาลไทย และ IRC/LAC*

#### **ในระดับประสานงานความช่วยเหลือตามหลักมนุษยธรรม**

- 10) ในบริบทของกระบวนการเปลี่ยนผ่านที่กำลังเริ่มต้นขึ้นในประเทศพม่า และการส่งตัวผู้ลี้ภัยกลับประเทศ ซึ่งจัดว่ามีความสำคัญในอันดับต้นๆ ให้ Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group (DHAWG) ลงทุนจัดทำกระบวนการช่วยเหลือ ที่จะสามารถระบุและแก้ไขปัญหาจากความผิดปกติในการปฏิบัติงานขององค์กรต่างๆ ที่ทำงานในระดับนี้ - *ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: DHAWG และองค์กรผู้บริจาคแนวทาง*

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บางด้าน และบ่อยครั้ง ภายใต้ระบอบประชาธิปไตย มีบทบาทสำคัญในการวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ และจับตามองโครงสร้างการบริหารจัดการและการปกครองอย่างเป็นทางการ องค์กรชุมชนในศูนย์พักพิงในปัจจุบัน เป็นทรัพยากรและโครงสร้างสำคัญ ที่คณะกรรมการศูนย์พักพิง และคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัย ควรใช้ประโยชน์เมื่อใดที่ทำได้ เพื่อตอบสนองต่อข้อแนะนำเหล่านี้

- 11) ให้เพิ่มประสิทธิภาพ และประสิทธิผลของ DHAWG ด้วยการจัดตั้งคณะทำงาน เพื่อสนับสนุนงานของกลุ่มผู้บริจาค ด้วยการประสานงาน ทำให้เกิดความต่อเนื่อง ให้ข้อมูลอย่างทันต่อเหตุการณ์ และวิเคราะห์ข้อมูลอย่างเป็นเอกเทศ - ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: DHAWG และองค์กรผู้บริจาคแนวหน้า
- 12) ให้ยอมรับว่าคณะกรรมการผู้ลี้ภัยเป็นผู้แทนอย่างเป็นทางการของผู้ลี้ภัยในศูนย์พักพิงทั้งเก้าแห่ง และให้เข้าร่วมอย่างเป็นทางการในกระบวนการวางแผนและจัดลำดับความสำคัญของ DHAWG - ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: ประธาน DHAWG
- 13) ให้ DHAWG รับรองอย่างเป็นทางการบทบาทผู้นำของ TBBC ในการสนับสนุน และเพิ่มประสิทธิภาพของโครงสร้างการบริหารจัดการผู้ลี้ภัย และจัดสรรทรัพยากรด้านการเงินให้เพียงพอต่อการเสริมสร้างขีดความสามารถ และปฏิบัติการทั่วไปของโครงการเหล่านี้ และให้ว่าจ้างหน่วยงานที่เหมาะสมให้ควบคุมดูแลมิติการบริหารศูนย์พักพิงในความช่วยเหลือตามหลักมนุษยธรรม - ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: DHAWG และองค์กรผู้บริจาคแนวหน้า
- 14) ให้ DHAWG ร้องขอ UNHCR ให้รับบทบาทผู้นำและตัวแทนกลุ่มผู้บริจาคในการพัฒนาแนวทางในการประสานงาน เตรียมการสำหรับการส่งผู้ลี้ภัยชาวพม่ากลับประเทศ - ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: DHAWG และ UNHCR
- 15) ในบริบทของการวางแผนช่วงเปลี่ยนผ่านสำหรับการส่งผู้ลี้ภัยกลับประเทศ ให้ DHAWG จัดให้มีการวิเคราะห์เชิงยุทธศาสตร์วิธีการที่สามารถนำรูปแบบการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง และโดยเฉพาะประสบการณ์ บทเรียน เครื่องมือ และขีดความสามารถไปสนับสนุนความพยายามการร่วมพัฒนาชาติให้มากที่สุด ระหว่างระยะเวลาห้าถึงสิบปีต่อจากนี้ไป - ผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาทหลัก: DHAWG และองค์กรผู้บริจาคแนวหน้า

คณะผู้ประเมินขอเสนอให้กรรมการประสานงานองค์การช่วยเหลือผู้ลี้ภัยในประเทศไทย (CCSDPT) เข้ามารับผิดชอบในการเริ่มต้น และติดตามผลกิจกรรมที่เกี่ยวข้องกับข้อเสนอแนะแก้ไขข้อในระดับการบริหารศูนย์พักพิง คณะผู้ประเมินขอเสนอด้วยว่าให้ DHAWG ทั้งหมดเข้ามารับผิดชอบในการติดตามผลกิจกรรมที่เกี่ยวข้องกับข้อเสนอแนะแก้ไขข้อในระดับประสานงานความช่วยเหลือตามหลักมนุษยธรรม และให้ระบุว่าองค์กรใดในกลุ่มองค์กรสมาชิกของตนควรเป็นผู้มีบทบาทในการปฏิบัติตามข้อเสนอแนะแต่ละข้อ เมื่อใดที่ไม่ระบุชื่อผู้ที่ควรมีบทบาท

## **บทสรุป**

การประเมินผลนี้พบว่าระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิงเป็นระบบที่ใช้ได้ผลเป็นอย่างดี และเป็นรูปแบบที่มีประโยชน์สำหรับการมีส่วนร่วมและการบริหารจัดการกิจการเกี่ยวกับผู้ลี้ภัย ประชากรผู้ลี้ภัยทั่วไปมองว่าโครงสร้างการบริหารนี้เหมาะสม และมีประสิทธิภาพ แต่ระบบนี้อยู่ภายใต้แรงกดดัน และจำเป็นต้องดำเนินการมาตรการเพื่อเพิ่มประสิทธิภาพให้แก่ระบบทั้งในระดับศูนย์พักพิง และระดับประสานงานในวงกว้าง เพื่อให้ระบบเข้มแข็งมากขึ้น และปรับปรุงสภาพแวดล้อมของระบบ เนื่องจากระบบบริหารศูนย์พักพิง เป็นเครื่องมือส่งเสริมสุขภาวะ และการปกครองผู้ลี้ภัย 140,000 คน ในศูนย์พักพิงตามชายแดนไทย จึงสมควรและคุ้มค่าที่จะลงทุนและปรับปรุงต่อไป นอกจากนี้ ยังอาจเป็นบรรทัดฐานอันมีค่าสำหรับความพยายามสร้างชาติ รวมถึงกระบวนการส่งผู้ลี้ภัยกลับประเทศ ทั้งสำหรับประชาชน และสถาบันต่างๆ ของประเทศพม่าในอนาคต

*Adaptation, Resilience and Transition: Report of the Formative Evaluation of Camp Management in the Burmese Refugee Camps in Thailand – Long Report*



# 1 INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Rationale, Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

In 2009 CIDA evaluated the CIDA-funded project, *Burma Border Areas Program 2005-2010*. Though that evaluation did not look at the humanitarian assistance component of the project in depth, it noted that the community-based camp management model being used in the Burmese refugee camps in Thailand, a model that involved the refugees and refugee structures in the day-to-day management of the camps, promoted the self-reliance of displaced people through the utilisation and development of their own resources, this with a view to preparing refugees for longer term solutions. The evaluation tendered the view that the basic model is sound, based on approaches dating back to the 1980s that began to view refugees and populations affected by disasters as key actors instead of as passive victims.

However, the report also highlighted that the model has been questioned of late by some, particularly the May 2008 report commissioned by the European Commission, *Strategic Assessment and Evaluation of Assistance to Thai-Burma Refugee Camps*.

Since 2008, debate among donors concerning camp management has intensified. A number of specific concerns have been raised by some donors, primarily the European Commission (EC), which if true, call for action. Based on these concerns, the validity of the camp management model has been called into question and organizations delivering services in the camp, such as TBBC, are under pressure to implement reforms.

CIDA therefore considered it prudent to investigate these concerns and the appropriateness of the camp management model at this time. CIDA took the initiative to draft Terms of Reference for an evaluation of the management model. These were circulated to key stakeholders in the donor community, the Ministry of Interior of the Royal Thai Government, CCSDPT and TBBC in May of 2011. The feedback and input received were reflected in the final TORs for this evaluation.

As planning for this evaluation was taking place, it became clear that there would be significant benefits if the evaluation were to cover all nine camps. CIDA therefore approached other donors to gauge interest in contributing financially. In the end, both the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the Australian NGO, Act for Peace/National Council of Churches of Australia (NCCA), agreed to contribute substantial funds to this undertaking and joined CIDA in co-sponsoring the evaluation.

The evaluation process aimed to facilitate dialogue and learning between and among stakeholder groups by ensuring that a broad range of stakeholders were engaged. It was the intent of the evaluation that beneficiaries and intermediary bodies would learn through their participation in and contribution to the evaluation. By identifying and investigating concerns raised and issues considered sensitive, the evaluation aimed to foster a constructive dialogue that supports greater consensus among stakeholders on the merit of existing structures and current approaches to the involvement of refugees in camp management, on what ought to change and what principles and values ought to guide that change.

The purpose of the evaluation is threefold:

- a) to facilitate a constructive dialogue among stakeholders on the issue of camp management in refugee camps situated on the Thai-Burma border,
- b) to comprehensively and accurately describe the current camp management model that is in place, and
- c) to identify areas where improvements and changes should be initiated.

The specific objectives of this evaluation are:

- a) To document the historic development of the camp management model used in the camps and its evolution to date;
- b) To assess whether the camp management model is able to ensure that the responsibilities of camp management are effectively covered;
- c) To assess the extent to which the work of the refugee management structures is in compliance with international standards, practices and principles for the care and protection of refugees; and
- d) To foster dialogue between partners about the model from documented evidence.

## **1.2 Background**

For 20 years, prior to 2005, the camp committees received no recognition or formal support for the responsibilities they fulfilled in the day-to-day running of the camps. Since 2005, significant resources were provided for staff stipends, administration and capacity building, but the overall model was not assessed to see whether all the responsibilities were being adequately covered and effectively carried out. The nature of the study is a formative evaluation, not only to assess performance levels of the camp committees, progress and achievements, but also to identify critical gaps and how they could be addressed.

In other refugee situations the camp management function is usually the responsibility of a national or international NGO, i.e., an independent body and not the beneficiaries themselves. Thus it is questioned whether the Camp Management bodies comprised of beneficiaries are able to effectively conduct their roles according to humanitarian principles and whether they are legitimate, representative bodies. Significant donor funds are required to maintain the existing model, but replacing this with a traditional model would entail greater allocation of resources; therefore it is incumbent to ascertain whether the Camp Management bodies comprised of beneficiaries are effective mechanisms for this purpose.

Value added from this evaluation is expected to be achieved through greater understanding of the functions of the camp management authorities, identified potential support mechanisms, identified gaps and appropriate delegation of support functions. It can also pave the way forward to support greater community participation in camp management and governance in other refugee settings around the world.

Camp management is the role of the Camp Management Agency, normally a national or international NGO. Camp management encompasses those activities in one single camp that focuses on the coordination of services, establishing governance and community mobilisation mechanisms, the maintenance of camp infrastructure, data collection and sharing, provision of defined services and monitoring the service delivery of other providers.

Since 1984 the camps along the Thailand Burma border have been managed by the beneficiaries themselves under the authority of the Royal Thai Government. The Thai authorities delegated day-to-day responsibility for the running of the camps to the refugees. For the first twenty years, neither UNHCR nor any NGO took (or could take) any responsibility or provided any support for camp management but only engaged with the communities as it related to direct service provision. The community-based camp management model that evolved is unique.

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) implements refugee policy set by the National Security Council (NSC) and controls the day-to-day running of the camps through provincial and district authorities, in collaboration with refugee and camp committees.

The Refugee Committees oversee all activities through the nine camp committees, coordinate assistance provided by NGOs, and liaise with UNHCR, the RTG, KNU and KNPP.

The Camp Committees are the administrative and management bodies of the refugee camps. They coordinate the day-to-day running of the camp and the delivery of services in collaboration with local MOI officials, as well as provide the main link between the camp population, NGOs, UNHCR and local Thai authorities.

### 1.3 Evaluation Object and Scope

At the time the evaluation was commissioned there were approximately 140,000 Burmese refugees residing in nine camps (see Table 1 below) along the Thai-Burmese border from the Thai northern most province of Mae Hong Son to the province of Ratchaburi which is at about the same latitude as Bangkok. The two northern most camps were set up in the mid-1990s under the Karenni Refugee Committee and their residents, at the time, comprised primarily people from the Karenni ethnic group. The Karen Refugee Committee oversees the other seven camps. A large majority of the residents of these camps when they were set up were Karen. In recent years, with the resettlement of significant number of refugees to third countries and the arrival of new refugees, the ethnic diversity of the camps has increased, particularly in the three camps in Tak.

Since refugees who arrived since 2006 have not been processed and registered by the RTG Provincial Admission Boards (PABs), the camp population is comprised of both registered and unregistered refugees. The number of unregistered refugees in some of the camps is greater than 50% of the population.

**Table 1 Basic Data on Burmese Refugee Camps in Thailand<sup>8</sup>**

Camp Name (Acronym) <sup>9</sup>	Population Total (at Dec. 2011)	Population Mix				Province	Refugee Committee
		Majority Ethnicity (%)	% Unregistered	% Female	% Adults		
Ban Mai Nai Soi (Site 1)	13,592	Karenni (93.4)	24.2	48.3	54.8	Mae Hong Son	Karenni
Ban Mae Surin (Site 2)	3,579	Karen (84.2)	48.5	49.2	49.7		
Mae La Oon (MLO)	13,763	Karen (99.2)	34.6	49.5	51.5		
Mae Ra Ma Luang <sup>10</sup> (MRML)	15,901	Karen (99.8)	42.5	50.4	49.3		
Mae La (ML)	46,431	Karen (83.9)	51.0	49.9	55.7	Tak	Karen
Umpiem Mai (UM)	17,609	Karen (74.7)	52.1	48.6	58.3		
Nu Po (NP)	15,325	Karen (77.9)	50.7	50.1	55.7		
Ban Don Yang (BDY)	3,883	Karen (95.0)	36.2	52.3	52.5	Kanchanaburi	
Tham Hin (TH)	7,074	Karen (98.5)	50.9	51.5	54.4	Ratchaburi	
<b>Total</b>	<b>137,157</b>	<b>Karen (78.5)</b>	<b>45.3</b>	<b>49.8</b>	<b>54.5</b>		

The camps vary in size. Some holding less than 4,000 refugees whereas, Mae La, the largest camp has over 45,000 residents. Five of the camps are of medium size with populations numbering between 13,500 and 17,600.

<sup>8</sup> In this report, unless otherwise stated, the figures used as reference are the 'verified caseload' figures of TBBC appearing in Appendix A of the *TBBC Programme Report – July to December 2011*, p. 109

<sup>9</sup> Throughout this report we will often use the camp name acronym in lieu of the camp name as we understand that most readers are familiar with these.

<sup>10</sup> To be consistent in the transliteration of the Thai name, this camp should be spelled Mae La Ma Luang and not Mae Ra Ma Luang. However, in this report, we have retained the common spelling used by most of those working in the camps.

At the time the evaluation was being planned it was estimated that many of these variables (size and ethnic makeup of the population, ratio of registered to unregistered refugees, geographic location and the Refugee Committee to which the camp is linked) would have a bearing on the management of the camps. Since some of the management challenges could be unique to a particular a camp and selecting a representative sample would have been difficult, it was decided to include all camps in the scope of the evaluation and additional financial resources were secured to do this.

It was also determined at the time of work-planning that it was imperative that this evaluation capture the voices of the refugees to ascertain how the refugee management structures were perceived by the refugees themselves: to what extent were the structures perceived as addressing their diverse needs and serving their various interests, or in other words to what extent were they perceived as representative and legitimate.

This evaluation has therefore focused primarily on the refugee management structures (Section Leaders, Camp Committees, Refugee Committees) themselves, and less on the other organizations and mechanisms involved in the coordination of the humanitarian response for Burmese refugees in Thailand.

## **1.4 Lines of Inquiry**

The evaluation terms of reference identified a number of major lines of inquiry and within each of these a number of dimensions and questions to be addressed. In particular, it clearly specifies the lines of inquiry that are to be its focus:

1. The extent to which camp management responsibilities are being effectively covered and by whom;
2. The extent to which camps are being administered and managed in compliance with international norms;
3. The TORs also put an emphasis on the intent that the camp management model be assessed from the beneficiaries (i.e., the refugees) standpoint.

These were further clarified at the time the evaluation work-plan was being prepared. The main areas of focus and lines of inquiry were summarized in the Framework of Inquiry Matrix (included here in Annex 2).

## **1.5 Organization of the Report**

This report presents the findings of this formative evaluation. It is organized in three parts. Part 1 describes the approach taken and the methodology adopted by the evaluation (Section 2). It also presents important contextual information (Section 3) regarding Thai policy with respect to refugees, historical origins of the current management model and a perspective on emerging international humanitarian assistance practice.

Part 2 presents the evaluation findings. Sections 4 to 8 deal with Part A of the evaluation's Framework of Inquiry, i.e., the focus is on camp management and governance functions; roles and responsibilities, leadership, authority and legitimacy; participation and representation; and other specific management dimensions. Section 4 describes the evaluation's understanding of the current camp management and coordination model. Section 5 reports on the refugee population perspectives and assessment of their leaders and the camp management structures. Section 6 looks at refugee leaders and managers perceptions of their roles, the fulfillment of their management roles and responsibilities and the challenges that continue to face. Section 7 examines the issues of participation, representation and selection of leaders as perceived by the refugee population as a whole as well as from the perspective of specific categories of

the population. And finally Section 8 examines specific dimensions of management, namely, protection and access to justice, coordination and data sharing, and service delivery and monitoring.

Section 9 examines the perspectives of other stakeholders regarding the camp management structures but also deal with the context within which the camps exist and are managed. Section 10 reports on the impacts of the camps on neighbouring Thai communities. These two sections are responding to Part D of the Framework of Inquiry. Section 11 examines the degree of alignment of the current camp management model with international norms (Part B of the Framework of Inquiry). Finally, Section 12 examines the how the management structures are being supported and strengthened, and the challenges they continue to face (Part C of the Framework of Inquiry).

Part 3 of the report presents the evaluation's Lessons (Section 13), Recommendations (Section 14) and Conclusion (Section 15).

## **PART 1 – EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND CONTEXT**

### **2 EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY**

#### **2.1 Overall Approach**

The focus of this evaluation is on camp management and therefore we are not looking so much at what is being achieved (e.g., what services are being provided and what is the quality of these services) but how it is being achieved, by whom and how the refugee population participates in the governance and management of the camps. The approach adopted for this evaluation is therefore primarily utilization-focused: Are camps being managed and their populations being provided for effectively? And are camps being managed in compliance with international norms? What improvements might be required in how camps are being governed and managed?

Since an emphasis is being put on an assessment from the refugee standpoint, refugees will be asked what they look for in their leaders and what they expect of their leaders. These leadership qualities and role expectations will serve as the basis for assessing camp management from the refugee perspective rather than using a set of pre-defined indicators or management roles.

This focus will be complemented by the perspective of others: refugees occupying camp management positions, representatives of other parties such as CBOs and international NGOs, local Thai authorities, etc. And such perspectives will be examined using recognized camp management categories as defined in the literature such as the establishment of governance and community mobilisation mechanisms, the maintenance of camp infrastructure, data collection and sharing, the coordination, provision and monitoring of services. The degree to which the exercise of management functions is being carried out in due consideration and compliance with specific international norms will also be examined.

#### **2.2 Approaches to Information Gathering in the Refugee Camps and Surroundings**

The evaluation used different approaches to information gathering. Some of the information was gathered using traditional forms of research such as document analysis and interviews of key informants. However, information gathering from the refugee population relied on participatory approaches and methodologies favouring group settings including small workshops and focus group discussions. These group encounters involved small groups of refugees randomly selected within certain categories. They provided contextualized information that better reflected the complexity of the situation and the interplay of various elements and factors.

During the sessions with various refugee categories (general population, minorities, women, youth), many of the same processes were used and same questions asked in order to allow cross-referencing and comparison of the responses between the different categories.

During the sessions with youth groups, the first half of the session was carried out with the young women in one sub-group and young men in a different sub-group to make it easier for participants to raise issues that they might not be comfortable to raise in a mixed group: e.g., issues related to fear about sexual and gender-based violence or other gender specific concerns.

In some sessions in Karen camps, groups were separated according to whether participants were Karen-speaking or non-Karen-speaking. This was necessary because of the language issue, but it also provided some insights into how the perspectives of such sub-segments of the camp population can differ.

As noted in the previous section, the intent was to focus much of the evaluation effort on assessing the perceptions and perspectives of the refugees vis-à-vis their leaders and the camp management structures and secondly, to examine the refugee management structures themselves.

Many other entities are involved in the delivery, coordination and management of services, protection and assistance to the refugees in the nine camps. While members of the evaluation team consulted with representatives of many of these agencies, it was primarily with regard to their perception of the current refugee management structures and not to assess their own roles in the management and coordination of humanitarian assistance to the refugee population.

Since the evaluation was to gather information from all nine camps, an evaluation team of 11 members was assembled. All 11 members participated in a three day orientation and training in Mae Hong Son at the end of October 2011 where they were introduced to the evaluation's purpose and the methodology and the information gathering tools to be used in the camps.

All evaluation team members took part in information gathering in Ban Mai Nai Soi camp (Site 1) during the first week of November. Site 1 allowed the team to both pilot the methodology and information gathering tools and served, for the less experienced members of the team, as *in situ* training and familiarization with the group session processes. The information gathering tools were adjusted and fine-tuned based on the experience in Site 1. The evaluation team leader also reported back to Director of the Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons (OCDP) of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), and on the basis of that report, the team proceeded with data gathering in the other eight camps.

The evaluation team split up into three smaller teams, each responsible for information gathering in the camps in Mae Hong Son, Tak and Kanjanaburi/Ratchaburi respectively (Table 2.1). Each team consisted of a senior evaluator and facilitators/ interpreters (Karen and Burmese/Karenni) responsible for gathering information in the camps. Each team also included a Thai evaluator who gathered information from shop-owners inside and outside the camps, and from government officials and community members resident near the camps regarding camp impact on the surrounding communities. The composition of each of these smaller teams is provided in Table 2.1.

**Table 2.1 Evaluation Team Members and Sub-team Composition**

	<b>Mae Hong Son</b> (Site 2, MLO and MRML)	<b>Tak</b> (ML, UM and NP)	<b>Kanchanaburi &amp; Ratchaburi</b> (BDY and TH)
<b>Senior Evaluator</b>	Dr. Ronald Renard	Mr. Paul Turcot	Ms. Rachitta Na Pattalung
<b>Facilitator/Interpreter (Karen)</b>	Mr. Palahae Suriyetrakul	Ms. Hser Htee Praikamasi	Mr. Chaiyan Mungthamdee
<b>Facilitator/Interpreter (Karenni/Burmese)</b>	Ms. Theh Mar	Mr. Aung Myo Aye	(same as above)
<b>Thai Evaluator</b>	Mr. Sompop Yeejorhor	Ms. Jaranya Daengnoy	Dr. Anchalee Singhanetra

Note: As well as being the senior evaluator for the Tak team, Paul Turcot was also the evaluation team leader. Information gathering in these remaining eight camps took place during the period of November 7-26, 2011.

## 2.3 Information Sources

### 2.3.1 Sources from the Nine Camps and Surrounding Communities

In each camp the evaluators conducted sessions with groups of refugees from the general population who were randomly selected within certain categories. These categories were identified in the evaluation work-plan to ensure that particular perspectives were heard given the focus of the evaluation and specific areas of inquiry (e.g., concern about the perspective of minority groups, women and youth). Information with respect to the selection criteria and desired number of participants for the sessions with each category is presented in Table 2.2.

**Table 2.2 Sessions Refugees from the General Camp Population**

<b>Session Type</b> Refugee Category	<b>Selection Criteria</b>	<b>Desired Numbers</b>
<b>General Refugee Population Workshops</b> (2.5 Hours) Refugees selected from the general camp population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adults</li> <li>A mix of long-term and recent (since 2005) arrivals from across sections</li> <li>A mix of women and men</li> <li>Randomly selected while reflecting proportions in total population</li> </ul>	16-20 people per workshop; # of workshops varies according to size of camp: 1 in small camps (Site 2, BDY, TH); 2 in medium size camps (Site 1, MLO, MRML, UM, NP); 3 in largest camp (ML)
<b>Minority Focus Group</b> (1.5 Hours) Refugees belonging to ethnic or religious minority groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adults</li> <li>From the different ethnic minority groups and different minority religious groups</li> <li>A mix of women and men</li> <li>Randomly selected</li> </ul>	10 to 12 people per focus group
<b>Women Focus Group</b> (1.5 Hours) Women refugees from the general camp population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adult women</li> <li>A mix of long-term and recent (since 2005) arrivals from across sections</li> <li>Randomly selected</li> </ul>	10 to 12 people per focus group
<b>Youth Focus Groups</b> (1.5 Hours) Youth refugees (14-17 years) First half of sessions were carried out in gender disaggregated sub-groups to facilitate conversations around potentially sensitive issues.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A 50:50 mix of young women and men</li> <li>Randomly selected for Site 1 only</li> <li>For other camps, youth active in schools or youth CBO reps were selected<sup>11</sup></li> </ul>	10 to 12 people per focus group

<sup>11</sup> Based on the experience in Site 1, the evaluation team decided to change the basis for identifying youth participants. Many of the participants identified via random selection for Site 1 were young (14 or 15 years old) and quite shy. With only 1.5 hours available for these sessions, the evaluation team did not have the option of involving the participants in a lengthy warm-up process before getting to the matters of concern. While not completely representative of the youth population, it was decided that the best approach to address this constraint was to invite to the youth focus group sessions in the remaining eight camps youth who were more articulate through their involvement in activities at school or in youth CBOs.

### 2.3.1.1 Refugees Drawn from the General Refugee Population

The random selection of participants was carried out from the TBBC population database making use of software designed for such a purpose. Participant lists were generated for each category. There was an oversampling to allow for errors in the database, the possible absence of people from their section at the time and also to provide for the elimination of individuals that held positions within the refugee management structures. These lists were sent to Camp Committee so that Section Leaders could inform the individuals listed that their presence was required at a set time and place to participate in an evaluation session.

Table 2.3 provide a summary of the number of refugees from all nine camps who participated in various sessions not including refugee managers or CBO representatives. A breakdown of the number of participants in the general refugee population workshops and in the various focus group discussions can be found in Annex 3 in Tables A3.1.1 and A3.1.2 respectively. Annex 3 also provides of the breakdown of the number of by camp (Tables A3.2.1 to A3.2.9).

**Table 2.3 Total No. of Participants – All Refugee Sessions**

	Site 1	Site 2	MLO	MRML	ML	UM	NP	BDY	TH	Total
<b>Women</b>	23	25	29	21	46	35	41	27	23	<b>270</b>
<b>Men</b>	41	14	39	28	43	36	33	20	21	<b>275</b>
<b>Registered</b>	47	27	51	32	36	28	41	34	30	<b>326</b>
<b>Unregistered</b>	17	12	17	17	53	43	33	13	14	<b>219</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>545</b>
<b>Minimum Sample Size Intended</b>	62	46	62	62	78	62	62	46	46	526

While 545 refugees participated in sessions, we did not meet the minimum sample size we were aiming for in some of the camps such as Site 2, MRML and TH. In both MRML and TH, the random sample lists for the various sessions did not reach the Camp Committee in time to properly alert the various participants. Other reasons explain why some of the people listed were not able to participate in a session: some prospective participants had other commitments (e.g., medical appointment, participation in a training session); some were not in the camp at the time of the session (this report confirms the fact that there is considerable movement of refugees in and out of the camp, both official and clandestine); small logistic slip-ups resulted in someone showing up at the wrong place or the wrong time, or at the right time but on the wrong day. However, we do not believe that these slightly lower participation numbers has negatively affected the findings of this evaluation.

In Table A3.1.1 (in Annex 3), we can see that the general refugee population (GRP) workshops are weighted 2:1 in favour of men. However the fact that there was a separate women's focus group session in each camp helped re-establish a gender balance in the sample (Table 2.3). Women account for 49.5% of our sample (270 women out of a total 545 refugee participants), whereas in the total population of the nine camps they account for 49.8% of the TBBC verified caseload.<sup>12</sup>

With respect to the representation of registered to unregistered refugees, unregistered refugees are slightly under-represented at 40.2% of the sample whereas in the total population of the nine camps they account for 45.3% of the TBBC verified caseload.

The random sampling listings developed for each camp worked well. There were a few instances of wives standing in for their husbands or vice versa. In a few cases, small errors may have slipped into the

<sup>12</sup> In this report, unless otherwise stated, the figures used as reference are those appearing in Appendix A of the *TBBC Programme Report – July to December 2011*, p. 109



database (e.g., a person identified as male but actually female; misspelling of a person's name). For the most part, participants were as per the lists provided to the camps.

We are satisfied that these randomly generated lists were adhered to by the Camp Committees and that there were no attempts to manipulate these lists in order to influence the outcome of the various sessions.

With respect to specific sub-groups of the refugee population, in reviewing the detailed information for each of camp (Annex 3), we note the small number of people who attended the minority focus group session in BDY and TH (Tables A3.2.8 and A3.2.9 respectively). In both cases a larger number of people indicated that while they were Buddhist Karen they did not consider themselves different in any way from the majority Christian Karen. For this reason they did not feel they would have much to contribute to the session. The evaluators thanked them for showing up for the session and they returned to their homes.<sup>13</sup> However, in MLO and MRML, which are over 99% Karen, representatives from the Buddhist Karen minority expressed interest in participating in the session with other ethnic and religious minority representatives.

In terms of the youth focus group discussions, as noted in Table 2.2 above, the evaluation did not rely on a random sampling of the TBBC population database but requested that youth active within schools or youth-focused CBOs be identified and invited to the sessions. Generally, this worked well. However in the case of TH, only half of the participants were 18 years or under, and in the case of Site 2, the participants were mostly young adults. In the case of MRML, due to a misunderstanding, while all the participants were youth, they all were from the same section of the camp.

### 2.3.1.2 Refugee Leaders and CBO Representatives

In each camp the evaluators also held focus groups discussions with Section Leaders, with members of the Camp Committee (not including the Camp Leader) and with representatives of CBOs active in program delivery. The Camp Leader of each camp was interviewed separately.

Table 2.6 provides a summary, for all nine camps, of the number of people in these categories who participated in these sessions. Again, detailed information for each of the camps is found in Annex 2.

**Table 2.6 Total No. of Participants – Refugee Managers and CBO Representatives**

	Site 1	Site 2	MLO	MRML	ML	UM	NP	BDY	TH	Total
<b>Women</b>	11	7	7	11	7	10	10	14	19	<b>96</b>
<b>Men</b>	24	21	26	19	30	26	25	23	18	<b>212</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>308</b>
<b>Registered</b>	28	20	23	22	28	30	24	25	25	<b>225</b>
<b>Unregistered</b>	0	0	0	0	9	6	0	0	0	<b>15</b>
<b>Total<sup>14</sup></b>	<b>28</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>240</b>

### 2.3.1.3 Other Camp Level Informants

Interviews were also held with the Thai Camp Commanders (TCC) of all nine camps.

<sup>13</sup> This was not the case in all such instances. For example, in MLO and MRML, where more than 99% of the population are Karen, representatives from the Buddhist Karen minority chose to participate in the session with other ethnic and religious minority representatives even though they recognized that they are in many ways not very different from the majority Christian Karen population.

<sup>14</sup> Information on whether CBO representatives are registered or un-registered refugees was only collected for ML and UM. Therefore the totals of registered and un-registered refugees for the other seven camps will not add up to the number who actually participated in the sessions

Meetings were held with field representatives of NGOs active in the camps. These meetings were held in Mae Hong Son (for Site 1 and Site 2), Mae Sarieng (for MLO and MRML), Mae Sot (for ML), Umphang (for UM and NP), Sangklaburi (for BDY) and in Suan Pheung (for TH). One senior evaluator interviewed (in person or over the telephone) other NGO representatives unable to attend these meetings. In all 18 people representing 12 different agencies contributed to the evaluation.

Evaluation team members also met with KRC and KnRC at their offices in Mae Sot and Mae Hong Son respectively, as well as with KRC representatives in their branch offices in Mae Sarieng and Suan Pheung. Meetings also took place with the Karen Women's Organization at their office in Mae Sarieng and with the UNHCR Senior Field Coordinator in Mae Sot.

### 2.3.2 Informants Reached by Thai Evaluators

As part of gaining a better understanding of the context within which the refugee camps must be managed, the evaluation examined the impacts the camps have on nearby Thai communities, and the impact this had on camp management. One operating assumption was that the situation in neighbouring Thai communities might influence actions or decisions taken by Thai camp commanders and other local authorities with respect to the refugee camps.

This part of the evaluation could not be planned in advance and largely depended on the Thai evaluators' abilities to approach various government and community informants and on others informally identified as useful sources of information.

In the end the Thai evaluators were able to meet and hold conversations with 176 different informants. Table 2.7 provides a summary of the number of sources of each type for all nine camps.

**Table 2.7 Number of Sources by Type and Camp**

Type of Informants		Site 1	Site 2	MLO	MRML	ML	UM	NP	BDY	TH	Total
<b>Government Officials</b> ( <sup>15</sup> or sor, etc.)	- inside the camp	6	3	4	5	1	2	2	3	2	28
	- outside of camp	5	1	2		3	1		7	3	22
<b>Shop Owners</b>	- inside the camp	3	3	5	6	11	8	4	2	3	45
	- outside of camp	4				2	1	1		4	12
<b>Estate/Large Farm Owners</b>						1	1		1		3
<b>Resort/Restaurant Owner</b>			1			2		1			4
<b>Community Members</b>	- next to camp	3	6	10	9	1	4	4	6	6	49
	- in proximity to camp		1			2	1	3			7
<b>Other</b>			1	2			1			2	6
<b>Total</b>		<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>176</b>

### 2.3.3 Other Informants

A limited number of interviews and meetings took place in Bangkok. In addition to a briefing with the OCDP, these included representatives of the UNHCR, CCSDPT, TBBC, IRC and the Humanitarian Facilitator working with the Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group.

<sup>15</sup> 'Or sor' is the transliteration of the Thai acronym for the Territorial Defence Volunteers. It is the expression most commonly used by all who live or work in the camps. These 'or sor' assist the Thai Camp Commander in manning the formal entry points to the camps and monitoring the application of RTG policy within the camps.

## **2.4 Limitations**

The evaluation has a number of limitations. Some of these are more significant, while a few others were less so:

### **1) Insufficient focus on the broader ‘camp coordination’ level**

The work-plan foresaw the emphasis of data collection to take place with the refugee population in the camps with camp management in its narrow sense (the day-to-day management of the camps) being the primary focus. The level of effort was therefore focused at this level. Some effort was invested in looking at the larger context within which the camps fit but the focus here was more on the situation within the vicinity of the camps which is the area on which the Thai evaluators concentrated their efforts.

While the evaluation TORs identified issues at both levels, it did not make a clear distinction between these two different levels. Also at the time of work-planning, conversations with a number of stakeholders indicated that the emphasis should be put on capturing the perspectives of the refugee population with respect to the camp management structures and related issues, so the work-plan focused the level of effort at this level.

Following the preliminary data analysis, as I began to draft the report, it became clear that there was a need to differentiate these two levels. It is at this point, in consultation with CIDA, that the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Camp Management Handbook and its reference to the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) model being promoted by the IASC (ref. section 3.3 of this report) was brought to my attention. This model sets out a clear distinction between Camp Management in its narrower sense from the larger dimension with which ‘Camp Coordination’ is concerned. Revisiting the data with this framework in mind was helpful in organizing this report. But had this framework been available at the work-planning stage, it would have been clear that more of the effort in data gathering should have been directed at this broader level.

Since insufficient effort was targeted at this broader level, the evaluation has far less data and therefore has to be more tentative with respect to findings, conclusions and recommendations. This is unfortunate since, as this report will reveal, some of the important challenges with respect to the camp management of the Burmese refugee camps in Thailand pertain more to this level than to camp management in its narrower sense.

### **2) Limited examination of a key player in camp management – the Royal Thai Government**

The Royal Thai Government (RTG) maintains ultimate authority and responsibility over the camps and their management. As discussed in section 4.1 of this report, the various agencies and personnel of the RTG constitute one of the key clusters of actors in the camp management model being evaluated here.

However, this evaluation could only take place on condition that it focus primarily on the refugee management structures and not on the role and performance of the various agencies and personnel of the RTG. This was made clear in an initial meeting between the lead evaluator and the Office for Coordination of Displaced Persons (OCDP). This meeting began on a tense note since the OCDP, initially, would not allow this evaluation to proceed. From the perspective of its Director as well as the Chief of the Planning Section, camp management is the responsibility of the Thai government and therefore it was its responsibility to authorize and oversee such an evaluation. The OCDP expressed dismay that such an evaluation was being undertaken without their knowledge and consent. It appears that, given a change in leadership at the end of September, the new Director was unaware of the purpose

and plan for this evaluation.<sup>16</sup> The evaluation was ultimately allowed to proceed on the understanding that its primary focus would be on the refugee management structures. Prior to proceeding, the OCDP requested that a condensed version of the work-plan be prepared and translated into Thai. After reviewing this document, the evaluation was allowed to proceed with a first step, the piloting of the proposed evaluation approach in Site 1.<sup>17</sup> Following information gathering in the pilot site (Site 1), a debriefing session with the OCDP over the telephone was required before permission was given to proceed with information gathering in the other eight camps. Once all the data gathering at the camp level had been completed, the lead evaluator also met with the OCDP along with one of the evaluation team's Thai evaluators to debrief on preliminary findings. To respect the request that interviews not be conducted with OCDP representatives, questions were not put to them during these encounters.

The evaluation team was allowed to meet and interview the Thai Camp Commanders of the nine camps as well as other representatives of local RTG agencies regarding the refugee management structures and the impacts of the camps on neighbouring communities and localities. While the role and performance of various Thai officials was not the focus of this evaluation, issues related to this were observed and, when pertinent to the focus of this evaluation, have been noted. However, it is not of the purview of this evaluation or its report to address specific recommendations to the RTG.

### **3) Various constraints resulted in fewer stakeholders encounters and interviews than planned**

Due to availability, the lead evaluator was only able to meet with a few Bangkok-based agencies and international NGO Directors during the week following the time in the camps and prior to his return to Canada. Also fewer representatives of international NGOs than foreseen participated in the sessions held during the information gathering period on the border.

Finally, only a limited number of donor representatives were able to attend the debriefing session prior to the lead evaluator's return to Canada since many were out of the country (attending a meeting of the donor community in Rangoon).

### **4) Mis-estimation of the amount of time required to fully fulfill the evaluation mandate**

At the time of work-planning, additional financial support was sought to allow the evaluation to examine all nine camps. While sufficient time was allocated for data gathering in the nine camps (between three and half and five days was budgeted for time spent in the camps depending on the size), the amount of time to process and analyze all the data that was gathered was considerably underestimated. There were insufficient resources to enlist additional capacity in this work which led to a significant delay in completing this work as most of it fell on the lead evaluator.

Given this pressure on resources available, only the senior evaluators and lead evaluator met for one day following the data collection in the nine camps for a preliminary reflection on the information gathered and to share first impressions. Ideally the evaluation would have benefitted from a reconvening of the full evaluation team in a two to three day workshop to undertake some preliminary processing of the information and the identification of tentative findings for this part of the evaluation.

Time limitations and geographic location of the Refugee Committees also meant that it was not possible to meet with the RCs following a preliminary processing of information in order to provide feedback and validate preliminary tentative findings. Ideally, such meetings with the RCs as well as with the Camp

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<sup>16</sup> While the Canadian Embassy shared the terms of reference for the evaluation with the OCDP in May for their input and feedback, it appears that the Director at the time had not shared these with other senior officers in the OCDP office.

<sup>17</sup> The evaluation team's information gathering in the pilot camp had to be delayed by a week due to this unforeseen obstacle.

Committees would have been both desirable and a requirement to be consistent with the participatory intent of this evaluation. Following the information collection on the camps, members of the evaluation team met with the RCs, but these encounters were limited to a few hours immediately following the time in the camps, and prior to any significant processing of the data. So it was only possible to share preliminary impressions with the RCs.

#### **5) The evaluation validation process had to be curtailed due to budgetary constraints**

The evaluation TORs and work-plan had foreseen a validation mission by the lead evaluator to present the draft report and allow the various stakeholders to discuss the findings and recommendations with the lead evaluator prior to the report being finalized. Due to financial constraints and the level of effort required to produce the draft report, this was not possible and the evaluation validation took place through a series of video and audio conferences between the stakeholders based in Thailand and the lead evaluator and CIDA representative based in Canada. The feedback received during these validation sessions has been captured in Annex 12 of this fuller version of the report.

#### **6) Lesser limitations and challenges**

With regards to the information gathering at the camp level, the evaluation team also faced a few lesser limitations:

Information gathering in Site 1 was less complete as it was the camp that was used as the pilot to test the approach and the various information gathering tools and processes. It was also integral to the training provided to the evaluation team members, since it constituted their first use of the tools in real time.

Given the one week delay in obtaining permission to proceed with work at the camp level, the most fluent Karenni member of the evaluation team was only available for two of the four days of work in Site 1 (due to prior commitments that could not be changed). This meant that most exchanges during the two days when our key Karenni facilitator was not available had to take place through an interpreter which both constrained the process and limited the amount of information that could be shared given the time taken up by interpretation.

For two of the camps, the lists of randomly selected participants arrived at the very last minute allowing little time to inform the concerned people about the sessions they were being asked to attend. This was especially a problem for those sessions planned for the first day in the camp.

Only one interpreter/facilitator who could work in both Karen and Burmese had been recruited for the Southern team. Since the team would be dealing with only two camps, and these were smaller camps, this set-up was deemed workable at the time of planning given the budget available. However, some days involved four different group sessions. This proved to be a very heavy work load for only one interpreter/facilitator to carry.

### **3 CONTEXT**

To assess the refugee-based camp management structures it is important to understand some of the Thai policy context, the history and evolution of these structures, the current context of international humanitarian assistance, and conditions prevailing in the camps at the time of this evaluation.

### **3.1 The Current Royal Thai Government Policy**

Mass movements of displaced persons from Burma to Thailand began in 1984. From the outset, the Royal Thai Government (RTG), given its recent experience with Lao and Cambodian refugees in the late 1970s and early 1980s, declared these people were “displaced persons fleeing danger” (phuu leepchai)<sup>18</sup> or “persons fleeing fighting.” They were allowed to temporarily remain in Thailand and were to return when the situation at home returned to normal. Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and does not use the term ‘refugee’ in referring to these asylum seekers but the term “displaced persons.”

These groups of people initially established themselves in small encampments<sup>19</sup> along the Thai-Burmese border, but when a number of these small encampments were attacked by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)<sup>20</sup> in the mid-1990s they were consolidated into the current nine ‘camps’, which the RTG terms “temporary shelters.”

#### **3.1.1 Key Elements of the RTG Policy with Respect to “Displaced Persons”**

##### *Temporary Asylum Seekers and Illegal Immigrants*

Thailand accepts displaced persons fleeing from fighting situations in neighbouring countries temporarily; it allows them to receive humanitarian assistance until they can be repatriated safely when durable solutions are found to deal with their plight

According to Thai immigration law these displaced persons are illegal immigrants who entered Thailand without proper travel documents and should normally be detained. However, recognizing the political reasons behind their plight, the RTG has allowed these people to remain temporarily in specifically designated areas.

##### *Encampment*

Initially established in small encampments, these people were relocated to nine government-designated temporary shelter areas. These ‘temporary shelter areas’ are referred to as ‘refugee camps’ by the international agencies providing humanitarian assistance, and to simplify the writing, we will use the term ‘refugee camps’ in this report). According to RTG policy, the Burmese are not to leave these designated areas because the Thai government considers them a threat to order and national security and is also concerned for their personal safety. While restricted to designated areas, there are administrative guidelines<sup>21</sup> that allow the Thai Camp Commander (‘Palad’) to issue exit passes in a limited number of specific cases.<sup>22</sup>

Significant numbers of registered ‘refugees’ also leave the shelters unofficially or clandestinely. In doing so they risk being ‘deregistered’, i.e., having their displaced person status ‘terminated.’

If ‘refugees’ choose to leave the camp and to become migrant workers, to be recognized as a legitimate migrant worker they would need to register with the Thai government which requires national verification by the government of Myanmar. Due to safety concerns, refugees are naturally reluctant to undergo such a process. Also RTG policy does not allow a person to hold dual status: by becoming a registered migrant

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<sup>18</sup> The RTG also referred to the Cambodian refugees as ‘phuu leepchai’ or ‘displaced persons fleeing danger’.

<sup>19</sup> About 30 encampments ranging from 200 to 3,000 people.

<sup>20</sup> Acting on behalf of the Burmese Army.

<sup>21</sup> Guidelines for Government and NGO Officials Including Relevant Agencies on Providing Services to Displaced Persons from Burma in the Temporary Shelters for Displaced Persons from Burma in Kanchanaburi, Tak, Mae Hong Son and Ratchaburi, Ministry of Interior, RTG, January 2011

<sup>22</sup> The *Guidelines* document list three purposes for which the displaced person may leave the temporary shelter area: for educational purposes, for occupational training or for resettlement procedures (interviews, medical examination).

worker a refugee would be giving up their ‘displaced person’ status thereby losing the protection this entails as well as their eligibility to 3<sup>rd</sup> country resettlement.<sup>23</sup>

### *Shelters*

All structures in the designated shelter areas, be they houses or community services buildings, must be temporary or semi-permanent structures:<sup>24</sup>

For household shelters, the materials permitted are restricted to bamboo or eucalyptus for house frames, and leaves or thatch for roofing.<sup>25</sup>

For community service buildings (warehouses, schools, medical clinics, offices, etc.), the *Guidelines* allow for semi-permanent structures: i.e., the use of metal posts and framework, concrete slabs, blocks or bricks as flooring and non-reflective or painted corrugated zinc roofing.

### *Humanitarian Assistance and Modalities*

The RTG has welcomed the assistance provided by the international community and donors, which cover the costs of basic food rations, shelter and other necessities as well as provide for various services (health, basic education, and some vocational training and livelihood activities).

The *Guidelines* document describes the conditions and modalities through which this assistance can be provided and the access that representatives of NGOs and donors can have to the camps.

Some example of the conditions or modalities covered by the *Guidelines* include:

- the number of expatriate staff is to be maintained to a minimum and preferably agencies should use ‘refugees’ whenever possible;
- agency representatives must report to the provincial or district authority supervising the camp and must obtain a camp entry pass to be worn while in camp;
- the *Guidelines* identify the types of goods and supplies that are permitted and how they should be processed;
- assistance to be provided only to ‘registered’ displaced persons and those registered in the pre-screening project phase;<sup>26</sup>
- assistance is provided only to civilians; and no political propaganda or activities are allowed in the camps.

### *Camp Administration and Day-to-Day Management*

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<sup>23</sup> The migrant worker registration process also involves fees that are not negligible, and it must be renewed on an annual basis. These are further disincentives.

<sup>24</sup> It is not clear whether this is to emphasize the fact that these ‘displaced persons’ are only being allowed to stay in Thailand temporarily and that, therefore, their conditions should not be made too comfortable or, for that matter, enticing (concern about a ‘pull’ factor); or whether it is to ensure that these designated shelter areas can be returned to their former state once the ‘refugees’ have left; or both of these reasons. According to one source, when Than Hin was set up, it was “clearly established as a humane deterrent to discourage new arrivals from coming in – it was deliberately below the standards of other camps”. There are serious consequences to the specifics of this element of the policy:

(1) Leaves and thatch roofing is highly flammable as are bamboo frames and walls and given the very crowded nature of the shelters in the camps, an accidental fire can rapidly spread to neighbouring buildings/homes, as recently witnessed in Umplem Mai on Feb. 23 when over 433 homes and buildings were destroyed by such a fire. Fortunately, the fire was in the middle of the day and there was no loss of life.

(2) The materials used are not durable and have to be replaced every other year at incredible expense and also causing a negative impact on the local environment as refugees try to supplement the limited housing materials they are provided with products available in the areas bordering the camps, most of which are located in designated forest reserves.

<sup>25</sup> Tham Hin is an exception as only plastic sheeting is allowed for roofing.

<sup>26</sup> At the time of writing this report, the guidelines for 2012 were issued and the distinction between ‘registered’ and ‘unregistered’ has been removed. The guideline refers to ‘displaced persons living in the camp’.

The RTG maintains the ultimate authority of the camps, but the camp residents have considerable scope for self-administration through refugees committees and camp committees. The MOI at the provincial and district level enforces the policies and oversees the day-to-day management of the camps in close collaboration with the refugees committees and camp committees. An MOI deputy district officer ('Palad') is usually appointed as the Thai Camp Commander and has under his jurisdiction Territorial Defence Volunteers ('or sor') helping with internal security within the camp and manning the formal entry point to the camp.<sup>27</sup>

#### *Some Policy Changes since 2006*

A shift in policy from "care and maintenance" to "solution oriented" appears to have evolved most likely in recognition of the fact at the time that the situation in Burma was not improving and that the refugees would remain in Thailand for the foreseeable future. In 2006, MOI gave NGOs permission to support some occupational training activities so that refugees could engage in income generation activities and employment inside the camps. For some camps, local permission has been given to use plots of land near the camps to grow vegetables and other farm products both for consumption and for market. These activities are being piloted by various agencies including ZOA, TBBC/CAN, and UNDP.

The RTG also provides Thai language instruction to camp residents with teachers from the Department of Non-Formal Education.

### **3.1.2 How the Policy is Currently Applied**

#### *Encampment*

Over time, other purposes have been added to the list for which exit passes are approved: e.g., for medical emergencies. The TCCs for the Tak camps also provide exit passes to registered 'refugees' who wish to attend the funeral or wedding of a close relative living outside the 'camp'. With time, almost all the camps have issued exit passes for refugees to perform seasonal farm work in the communities adjacent to the camps.

As well as those who leave the camp with official exit passes, there are significant numbers of refugees (registered and unregistered) who leave the camp clandestinely. This practice is well known and, for the most part, tolerated or seen as unavoidable by the TCCs. When caught, those with registration status are not normally 'deregistered'.<sup>28</sup> They normally return to the camp but need to pay a fine or perform community work in reparation. Those without a registration card are sent back across the border and will usually attempt to return to the camp. However in data gathering sessions in the camps some respondents also noted that, with the payment of a 'fine', some unregistered camp residents have been allowed to return to the camp.

#### *Shelters*

The policy of designated encampment areas and temporary shelters also only allows electricity from generators to supply medical clinics, offices and other buildings serving the community as a whole. Mobile telephones are also not to be allowed.

In practice, however, both Mae La and Umpiem Mai are connected to the Thai Provincial Electricity Authority grid and electricity is available to anyone willing to pay for it, including individual households (at a substantially marked-up rate). Some of the camps (Site 2, Mae Ra Ma Luang and Nu Po) have set up mini-hydro generating stations to supply electricity to camp offices, but some of the electricity is also used for lighting homes.

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<sup>27</sup> The Thai military and border patrol police (sometimes assisted by Rangers) provide security on the outside of the camp and in the border region.

<sup>28</sup> There have been instances in Mae Hong Son province, where refugees that were caught lost their status, and the threat of deregistration is being used as a deterrent.



With respect to mobile telephone, many of the camps are so remotely located that there is no signal (Site 1, MRML, MLO, NP, TH). However, where a signal is available (Site 1, ML, UM, BDY) mobile phones are quite ubiquitous. They facilitate communication within the camps (between SLs and CCs) as well as between the CCs and the RCs. They allow refugees to be in touch with relatives on the outside or in 3<sup>rd</sup> countries both via telephone calls and access to the Internet and email.

#### *Humanitarian Assistance and Modalities*

We were told that the various modalities described in the *Guidelines* document are, on the whole, enforced.

All these derogations from the official policy are, in various ways, beneficial to the refugees. As will be seen later in this report, the lack of freedom to move in and out of the camps is one thing the refugees find most challenging. The pressure to do so is even greater due to cuts in rations that have taken place in recent years since refugees need to find ways to supplement the rations and/or earn income.

The lack of clarity and transparency around the application of the policy, however gives rise to grey zones. Such grey zones, on the one hand, provide for flexibility, but on the other provide a rich terrain for abuse.

## **3.2 Origins of the Current Refugee-Based Camp Management Model**

### **3.2.1 Early Years Until 2004**

Following attacks by the Burmese army deep into ethnic areas in Eastern Burma in January 1984, almost 10,000 Karen farmers and small traders and some families of KNU and KNLA combatants entered Thailand north of Mae Sot, in Tak province, to flee the fighting. Thai authorities allowed them to set up basic dwellings by drawing on the resources available in their immediate environment. Both the Thai authority and the Karen believed that these shelters would only be required for a few months until, come the rainy season, and the Burmese military retreated from the areas they had been forced to flee.

Scattered along the Thai-Burmese border, these refugees came together in various temporary small encampments often recreating their communities of origin. Further south, Mon villagers had also been similarly attacked and forced to flee into Thailand near Three Pagodas Pass in Kanchanaburi province.

By February 1984, the Thai Ministry of the Interior (MOI) had invited voluntary agencies working with Indochinese refugees (numbering approximately 350,000) to provide limited emergency assistance to these populations. Voluntary agencies and NGOs were grouped together under the Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), which served as the main interface between agencies and the Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons (OCDP) of the MOI. A group of individual CCSDPT members rapidly mounted a mission to the border but not in the name of CCSDPT.<sup>29</sup> This first mission led to the formation of the Burma Border Consortium (BBC),<sup>30</sup> a grouping of NGOs interested in supporting these new arrivals and determined to do so in a coordinated approach from the outset. Médecins sans frontières (MSF) and Médecins du monde (MDM) had also established separate programmes for these populations.

Given its experience with the Indochinese refugees, the CCSDPT had moved towards approaches that maximized refugee self-reliance. What the mission found when they reached the isolated Karen encampments along the border were refugee communities that were organized and well-run. Traditional social and governing structures were still in place including village leaders, spiritual leaders and respected

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<sup>29</sup> Jack Dunford, the current Director of TBBC, was a member of this first mission in March 1984.

<sup>30</sup> The Thai Burma Border Consortium's precursor.

elders. And the various communities were linked among each other under the Karen Christian Refugee Committee (KCRC) – later to become the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC). It therefore made sense to the BBC and its member NGOs that they should recognize and support these existing structures and the KCRC/KRC.

When the 1984 monsoon rains arrived and the Burmese army had still not withdrawn, the populations in these temporary shelters adjusted to the fact that they would not be returning yet.

In 1985, a further offensive by the Burmese military led to thousands more refugees fleeing to Thailand. In subsequent years, there were further offensives and further refugee inflows of mostly villagers from rural communities in Eastern Burma. In 1988, following the pro-democracy uprising and the military crackdown, approximately 15,000 students joined the populations in various additional settlements on the border. In 1989, the Burmese army's offensive in Karenni state sent the first large influx of refugees into Mae Hong Son province. Between 1984 and 1995, the numbers increased every year, except in 1988, reaching over 92,000 by the end of 1995.

At the time of the first BBC mission in March 1984, the only thing the refugees asked for was rice. They had access to roots and vegetables from the jungle and in some cases were still able to harvest crops from across the border. Some found work on Thai farms and provided for some of their needs in this way. Following a review of their needs, it was agreed that there was approximately a 50% shortfall in the amount of rice required and that BBC would top up other donations they received to cover this shortfall. Sophisticated needs assessments and detailed baseline surveys were not undertaken. As to the needs of special groups (the elderly, the handicapped, single parents families, unaccompanied minors), it was assumed that these would be addressed by the communities according to their own social and cultural traditions.

The relationship between the refugee structures and the BBC was based on a high level of trust:

*"The refugees had their own community and administrative systems and were well able to work out how to store and distribute supplies, some say, using British Quartermaster procedures. They were from ancient, rural cultures with strong moral, family and community values and somehow exuded trustworthiness. There was a joke that the Karen were the worst liars in the world. In those innocent days the NGOs were little concerned about assistance being misappropriated and, apart from casual visits, did not consider it necessary to carry out any kind of methodical monitoring or checks. These were formative days when real partnerships were forged. It was all consistent with the Thai Government's policy of keeping staff presence and assistance levels to a bare minimum.*

*The programme was simplicity in itself. Donors were very trusting and impressed with its efficiency. BBC could buy rice at the local shop, which arranged delivery to camp, and the job was done. No talk in those days of international tendering or professional quality control."*<sup>31</sup>

While in the first year only 50% of the rice requirement was provided in 1984, over subsequent years it became increasingly difficult for refugees to find their own food, however, the BBC agreed to provide salt, fish paste and by the mid-1990s was providing 100% of the rice ration to over 25 small camps. Additionally, on an annual basis, BBC also provided blankets and mosquito nets.

Each settlement or camp was headed by a refugee leader, usually a man, who was assisted by a camp committee and leaders from various sections within the settlement or camp. Members of the committees were responsible for the storage and distribution of supplies (rice, fish paste, blankets, etc.), maintaining and safeguarding the camp infrastructure and the physical environment of the settlements, overseeing

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<sup>31</sup> Between Worlds – Twenty Years on the Border, Burmese Border Consortium, 2004, p. 111

community health clinics, supporting the school system, ensuring security within the settlement and overseeing the administration of justice. These responsibilities were quite comprehensive. The refugee leaders and the committees also ensured smooth relations with local Thai authorities and local communities in the vicinity of the settlement and coordination of activities with BBC and NGOs providing medical, education, sanitation and other services to the settlement.

Monitoring this assistance was not a major concern during this period. It was still reliant on the relationships of trust established with the refugee structures at the outset:

*“BBC still had only three field staff on the border, each solely responsible for all the camps in his area without even any administrative assistance. But by now BBC was spending millions of dollars and was becoming more reliant on government funding. The first evaluation of the programme was carried out in 1994. The evaluation was very supportive but pointed out the dangers of having such low staff presence and working with such a high level of trust. This led to the formalising of staff field checks and an embryonic monitoring process.”<sup>32</sup>*

When the Burmese side of the border fell under the control of the Burmese army starting with Manerplaw (the Karen resistance base) in 1995 and eventually other border areas in 1996 and 1997, even the small refugee settlements near the border on the Thai side were no longer safe from cross-border attacks.<sup>33</sup> To improve security the RTG decided to consolidate the numerous small refugee settlements scattered along the border into nine larger government-designated “temporary shelter areas” or camps. Security was placed around the camps and refugees were no longer permitted to leave the camps to work or to gather building materials and fuel or forage. The larger densely populated camps, all situated in forest reserve areas, were a potential threat to the environment. However, restricting the movement of the refugees would make them far less self-sufficient and therefore far more dependent on international assistance. It became necessary to provide building materials and charcoal, add additional staples to the food basket to ensure adequate nutrition, and provide other necessities including clothing, cooking pots and soap.

These consolidated camps retained many of the basic committee structures and organization of work that had existed in the encampments from where the refugees were arriving.<sup>34</sup> One encampment now became a section within the camp and the village leader became the section leader.

In 1998 the Thai government invited the UNHCR to begin playing a role in line with its protection mandate. The UNHCR was also given the mandate to identify gaps in services and began to look at the extremely vulnerable individuals (EVI) of the refugee population to determine whether any particular sub-group of the population has special needs to be addressed. Gender and equity issues also became more of a focus.

The late 1990s also saw an increased focus by the donor community on the quality of humanitarian assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors and the affected populations. For example, in 1997 a large number of humanitarian agencies established the Sphere Project,<sup>35</sup> a community of humanitarian response of practitioners with a common aim – to improve the quality of humanitarian assistance and the accountability of humanitarian actors.

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<sup>32</sup> Between Worlds – Twenty Years on the Border, Burmese Border Consortium, 2004, p. 111

<sup>33</sup> For example, Mae Ra Ma Luang was attacked in April 1995; Wang Kha, near Mae Sot, and Mae La in 1997

<sup>34</sup> And these encampment structures reflected the village structures and village leadership that had existed in the villages from where they came.

<sup>35</sup> <http://www.sphereproject.org/about/> . In 1998, the Sphere Project published the first trial edition of its Handbook, Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response and it is now in its third edition (2011). The Sphere Handbook is internationally recognized set of common principles and universal minimum standards for the delivery of quality humanitarian assistance. Because it does not belong to any one organization, but benefits from the contributions of many, it enjoys broad acceptance by the humanitarian sector as a whole.

As a result of the increased dependence on international assistance, the resulting increased value of financial assistance (from approximately 10 million Thai baht in 1984, to 313 million in 1995)<sup>36</sup> and the increased scrutiny and concern for international standards, the BBC needed to respond to these new trends. In 2000, it introduced competitive tendering and professional quality control standards for the majority of its purchases as well as methodical monitoring controls and checks on the delivery and distribution of supplies. These were subject to extensive evaluations and audits and, when necessary, further procedures, controls and measures were introduced to meet donor standards.

When these more rigorous accountability measures were introduced, it was critical that it be done in a way that did not undermine the refugee management structures. As BBC noted at the time:

*“The challenge in all of this has been to maintain the self-respect of the refugee committees and the integrity of BBC’s relationship with them. BBC has made great efforts to involve them in all aspects of redesign of the programme and to explain current demands for accountability. It has been important for them to understand that demands for more monitoring are not because of mistrust, but that they themselves must also be transparent and accountable. The refugees will still retain full responsibility for handling supplies, but there will be a verifiable paper-chain to satisfy donor requirements.”<sup>37</sup>*

The increasing emphasis on controls and the need to track and report on the delivery, storage and distribution of supplies meant that camp management and administration was becoming increasingly demanding. These refugee structures needed resources to run the camps and compensate those involved since the Camp Committees were receiving only minimal financial support from BBC. While at the very beginning, some functions had been carried out on a volunteer basis, as the responsibilities became more onerous it was necessary to compensate workers/staff and committee members for the time invested to fulfill their responsibilities.

Camp Committees needed resources to run their camp and the different committees responded to this challenge in various ways: inflating population figures (by not reporting departures or death thereby generating some surplus that could be used as payment in kind), ‘taxing’ refugees a tin of rice at the time of distribution, selling excess supplies, selling the containers in which the supplies were shipped to the camps (rice bags, fish paste, etc.). In 2003, in response to an increased need for transparency and to strengthen good governance BBC, in collaboration with the Refugee Committees (Karen and Karenni), undertook an in-depth eight month *Camp Management Review* of camp management practices to gain a better understanding of the changing demands on the Camp Committees.

The Review shed light on:

1. Demands being put on Camp Committees (Table 3.1);
2. Sources of pressure on staff, Sections Leaders and Committee members (Table 3.2); and
3. Sources of income camps had identified to support the running of the camps (Table 3.3).

**Table 3.1 Demands on the Committees**

Managing the storing and distribution of supplies
Ensuring camp security
Supporting the work of education, health and sanitation workers
Dealing with the special needs of the elderly, the disabled and other vulnerable groups

<sup>36</sup> According to figures appearing in TBBC reports, the refugee population had increased from 9,502 at the end of 1984 to 81,653 at the end of 1995. So the average cost per refugee increased from Thai Baht 1,052 per refugee in 1984 to 3,833 in 1995, i.e., it had more than tripled.

<sup>37</sup> Between Worlds – Twenty Years on the Border, Burmese Border Consortium, 2004, p. 113

<p>Responding to the demands of various groups:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- registered camp population, unregistered people in the camp, and new arrivals</li> <li>- people who have temporarily fled across the border &amp; located themselves in the vicinity of the camp</li> <li>- emergency requests for support from people inside Burma (needy villagers, IDPs),</li> <li>- students from Burma studying in the camp,</li> <li>- requests for support to special cultural and religious functions,</li> <li>- CBOs; and</li> <li>- staff and committee members who need to support their families</li> </ul>
Dealing with demands and maintaining good relations with Thai authorities and neighbouring Thai villages
Coordinating and supporting the activities of NGOs and UN agencies including the completion of surveys and preparation of reports

**Table 3.2 Sources of Pressure on Staff, Section Leaders and Committee Members**

Some staff positions such as medics and teachers were being paid a stipend by the NGOs.
Since staff, committee members, etc. did not receive a stipend, they were given surplus supplies which they could trade, but this was being questioned by the population. It was giving them a bad reputation and creating distrust between the refugee structures and the population.
Since staff, committee members and others needed to support their families, they often had to find alternate sources of income such as work outside the camp. But doing this makes it difficult to fulfill their camp responsibilities.
The lack of stipend, compared to medics or teachers, is an added difficulty in recruiting qualified people for these tasks and roles.

**Table 3.3 Sources of Income for Camp Management**

Reselling used rice sacks and fish paste containers (agreed to by TBBC); but when jute rice sacks were changed to polypropylene, the resale value fell from 20 baht to 1 baht.
Overestimating population figures so surplus could be used to cover staff costs, support for CBOs, support for new arrivals and general camp management costs.
<p>When TBBC started implementing more rigorous controls to ensure that all supplies reached the beneficiaries, Camp Committees requested financial support to cover management costs. Initially TBBC provided 1.8 Baht per refugee. However this accounted for only 27% of costs. The remaining 73% was raised by selling excess supplies (usually at 50% reduction of actual costs) or 'taxing' refugees a can of rice or yellow beans at distribution time.</p> <p>The non-transparent, 'under-the-table' nature of these arrangements was a source of mistrust, misunderstandings, lack of respect and strained relationships with NGOs who could not trust the Camp Committees' population figures.<sup>38</sup></p>

The joint Camp Management Review conducted by TBBC<sup>39</sup> and KRC/KnRC involved all nine camps and no less than four visits to all the Camp Committees and Section Leaders in order to analyze the situation and determine the support required to manage the camps.

The Camp Management Project (CMP) would be implemented to put into practice the recommendations of the Review.

### **3.2.2 Changes in the Camp Management Model Since 2005**

Under the Camp Management Project, TBBC agreed to provide on a monthly basis the following:

<sup>38</sup> There was an unstated understanding that Camp Committees had additional needs for which surpluses were used. The needs themselves were not questioned. It was the lack of transparency of the arrangements that was the cause of concern.

<sup>39</sup> The BBC registered itself as a charitable company in the United Kingdom under the name of the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) in September 2004.

- enough supplies to support the camp residents, based on the actual camp population (the initial feeding figure for all nine camps at the beginning of CMP was assessed to be 131,858, down from 144,157)<sup>40</sup>
- rice for extra needs and contingencies (see list below)
- financial support for administrative costs to manage and administer the camp (average for all nine camps: approximately 8.1 baht per refugee; a total of 1,064,000 baht/month)
- based on an agreement with each Camp Committee about the number of staff required, financial support for staff stipends (average for all nine camps: approximately 7.3 baht per refugee, a total of 967,500 baht/month), and
- financial support (a total of 63,200 baht/month) and staff stipends (a total of 39,000 baht/month) for the KnRc and KRC headquarters as well as for KRC offices in Mae Sariang, Ratchaburi and Sangklaburi.

In exchange for this support, Camp Committees agreed to:

- no longer sell TBBC supplies
- no longer regularly ‘tax’ camp residents
- revise and use more accurate stock reporting forms
- provide more accurate population figures, and
- do more monitoring and financial reporting.

The extra needs and contingency supplies were required for five main categories:

- *Food for logistical support*: part-time workers, office lunches, support to work teams, etc.
- *Relations*: support to security personnel, Thai authorities, affected Thai villages, etc.
- *Security*: payment in kind for in-camp security staff, office lunches, etc.
- *Activities*: special cultural and religious functions/festivals, support to CBOs, training activities, meetings, etc., and
- *Emergencies*: new arrivals, replacement for damaged rice, etc.

Since 2005, TBBC has continued to provide funding to support these refugee-based camp management structures. In its more recent incarnation, the support provided comes under the Camp Management Support Program. In recent years, as well as providing financial assistance to the structures, it has worked with the Refugee Committees and Camp Committees to clarify roles and responsibilities, move towards greater uniformity between the management structures in the camps, supported the RCs in making changes they to election processes and the adoption of codes of conduct and provided various types of training for committee members and staff working in these structures.

### **3.3 Emerging International Humanitarian Assistance Practice<sup>41</sup>**

That there are significant challenges in ensuring effective and efficient coordination and management of humanitarian responses should not come as a surprise. The international community has itself only recently come to grips with it in a concerted way.

#### **3.3.1 The 2005 Humanitarian Response Review**

Due to the ad-hoc, unpredictable nature of many international responses to humanitarian emergencies, the UN Secretary-General commissioned an independent *Humanitarian Response Review* (HRR) of the global humanitarian system which was published in 2005.

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<sup>40</sup> The pre-CMP figure was therefore an overestimation of 9.3 %. This overestimation varied from one camp to another: it was as high as 11.9% in Mae Ra Ma Luang and as low as 6.2% in Ban Don Yang.

<sup>41</sup> Information for this section draws on the following source: Appendix B, The Camp Management Toolkit, Norwegian Refugee Council/The Camp Management Project (CMP), May 2008.

The HRR noted that “almost all recent operations have disclosed a weakness in the sector of camp management.” It highlighted:

- a lack of ownership for the broader aspects of working with internally displaced populations in camp situations;
- weak capacity standards; and
- the lack of tools and standards.

In response to the recommendations of the review, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) – the main international forum for humanitarian coordination – established measures to increase predictability and accountability in humanitarian responses to situations of internal displacement.

One of those initiatives was the *cluster approach*, through which the IASC designated global cluster leads for clusters/sectors or areas of humanitarian activity where predictable leadership and/or enhanced partnership was needed.

The Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) cluster was one of the key priority areas around which a cluster was formed (there are eleven clusters in all). The global CCCM Cluster is a joint cluster with co-leads: UNHCR for conflict induced displacement and IOM for displacement following natural disasters.

In general, the Cluster Approach aims to ensure sufficient global capacity, as well as effectiveness of the response in five key ways. The approach aims to:

- ensure sufficient global capacity
- ensure predictable leadership
- enhance the concept of partnership
- strengthen accountability, and
- improve strategic field-level coordination and prioritisation.

The IASC has agreed that the cluster approach should be implemented at field level:

- in all new emergencies involving internal displacement
- in on-going emergencies, gradually in a phased manner, and
- in all contingency planning for new emergencies.

Clearly the situation of Burmese Refugees in Thailand predates this IASC cluster approach by some 20 years. From the IASC’s perspective it might no longer be considered an ‘emergency’.

However, we note the leadership role that has been given to the UNHCR with respect the CCCM cluster in situations of conflict induced displacement. At the very least, this would suggest that the UNHCR should be a source of expertise and support for whoever is charged with the responsibility of camp coordination and camp management of the on-going Burmese refugee situation in Thailand.

### **3.3.2 Camp Coordination and Camp Management – Current International Practice**

In reflecting on camp coordination and camp management, an important resource is *The Camp Management Toolkit*<sup>42</sup> developed by the Norwegian Refugee Council.

The *Toolkit* describes the list of standard stakeholders involved in camp coordination and management and the division of roles and responsibilities (as per CCCM Cluster guidelines):

- *National government*: camp administrations/supervision role;
- *IASC-designated cluster lead* (e.g., UNHCR): camp coordination role; and

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<sup>42</sup> *The Camp Management Toolkit*, Norwegian Refugee Council/The Camp Management Project (CMP), May 2008.

- *Camp management agency* (e.g., a national/international NGO): camp management.

An outline of the various responsibilities for each of these main roles is summarized in the Table 3.4 below.

**Table 3.4 Key Stakeholders and Usual Roles and Responsibilities**

<b>Camp Administration (Supervision) / Role of National Government</b>
Designating, opening and closing camps
Securing land and occupancy rights for camps / temporary settlements
Providing security, maintaining law and order and guaranteeing the civilian character of a displaced persons' camps
Issuing documentation, permits and licenses (such as birth certificates, ID cards and travel permits) to camp inhabitants
Protecting citizens and preventing evictions of those living in the camp before they can regain their original homes in safety and dignity
Facilitating access to camps by humanitarian agencies
<b>Camp Coordination/ Role of IASC-designated Cluster Lead (e.g., UNHCR)</b>
Primary function: to create the humanitarian space necessary for the effective delivery of protection and assistance. Also responsible for:
- coordinating roles and responsibilities to the development and support of national plans for establishment and management of camps (including exit and long term solutions strategies)
- coordinating roles and responsibilities in the overall humanitarian camp response, including ensuring adherence to standards
- ensuring situational assessment, operational planning, strategic design, monitored implementation, technical support and overall cluster coordination
- ensuring that during the humanitarian response there is full and appropriate consultation with beneficiary populations, national government authorities, humanitarian and development partners (including camp managers and service delivery partners) and other actors (donors, diplomatic community, civil society, local/host communities)
- providing appropriate support to national authorities, including capacity building
- establishing and maintaining an open dialogue with the authorities
- promoting and encouraging government ownership of the protection and assistance strategy for camps/temporary settlements
- ensuring that international standards are applied and maintained within and amongst camps
- identifying and designating Camp Management Agencies and service providers
- monitoring and evaluating service provision
- addressing issues of poor performance by camp management and/or service delivery partners
- providing training and guidance to all humanitarian partners
- setting-up and maintaining assessments and monitoring and information management systems
- ensuring that all partners and service providers have access to, and share, operational data at the camp and inter-camp levels to help identify and address gaps and avoid duplication by service providers
<b>Camp Management/ Role of Camp Management Agency (normally a national/international NGO)</b>
Under the overall coordination and support of the Camp Coordination Agency, the Camp Management Agency will closely collaborate with the on-site authorities (the Camp Administration) and liaise with them on behalf of all humanitarian actors and service providers. Camp management encompasses those activities in one single camp that focus on:
- coordination of services (delivered by NGOs and others)
- establishing governance and community participation/ mobilisation mechanisms
- ensuring maintenance of camp infrastructure
- data collection and sharing of the data
- provision of defined services



- monitoring the service delivery of other providers in accordance with agreed standards
- identifying gaps in the provision of protection and assistance and avoiding duplication of activities
- referring all problems that cannot be resolved at the camp level to the CCCM Cluster Lead Agency/Camp Coordination Agency
- assisting the Camp Coordination/Cluster Lead Agency in defining the standards and indicators that are to be applied in particular responses requiring camp or camp-like situations

The above division of roles and responsibilities is a useful reference as we examine the current refugee-based camp management model. This evaluation is focused primarily on the latter of these three roles. But all three roles are interdependent, and any gaps or shortcomings in the other roles hinder the ability of the camp management agency to fulfill its mandate.

### **3.4 Certain Prevailing Conditions in the Camps at the Time of this Evaluation**

Finally, we believe it is important to be aware of some of the prevailing conditions that existed in the camps as the evaluation team prepared its work. We were cognizant of many of these prior to the evaluation, but often only superficially. The importance of some of these factors became evident during the information gathering processes and in the answers received.

The elements that stand out are the following:

- The recent cuts in rations (both food and non-food items).
- The resettlement that had taken in place in recent years (2006 - 2011) and was still on-going.
- The large number of new arrivals since the 2006, a large majority of which are not registered.
- The recent budgetary cuts experienced by international NGOs providing services in the camps (especially in the education and health sectors).
- Recent increase in interest in certain international standards, in particular regarding children's rights and sexual gender-based violence.
- The substantial turnover in people holding refugee management positions due both to attrition (departures for 3<sup>rd</sup> country resettlement) and the 2010 elections.
- Finally, the political situation unfolding inside Burma during the previous year and while the evaluation was underway. Many refugees did not seem to have ready access to much of the news, but people at the leadership level were better informed and wondered whether real change was in the offing and how this would impact the camps.

## **PART 2 – FINDINGS**

### **4 UNDERSTANDING THE CAMP MANAGEMENT MODEL**

#### **4.1 A View of the Whole System**

As it has evolved in the nine camps on the Thai border, the camp management model is composed of three clusters<sup>43</sup> of responsibility, each comprising a network of sub-component organizations. How the model functions overall is influenced by the capacity and performance of sub-component organizations in each of the clusters, as well as their effectiveness in coordinating within their cluster and across clusters.

A series of graphics depict the camp management model as it has evolved to this point. Figure 1 shows the three basic clusters. Figure 2 details the components of the camp clusters, Figure 3, the components of

<sup>43</sup> The use of the term 'cluster' in this instance should not be confused with the *cluster approach* introduced by the IASC in its response to the 2005 UN Humanitarian Response Review and discussed earlier in this report (Section 3.3.1).


the donor cluster, and Figure 4 the components of the RTG cluster. Figure 5 presents a detailed picture of the full camp management model or eco-system.

**Figure 1      Camp Management Model – Three Clusters**



In the “camp cluster” (our term), are the organizations concerned with the delivery of services to the camps themselves. At the core of this cluster are the two Refugee Committees (RCs) and nine Camp Committees (CCs). Under each of the CCs and reporting to them are section leaders supported by section committees. These structures are supported by international NGOs whose main programs involve health and sanitation, education; food, shelter and non-food support, as well as management support, provided by the Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC); and protection, provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and more recently in five of the nine camps by a special International Rescue Committee (IRC) project, the Legal Assistance Centres (LAC). The NGOs operating in the camps are coordinated by the Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), which also acts as the interface between these NGOs and the Royal Thai Government (RTG).


**Figure 2 Camp Cluster Components**



\* also 3 Zonal Leaders & Zonal Committees above Section Leaders level


A second cluster in the system is the “donor cluster” (again, our term). Here the donor countries, often through their embassies in Bangkok, participate in the Donor Humanitarian Assistance Working Group (DHA WG). The major donors include the United States and the European Union. The Working Group, in turn, coordinates and shares information with the CCSDPPT and its programs, liaises with UNHCR, and also consults and coordinates with key actors in the Royal Thai Government (RTG). In contrast, however, funds flow directly from individual donor agencies through the TBBC or through NGO service providers to the camps.

**Figure 3 Donor Cluster Components**




The third cluster involves the Royal Thai Government (we call it the “RTG cluster”). The main actors here include the National Security Council (NSC), the Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the Thai Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and MOI’s Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons (OCDP), which is tasked to approve CCSDP member plans, and work with UNHCR and other bodies. Reporting to the MOI are the four Governors of the provinces in which the camps are located, with Deputy District Officers (the title for Thai Camp Commanders) reporting via their District Offices to their respective Governor’s Office. Thai Camp Commanders interact directly with and retain ultimate authority over Camp Committees and their sub-structures.

**Figure 4 Royal Thai Government Cluster Components**



For most of the past two decades, this set of actors has evolved in their relationships and have, collectively, constituted a kind of eco-system. That eco-system has generally functioned in an adaptive and resilient manner, responding and adjusting to new players and needs as conditions have changed, and mobilizing resources to achieve the objectives of its constituent parts. For much of its history, this eco-system has operated generally effectively because, in our view, of two main factors: first, a common vision and set of values; and, second, mutual trust. At the centre of these positive working relationships was a commitment to the welfare of the refugees and the value and practice of transparency.

**Figure 5 Full Camp Management Model**



\* also 3 Zonal Leaders & Zonal Committees above Section Leaders level

## **4.2 Key Organizations in the Model**

While this evaluation was primarily concerned with the refugee management structures within the ‘camp cluster’ (i.e., the RCs and the camp-level structures such as the CCs, and Zonal Leaders and Committees and the Sections Leaders and Committees), the other important dimension in this model is the humanitarian assistance coordination level. A number of mechanisms or agencies play important roles in humanitarian assistance coordination, and as such are worth describing in turn:

### ***The Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons (OCDP)***

Within the Royal Thai Government (RTG), the Office for the Coordination of Displaced Persons (OCDP) of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) was created to deal with the large number of Indochinese refugee in Thailand in the late 1970s and act as the primary interface between the RTG and international NGOs providing material support and services to the refugees. It continues to play this role with respect to Burmese refugees and receives and approves all the plans for activities and services provided by TBBC and various international NGOs to the camps. One of its roles is to affirm Thai sovereignty over all the camps and all activities that take place in the camps. However, it does not have the staff or financial resources to assume the role of overall coordination of the assistance being provided to the camps.

It is also our understanding that while the OCDP has a coordination and communication relationship with the camp level Thai Camp Commanders (TCC), it does not hold a supervisory role over the TCCs. In the performance of their roles, each TCC is answerable to his<sup>44</sup> District Chief Officer and ultimately to his Provincial Governor.

### ***Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT)***

The CCSDPT was created to facilitate the interaction between international NGOs and the RTG in the provision of food, material and services to the large number of Indochinese refugees in Thailand in the late 1970s. From the outset, the CCSDPT has also acted as the coordination body of the various NGOs involved with providing assistance to Burmese refugees. It continues to act as the main interface between its NGO members and the RTG as well as the donor community. It has various standing sub-committees and working groups<sup>45</sup> that focus on specific sectors. Much of the sectoral level sharing and learning takes place within these CCSDPT sub-committees and working groups that also contribute to ensuring that certain standards of service are maintained across the nine camps. In recent years, the CCSDPT has, in collaboration with the UNHCR, engaged in a dialogue with the RTG to achieve a vision of an improved, comprehensive, solutions-oriented humanitarian policy for Burmese refugees in Thailand (see UNHCR, below).

### ***Thai Burma Border Consortium (TBBC)***

The TBBC came about when a group of primarily church-based NGOs with prior experience working with Indochinese refugees responded to a request of the Thai government to assist with the first groups of Burmese refugees crossing the border. From the outset, the group decided to adopt a coordinated approach and formed a consortium, the TBBC consortium (initially called the Consortiums of Christian Agencies, then in 1991, the Burmese Border Consortium; its name changed to the TBBC in 2005).

From the outset, the TBBC has been responsible for coordinating the supply of most of the food and non-food items to the nine camps. Due to difficulties and delays in the refugee registration process, the TBBC had to establish, in cooperation with existing refugee management structures, its own camp resident ration cards and system to determine the feeding caseload for each camp. Since 2005, TBBC has also taken on a

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<sup>44</sup> Currently all nine TCCs are male.

<sup>45</sup> There are sub-committees in the following sectors: health, education, environmental health and infrastructure, and protection. The working groups include the following: camp management, food and nutrition sector, livelihoods, and shelter and non-food items sector.

role of supporting the strengthening of refugee management structures through the Camp Management Project and subsequently through the Camp Management Support Program (CMSP).

### ***The Refugee Committees (RCs)***

The KRC and KnRC have contributed to the overall coordination by establishing common policies and practices for the provision of services and support as well as the day-to-day management of the camps, enabling camp governance and participation (overseeing election processes, facilitating consultations with the population) and providing guidance, capacity building and oversight of camp management. The RCs could contribute more to overall coordination but not all parties involved in coordination make a point of consulting with the RCs. It is mainly TBBC and CCSDPT that have made a practice of doing so regularly.

### ***The UNHCR***

In the early years of the presence of Burmese refugees in Thailand, UNHCR was not involved. It only became formally involved when the RTG requested that UNHCR assume its refugee protection mandate in 1997.<sup>46</sup> In the period of 1998 to 2005, the UNHCR also worked closely with the Provincial Admission Boards that the RTG set up at the provincial level to help determine the status of displaced persons.<sup>47</sup> This more limited role for the UNHCR is unusual. More often, as a UN agency, the UNHCR plays the overall coordination role of humanitarian assistance provided in refugee situations.

In recent years, the UNHCR has become more involved in overall coordination. Since 2005, in collaboration with CCSDPT, UNHCR has engaged in a dialogue with the RTG to achieve a vision of an improved, comprehensive, solutions-oriented humanitarian policy for refugees in Thailand. In 2009 the two agencies developed a first draft of a medium-term strategy entitled, *CCSDPT/UNHCR Five Year Strategic Plan* that sought to envisage solutions for refugees for which resettlement was not an option and voluntary repatriation seemed to be but a distant possibility. As a result of continued dialogue with the RTG, this strategic plan was revised to acknowledge the complexities in the RTG refugee policy and to incorporate more realistic timeframes within which objectives might be achieved. The resulting document is entitled, *Strategic Framework for Durable Solutions*.<sup>48</sup> Given recent developments on the political front in Burma/Myanmar, the UNHCR regional office has also been quietly working at preparing the ground for the day when it will be possible for Burmese refugees to safely return to their country. Facilitating the repatriation of refugees is part of UNHCR's core mandate, and when the conditions are favourable for a safe return, the UNHCR will be expected to play a major role.

### ***The Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group***

In the past few years, given differing perspectives within the donor community about how to best engage with the RTG and address humanitarian assistance for Burmese refugees, the donor community set-up the Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group. The services of a Humanitarian Facilitator were retained to assist the group in its work.

For most of the past two decades, this set of actors in all three clusters has evolved in their relationships and have, collectively, constituted a kind of eco-system. That eco-system has generally functioned in an adaptive and resilient manner, responding and adjusting to new players and needs as conditions have changed, and mobilizing resources to achieve the objectives of its constituent parts. For much of its history, this eco-system has operated generally effectively because, in our view, of two main factors: first,

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<sup>46</sup> As of 1994, the UNHCR had a roving protection officer visiting the border. But the RTG remained resistant to the UNHCR having a role until 1997 following a change in government and serious fighting on the border.

<sup>47</sup> Approximately 75,000 of the current 137,157 refugees still in the camps were formally processed in this way by the PABs and UNHCR. The remaining 62,000 or so are unregistered.

<sup>48</sup> Strategic Framework for Durable Solutions, CCSDPT and UNHCR, January 2011.



a common vision and set of values; and, second, mutual trust. At the centre of these positive working relationships was a commitment to the welfare of the refugees and the value and practice of transparency.

## **5 REFUGEE PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES**

### **5.1 Current Perception of Camp Life: Things Appreciated and Difficult Challenges**

The sessions with groups of refugees usually began with two questions:

- 1) What are the things you appreciate the most about living in the camp?
- 2) What are the most difficult challenges you face?

Annex 3 presents tables that summarize the responses to these questions for each of the nine camps. Further summary tables allow the reader to compare the similarities and differences between the camps according to different categories of respondents including the general refugee population, minorities, women, and youth.

#### **5.1.1 Substantial Consistency Across Camps**

While there are differences between the camps, what is striking is the high degree of consistency between the camps regarding the answers to these two questions. The tables on the following pages summarize the things refugees identified most often. Table 5.1 presents the eight things appreciated most across all camps and all categories. Table 5.2 presents fourteen most difficult challenges identified across all camps and all categories.

‘Access to education’, ‘provision of food’, ‘access to health care’, and ‘security from attack (the asylum provided by the camps)’ were identified by at least one group in each of the nine camps. Of a total of 43 different sessions, 39 identified access to education<sup>49</sup> as one thing appreciated most. Almost as many (35) identified the provision of food. Access to health was slightly less at 30, and security from attack from armed forces was slightly less again, at 25. But even in these latter two cases more than half of the groups had identified them as things appreciated most. ‘Provision of other basic needs’, such as shelter and clothing, was identified by at least one group in seven of the camps.

There is also considerable consistency in some of the most difficult challenges identified. Groups in all nine camps identified the lack of freedom of movement (not allowed to leave the camp, leaving the camp is risky and/or expensive) and insufficient opportunities to work, to be involved in livelihood activities and/or to earn income among their most difficult challenges. Food ration reductions was also identified in more than two thirds (29 of 43) of the sessions. Only Tham Hin did not identify food rations reductions as a difficult challenge.<sup>50</sup> A third of the sessions, and at least one group in seven of the camps identified the reductions in, or the poor quality of, shelter materials as one of their challenges. Two other challenges were identified by seven of the nine camps, but mostly by only one session per camp: the lack of opportunity to pursue studies (raised especially by the youth groups) and lack of hope and uncertainty about the future.

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<sup>49</sup> In the case of Tham Hin, only the two most appreciated things were recorded. Had more than two been recorded as was done in other camps, it is possible that these numbers could be even larger.

<sup>50</sup> While in Tham Hin only the two most difficult challenges were recorded, the cut in food rations was less of a concern here than in other camps and the population was far more concerned about the very crowded nature of their camp.

What also became clear during the dialogue that took place with different groups is that the four most difficult challenges are intricately interlinked. Both the reduction in food rations and in shelter materials puts pressure on the refugees to find other ways to cope. Whereas, in the past, the food rations were such that any slight surplus could be exchanged or sold to supplement other needs, but this is no longer the case. Families need to find other ways of providing for themselves, i.e., they need to find work, other livelihood means or other sources of income, food or shelter materials.

Options are limited within the camps and therefore there is considerable pressure to leave to gather produce from the surrounding forests or to earn income. Since only a limited number of camp passes are approved, many are forced to leave clandestinely, at considerable risk (especially for the unregistered) and/or cost. While the lack of freedom of movement is felt as an infringement of a basic right, many refugees recognize that some restrictions on their movement is the price paid for the security of being in Thailand. However, recent cuts in rations have considerably exacerbated the degree to which restrictions on freedom of movement are felt.

### **5.1.2 Differences Between Camps**

While there is considerable consistency between the camps regarding some of the most difficult challenges and things most appreciated, there are also significant differences. For instance:

Regarding most difficult challenges:

- ‘reductions in charcoal’ was identified in all three Tak camps but not in the other camps
- ‘the presence of alcohol and drugs’ was only raised as a difficult challenge by youth groups (Site 2, MRML, MLO, ML and UM)<sup>51</sup>
- ‘education cutbacks’ was identified by three camps: the youth groups in Site 1 and Ban Don Yang, and both the minority group and women’s group in Umpiem Mai
- ‘fear of aggression or gender-based violence’ was raised only as a difficult challenge in two of the Tak camps (ML and UM);<sup>52</sup> it was not identified initially as a challenge or perceived threat, but was raised following further probing by the facilitator
- ‘fear of attacks by Burmese forces’ was raised only in the two Karenni camps (Site 1 and Site 2), and
- ‘insufficient water’ was only raised as a concern in Mae La and Mae Ra Ma Luang.

Regarding things most appreciated:

- ‘freedom of religion’ was identified by minority groups in three camps (MLO, ML and UM); it was a woman from a minority group that also raised this in the ML women’s group
- ‘cleanliness, good sanitation and access to potable water’ was raised in three of the camps (Site 2, Mae La and BDY).

### **5.1.3 Consistency and Differences Across Categories of Refugees**

In all of the camps, when considering the ‘things most appreciated’, there is consistency across categories (general refugee population, minorities, women, and youth). This can be seen in looking at the appropriate columns for each of the camps in Table 5.1 and by referring to Tables A3.1.1 to A3.9.1 (Annex 3) which provide further detail on each of the camps.

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<sup>51</sup> Drunkenness and alcohol/drug abuse was also raised as a concern by another group (i.e., Sections Leaders). It also came up in response to questions regarding the qualities looked for in leaders and the improvements to management structures refugees would like to see. This is addressed in another section of this report.

<sup>52</sup> These concerns were not identified initially as challenges or perceived threats, but were raised following further probing by the facilitator on concerns of this kind. The issue of sexual or gender-based violence was also discussed with Section Leaders, Camp Committee members and CBOs. It will be addressed at greater length in another section of the report.

With respect to ‘most difficult challenges’, it is important to examine each of the special categories.

### **Minorities**

Reference to Table 5.2 indicates some divergence between what the minority group considers the most difficult challenges and what other groups from the same camp identified: e.g., Site 1, Mae La Oon, Mae La and Tham Hin. But it is best to look at the complete information available for each camp in Tables A3.1.2 to A3.9.2 in Annex 3. In referring to these more complete tables, one notes that in the cases of Site 1, Mae La Oon and Tham Hin only two difficult challenges were recorded from the minority group session in each camp, which, in itself, limits the amount of overlap possible.

That there is considerable overlap in how minorities perceive the lives in the camp compared to the general population and other special groups such as women and youth is a first indication that there is not, for the most part, systematic discrimination against minorities. This does not mean that camp management structures do not face challenges to ensure fair treatment of minority groups.

Some of the challenges identified during sessions with minority groups relate directly to the participant’s status as a member of a minority group:

**In Mae La Oon**, the limited access to work or additional income, as a minority person, made it difficult to donate to religious ceremonies.

**In Mae La**, participants had few job opportunities and few prospects for improvement or development because they did not speak Karen. Others noted that it was difficult for their young children to attend school because they did not speak Karen.

**In Umpiem Mai**, an unregistered refugee (there is a higher proportion of minority people among the unregistered) noted that he/she has less recourse if caught outside the camp without a pass, and passes are not issued to unregistered refugees; this differential treatment was also noted in one of the sessions with the general refugee population. A female member of a minority group (in the women group session) noted that the language barrier was a difficult challenge.

**In Tham Hin**, minority people feel discriminated against, looked down upon and treated badly by members of the majority group.

The situation of minorities in the camps is further discussed in Section 7.3.3. It presents the challenges that camp management structures face in terms of ensuring their minority populations have a voice and are represented.

### **Women**

There is a high degree of consistency between the ‘difficult challenges’ identified during women group sessions and those identified during sessions with the general refugee population. This should not be too surprising since about a third (32.5%; ref. Table 2.4) of the participants in the general refugee population sessions were women.

One challenge that was only sparsely raised by various groups of the population is gender-based violence (it was raised by only one woman in a women’s session as well as by two young women in youth sessions). The issue of gender-based violence is examined further in Sections 8.1.1 and 11.3.

**Table 5.1 The Eight Things Appreciated Most by Refugees (Across All Camps and Categories)**

Things Appreciated Most	Mae Hong Son																Tak												Kanchanaburi				Ratchaburi				# sessions identifying item	Rank per # sessions	# camps identifying item	Rank per # camps					
	Ban Mai Nai Soi (Site 1)					Ban Mae Surin (Site 2)				Mae La Oon				Mae Ra Ma Luang				Mae La					Umplem Mai				Nu Po				Ban Don Yang				Tham Hin										
	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	GRP 3	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP					Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP	Minorities
Access to education			M	W	Y		M	W	Y			M	W	Y			M	W	Y				M	W	Y			M	W	Y			M		Y			W			39	1	9		
Food			M		Y			W				M		Y			M	W					M	W	Y			M					W			M	W	Y			35	2	9		
Access to health care			M	W			M	W	Y				W				M						M	W					M	W				W	Y				Y			30	3	9	
Security / Asylum							M						W	Y			M	W	Y				M	W								Y		M							25	4	9		
Shelter, clothing, etc.												M		Y				W					W	Y																		11	5	7	
Able to attend training workshops			M						Y			M														Y							Y									5	6	5	
Good sanitation/ potable water																																										5	6	3	
Freedom of religion												M											M						M													4	8	3	

**Table 5.2 The Fourteen Most Difficult Challenges Faced by Refugees (Across All Camps and Categories)**

Most Difficult Challenges	Mae Hong Son																Tak												Kanchanaburi				Ratchaburi				# sessions identifying Item	Rank per # sessions	# camps identifying Item	Rank per # camps			
	Ban Mai Nai Soi (Site 1)					Ban Mae Surin (Site 2)				Mae La Oon				Mae Ra Ma Luang					Mae La					Umplem Mai				Nu Po				Ban Don Yang				Tham Hin							
	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	GRP 3	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP 1	GRP2	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP	Minorities	Women	Youth	GRP	Minorities					Women	Youth	
Not allowed/expensive to leave camp							M	W	Y				W				M	W	Y			M	W	Y			M	W	Y				Y			W		32	1	9	1		
Insufficient opportunities (work/livelihood) / income				W			M	W	Y				W	Y				M	W					W					W	Y						Y		25	3	9	1		
Food ration reductions			M	W	Y		M	W				M						M	W				M	W				M	W			M	W						29	2	8	3	
Reduction/poor quality of shelter supplies																							M	W					M										14	4	7	4	
Uncertain future / depression																		M						W				M				M							7	6	7	4	
Lack opportunity /incentive to pursue studies				Y				Y					Y					M	Y					Y											Y			9	5	6	6		
Health cutbacks (medicine shortage, low qualifications of staff, decrease referrals)			M										Y					W										M	W										7	6	6	6	
Presence of drugs/ alcohol in camp								Y					Y							Y				Y														5	8	5	8		
Reduction in charcoal																			W																			4	9	3	9		
Education cutbacks				Y																			M	W									Y					4	9	3	9		
Insufficient water in dry season																																						3	11	2	11		
Fear of aggression/ of gender-based violence																			Y					W	Y												3	11	2	11			
Lack of security/ fear of attack by Burmese																																						2	13	2	13		
Health – disease outbreak/ often sick in camp			W										Y																									2	13	2	13		

## **Youth**

While there is considerable consistency between the ‘most difficult challenges’ raised by youth and those raised in other sessions, youth sessions also had their own particular areas of interest. As noted earlier youth groups in seven of the camps identified the ‘lack of opportunity or incentives to pursue further studies’ as of particular concern (only two other groups identified this as a challenge). Youth are also clearly concerned about the ‘presence of alcohol or drugs in the camps,’ whereas this was not raised by any other group in response to this question. Fear of sexual aggression within or outside the camp was also raised by two youth groups. A number of other challenges were raised by just one group. The can be reviewed by reference to Table A3.10.3 in Annex 3.

## **5.2 Refugee Perceptions of Refugee Leadership and Their Duties**

Camp residents rely first and foremost on their own capacities, resources and initiative to solve the challenges they face. When unable to solve the situation on their own, they turn to relatives, friends and neighbours for assistance. For most challenges, it is only when these avenues have been pursued to no avail will they turn to others including religious leaders, SLs, CC, CBOs, NGOs or the UNHCR. Refugees, for the most part, are aware that they can bring more difficult issues to the attention of their Section Leader. But they are also aware that some challenges are beyond the capacity of the Section Leader, and even that of the Camp Committee, to resolve. This is the case with some of the most important challenges refugees identified. The following table (Table 5.3) provides some coping mechanisms refugees identified to deal with these challenges and their understanding of how the Section Leaders and Camp Committee are able to assist with these challenges.

**Table 5.3 Refugee Coping Strategies and Possible Role for SLs and CC**

<b>Most Important Challenges</b>	<b>Coping Strategies</b>	<b>Role of SLs or CC</b>
Reductions in food rations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Borrow from relatives or neighbours with a surplus (e.g., from families with many children, since children who are five or older get adult rations and don't eat all leaving a small surplus); this is then repaid the following month.</li> <li>▪ Leave the camp to gather/hunt from the forest or to buy from local market/shops or neighbouring Thai communities.</li> <li>▪ Leave the camp to work in neighbouring communities (where this is permitted by the Thai Camp Commander) and use income to supplement rations.</li> <li>▪ Some grow vegetables or other crops for both consumptions and for sale (Site 2.). In most camps the capacity to do this is limited because of limited land inside the camps. Access to land outside the camps is limited (various pilot projects underway) and in some cases the quality of the soil near the camps is poor.</li> <li>▪ Some cook rice porridge with vegetables since it uses up less rice. Some have reduced meals from three times to twice a day.</li> </ul>	<p>The rations cuts are beyond the power of the SLs or CC to resolve.</p> <p>The decision to cut rest with the donors and TBBC.</p> <p>Under special circumstances, the SL can sometimes provide extra supplies to someone facing special needs (e.g., due to illness).</p>
Not allowed/ expensive to leave the camp	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Many camp residents leave the camp. Some do so with official passes, but many do so clandestinely with the understanding that this is tolerated as long as it is within a restricted area near the camp.</li> <li>▪ There is nevertheless the risk of being arrested and having to pay a fine or do ‘volunteer’ work in compensation. The risk is far greater for unregistered refugees since they risk being returned to the border if caught.</li> </ul>	<p>The CC helps with the issuance of camp passes. The SLs and CC will often help negotiate the release of a refugee that is arrested. But negotiating the free movement of the refugees is beyond the power of the CC. The RTG determines the policy and the local Thai Camp Commander decides how it is applied locally.</p>

It became clear during the sessions that many refugees were aware that the cuts in food rations (reduction in rice, oil, etc. and the elimination of chillies altogether) and in non-food items (building materials, charcoal, mosquito nets, clothing, etc.) are tied directly to cuts in the funding to TBBC by donors. They believed that these cuts were due to many factors including that donors provide support to refugees in other parts and possibly to situations that were even more desperate and that economic problems in donor nations may affect the amount of aid countries provide. Some were aware that an increase in the price of rice affected the amounts of rice provided.

So what do the refugees expect of their Section Leaders, Camp Committees and Camp Leaders? First, not many of the refugees had dealt directly with their Camp Committee. They more often dealt directly with their Section Leader<sup>53</sup> and they understood that if a situation was beyond the capacity of the Section Leader to deal with, the Section Leader could then bring this matter to the attention of the Camp Committee. From responses to the various questions covered during the sessions, the following composite picture emerges of how refugees perceive the duties of their camp leaders.

They expect that their leaders will:

- ensure security and maintain law and order within their section, zone and the camp as a whole
- ensure that the camp is a good a place as possible to live in, i.e.:
  - that their basic needs (food, potable water, shelter) are addressed
  - that basic services (health, education, sports, cultural/social life) are provided
  - that the physical space of the camp is taken care of, i.e., the camp is kept clean (garbage collected, latrines), roads and community buildings are maintained, etc.
- ensure that the above is done in a fair and non-discriminatory way
- act as the main contact between, on the one hand, the camp and its population, and on the other the outside world (i.e., with Thai authorities and RTG representatives, NGOs, the international donor community, others interacting with the camp population such as merchants, local Thai communities); and as part of this:
  - ensure the effective communication of relevant information
  - defend the interests of the refugees, and, when necessary, help them get out of trouble.

### **5.3 Qualities Looked for in Leaders**

In the larger workshops with the members of the ‘general refugee population’ (GRP), one question that was asked of participants was what the qualities they looked for in a leader. This question preceded the exercise where we asked participants to rate both their Section Leaders and their Camp Committee, so that indirectly it would serve as a backdrop to their reflection and assessment of these. We examine how various refugee groups rated their management structures in the next section.

Table 5.4 on the following page summarizes the qualities identified in all nine camps. The list is interesting in a number of ways including the particular qualities identified, certain qualities or attributes not mentioned; and which qualities were deemed important in some camps but not in others.

In the following section when we examine how the refugees assess their current leaders and what improvements they wish to see in their performance, the reason why some of the qualities have been identified in some camps become clearer.

Some qualities were identified by at least one group in almost all camps: e.g., having a basic education and the ability to read and write, being well-behaved (no drunkenness, drugs or gambling) was identified in seven of the camps; as well as having good interpersonal relations was a quality identified in six of the camps.

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<sup>53</sup> There were only a few instances where refugees indicated that they did not know who their Section Leader was.

Other qualities were identified only by groups in certain camps. For instance, the need for leaders to be impartial and not demonstrate any favoritism was only raised in the three Tak camps, and non-discrimination according to ethnicity, religion or social status in Mae La and Umpiem Mai. On the other hand, it is only the two southern camps (BDY and TH) where honesty was identified as an important quality. It is also in these latter two camps where participants seem to indicate that being Karen was an essential attribute of a leader.<sup>54</sup>

It is striking that, with the exception of basic education and language capacities, most of qualities identified relate to character traits, and very few relate to necessary skills required for the efficiently fulfilling the positions expected of Section Leaders and members of the Camp Committees. Planning and management skills and problem-solving skills were recognized as important only in the three Tak camps and by one group in MLO. This indicates that leaders are therefore not being selected so much for the skills they have but more on the basis of character traits. This, therefore, has implications for the type of training and capacity building that is required when people for management positions are chosen through democratic electoral processes. It is likely that there will have to be a focus on building management skills and capacities.

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<sup>54</sup> It is possible that participants were expressing what they understood to be current policy as opposed to what they believed should be a necessary attribute. This distinction was not explored during the sessions.



**Table 5.4 Qualities Looked for in Leaders**

Main Qualities Looked for in Leaders	Ban Mai Nai Soi (Site 1)		Ban Mae Surin (Site 2)	Mae Ra Ma Luang		Mae La Oon		Mae La			Umplem Mai		Nu Po		Ban Don Yang	Tham Hin	# of sessions out of 16 identifying item	# of camps out of 9 identifying item
Data from General Refugee Population Sessions	1		1	1		1		1			1		1		1	1		
Group #	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	3	1	2	1	2	1	1		
<b>Education and Knowledge of Languages</b>																		
Be educated (Grade 7, 9, 10 or higher)																	11	7
Be literate in Burmese as well as Karen/Karenni																	5	5
Able to speak at least Karen and Burmese																	3	3
Be literate in English an asset																	2	2
Some basic knowledge of Thai																	1	1
<b>Skills and Experience</b>																		
Experience in management & leadership / able to lead people																	8	5
Has planning / management / leadership skills																	6	4
Problem solving capacity																	4	2
<b>Personal Character Traits</b>																		
Good behaviour (no drunkenness, no drugs, no gambling, etc.)																	8	7
Self-confident / outspoken / dares to speak up & defend our interests																	5	4
Impartial / fair in decision making / no favouritism																	5	3
Does not discriminate according to ethnicity, religion, status																	4	2
Responsible and accountable																	3	3
Honest																	2	2
<b>Character Traits re How Relate to Community</b>																		
Good interpersonal relations / sociable																	8	6
Generous / willing to sacrifice/work for benefit of the community																	6	4
Understands people's problems/situation																	5	3
Considerate of others / good attitude																	4	3
Patient / good listener																	4	3
<b>Other Attributes</b>																		
Age is important: at least xx years old		20	25						40						20	20	5	5
Can be male or female																	3	3
Has to be Karen (cannot be minority or Burmese)																	2	2
Should be registered refugee																	1	1

## **5.4 Refugees' Assessment of Their Camp Management Structures**

### **5.4.1 How This Was Done**

To obtain a rough assessment of what refugees thought of their management structures, we used a simple 4-level rating scale (a rating of 4 meant *very good*; a rating of 3 meant *good*; a rating of 2 meant *not so good*; and a rating of 1 meant *bad*). We had prepared individual ballots on which we had drawn a bamboo pole with four sections, with each section corresponding to one of the ratings.

**Figure 5.1 Rating Management Structures Using 4-Level Bamboo Scale**



We asked each participant in the session to indicate on their ballot their individual rating<sup>55</sup> in response to the question that was asked (e.g., the photo on the left in Figure 5.1 shows participants marking their ballots in the 'general refugee population' workshop in BDY). The ballots were then collected by an evaluation team member, collated and the results were posted on a large piece of flipchart paper for all to see.

The results on the flipchart were then used to hold a conversation with the group as to the factors that brought people to give a low rating, and the kinds of improvement they would want to see in order to give a higher rating (e.g., the photo on the right of Figure 5.1 shows the results of the rating by the Section Leaders in Site 1 and the facilitator/interpreters clarifying the points from the ensuing discussion that were captured on a separate sheet).

The same approach was used in all of the sessions with refugee groups, but the questions varied somewhat according to the type of group (general refugee population, minorities, women, youth and section leaders). More information on the different questions used for each of the groups can be found at the beginning of Annex 5. Annex 5 also presents, on a camp-by-camp basis, the different ratings for all of the sessions in each camp. Annex 6 provides a listing of the improvements suggested by each group for each of the camps.


<sup>55</sup> Methodologically, we are aware that each individual rating is based on that individual's personal frame of reference, and his/her overall assessment at that particular point in time. The individual frames of reference will be highly variable from one individual to another (e.g., what it takes to give a rating of 3). Because of this, combining the assessments of a group of individuals is not rigorously scientific since each individual scale is unique. However, the technique does provide a useful and valid reading, coarse as it may be, of what a group is thinking in response to a particular question. For the same reason, comparing one group to another within the same camp, must be done with caution. Comparing results between camps, is even more problematic not only because the frames of reference will be different, but the recent history of two camps could also be very different. For example, if the Camp Committee elected in 2010 in one camp is significantly better than their previous Committee, this will factor into people's assessment and likely lead to a rather positive assessment. If, in another camp, the reverse took place, this will likely result in a more critical assessment. Comparing the ratings of these two Camp Committees is problematic since both groups are using different references in making their assessment.

### 5.4.2 The Results of Refugees' Assessment of Their Camp Management Structures


#### Results from the GRP Sessions

Charts 5.1, below, presents the overall rating by GRP sessions of Section Leaders in all nine camps. Chart 5.2 presents a similar overall rating for the Camp Committees. These indicate that, when taken as a whole, the overall assessment of the current camp management model by the refugee population is quite positive.

**Chart 5.1 Overall Rating of Section Leaders by All GRP Sessions in All Camps**




**Chart 5.2 Overall Rating of Camp Committees by All GRP Sessions in All Camps**




82.6% of participants in the GRP sessions consider their SLs to be 'good' (rating of 3) or 'very good' (rating of 4) and only 3.4% (or 9 out of 264 respondents) indicate that their SLs are 'bad' (rating of 1) leaders. The assessment of the Camp Committees is also quite positive, since 85.8% of the 261 respondents rated their CCs as either 'good' or 'very good'. And only three of the 261, consider their CC to be 'bad'.

Charts 5.3 and 5.4 provide a breakdown of the above ratings on a camp-by-camp basis for the Section Leaders and the Camp Committees respectively.

**Chart 5.3 Summary of Ratings of Section Leaders by GRP Sessions in Each Camp**



**Chart 5.4 Summary of Ratings of Camp Committees by GRP Sessions in Each Camp**



While presenting the information for all the camps in one chart is convenient, such a presentation of camp information side-by-side can lead to making easy comparisons between camps. As noted earlier (see footnote no. 35, p. 32), making such comparisons are risky since each respondent would have been using their own personal frame of reference as opposed to a commonly agreed upon standard. The recent evolution with respect to management structures in one camp vs. another could also affect how respondents in a particular camp were rating their structures.

However, Chart 5.3 does reveal that of the nine respondents who rated their Section Leader as ‘bad’, four were from MLO, two each were from Site 2 and UM, and one from ML. These respondents were clearly not very satisfied with their current Sections Leaders. Given that these ratings were carried out in a group sessions, we did not request individuals who rated their SLs as ‘bad’ to identify themselves. However, when respondents were asked to identify what factors would lead to a less than a ‘very good’ rating and what improvements they would want to see to give a higher rating, the areas of particular concern were identified.

A generally favorable assessment can sometimes mask significant differences at the level of sub-groups of a camp population. This should be of particular concern to camps with a sizable proportion of ethnic minorities (Site 2, the three Tak camps, and TH). As can be seen from Annex 5, some GRP sessions in ML and UM had significant enough numbers of both Karen-speaking and non-Karen speaking participants that the sessions were conducted simultaneously with the two groups, one being facilitated in Karen, the other in Burmese. In both these instances there were significant differences in the ratings: the non-Karen speaking group was more critical in its rating of the management structures than the Karen speaking group (ref. sections A5.5 and A5.6 of Annex 5). In the case of ML, this information was somewhat offset by the more positive ratings arising from the minorities' group. But in the case of UM, this critical assessment was reinforced by ratings of the minorities' group which were even more critical. This is therefore a cause for concern.

#### *Results from the Sessions with Specific Categories of Refugees*

As noted above, it is important to look at each camp separately and compare the ratings of various groups as is done in Annex 5. However, when looking at the ratings as a whole, it is striking that there are not many highly divergent assessments from the distinct categories of refugees (minorities, women and youth) when compared to those of the GRP sessions.

Also, even where there is a slightly divergent assessment from one group, this is often offset by the assessment of another group: for example, whereas in ML the youth group in their assessment is somewhat more critical of the management structures than the GRP sessions (Chart A5.5.1), the women's group is somewhat more positive in their assessment than the GRP sessions.

With respect to special concerns of groups being addressed, on the whole the management structures are, for the most part, assessed positively in terms of their capacity to deal with the special concerns of these groups. The one significant exception being the assessment by the minorities' group in UM where eight of 11 participants (72.7%) gave a rating of 'not so good', and only three participants (27.3%) gave a rating of 'good' or 'very good'.

The assessment charts in Annex 5 also include ratings given by the Section Leaders. These were included to see how the assessment of Section Leaders might differ or be similar to those of other refugee groups. It is interesting to note, that for seven of the nine camps, the Section Leaders ratings are actually more critical of the management structures (of which they are a part) than the assessments by the other refugee groups and in particular the GRP session ratings of the CCs.<sup>56</sup> Only TH and UM are not more critical. And in the case of UM, the SLs assessment is significantly more positive than the GRP sessions assessment of management structures. This divergence of perspective could point to a lack of self-awareness on the part of SLs in UM which should be a cause for concern.

#### *Areas Identified for Improvement*

The generally positive assessment of the management structures by the refugees does not mean that there is no need for improvement. Many areas were identified during the sessions. Some of these are highlighted for each of the camps in Annex 5. Annex 6 also provides a detailed listing of areas identified by each session for all nine camps.

For both the SLs and the CCs, the areas raised most often as requiring improvement relate to doing better at being fair, avoiding favouritism and avoiding discrimination (on the basis of socio-economic status, or ethnic /religious identity), being honest and avoiding corruption, being respectful of people and not talking down or talking harshly to the people, and exhibiting good behaviour and abiding by camp rules

<sup>56</sup> Based on the discussions that followed rating the management structures, it became clear that most SLs were primarily thinking of their CC as the structure that they were rating and for which they then identified improvements they wished to see.

(leaders should be an example to the community and not get drunk or gamble). Finally, for the CCs, a number of respondents noted the importance of maintaining good relations with NGOs (and by extension with donors) and with Thai authorities. There is realization by the population that they are highly dependent on both these groups for their basic welfare.

## **6 REFUGEE LEADERS AND MANAGERS SELF-PERCEPTIONS**

### **6.1 Understanding of Main Responsibilities**

In each camp separate sessions were held with a group of about a dozen Section Leaders and the equivalent number of members of the Camp Committee.<sup>57</sup> One of the questions asked of both groups was their understanding of their main duties and responsibilities. Their answers have been consolidated in Tables A7.1 and A7.2 of Annex 7 for the SLs and CCs respectively. For ease of reading we have grouped similar or related answers under different headings. Reference to these tables reveals considerable amount of consistency across all nine camps.

We highlight below what the Sections Leaders and the members of the Camp Committees have identified as their main responsibilities.

#### **6.1.1 Section Leaders**

For Section Leaders, they see their main responsibilities as:

- maintaining order and a respect for rules and regulations within their section, and ensuring security; part of maintaining the ‘rule of law’ within their section involves helping to solve problems and resolve conflicts that develop between members of their section
- maintaining detailed population records including tracking new arrivals and section members being resettled
- overseeing and facilitating the receptions of supplies and the distribution of rations within their section
- communicating/information sharing with the section population
- coordinating with CBOs and NGOs and supporting their activities within their section, and
- overseeing their Section Committee and administrative duties, including reporting to the Camp Committee.

#### **6.1.2 Camp Committee Members**

For members of Camp Committees, they perceive their main shared responsibilities as:

- ensuring order and the rule of law within the camp, including facilitating the requests for camp passes, as well as overseeing camp justice and protection within the camp
- overseeing social affairs of the camp population (health, education, cultural activities, rights), and as part of this coordination with NGOs and CBOs
- overseeing overall camp management including the supervision and support to Section Leaders and communication with their Refugee Committee
- maintaining detailed population records including tracking new arrivals and camp members being resettled
- overseeing and facilitating the reception of supplies and the distribution of rations
- attending to administrative matters (budgeting and accounting, reporting, filing)

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<sup>57</sup> In In Mae La, a few Zonal Leaders participated in the Camp Committee session.

## **6.2 How This Compares to Formal Description of Positions and Structures**

The responsibilities identified by the Section Leaders (Section 5.1.1 above) as their main duties are, for the most part, consistent with the Section Leader job description. However, the job description focuses primarily on those responsibilities that relate to maintaining population records and assisting with ration distribution, i.e., responsibilities that are in support of TBBC's function of provisioning the camps with food and non-food rations. Clearly, while these are seen to be important by Section Leaders, from their perspective, their most important and most demanding duties relate to their roles in problem solving and maintaining peace and order within their section.

Similarly, the responsibilities identified by Camp Committee members (Section 6.1.2 above) are consistent with those described in the formal job descriptions. These formal job descriptions are the results of work carried out between the KRC, KnRC, the Camp Committees and the TBBC supported Camp Management Support Program. This effort, that was carried out in the last few years, resulted in a clear division of responsibilities between various office holders at the camp, zone and section committee levels, and a move towards standardization between the seven camps overseen by the KRC and the two camps overseen by the KnRC. These job descriptions were shared with us by some of the camp committees and were essentially the same from one camp to the next. Here again, we note that many of the job descriptions go into considerable detail on those responsibilities directly linked to TBBC's provisioning and support to camp management functions, i.e., maintaining detailed population records, reception and distribution of food and non-food items (including 'extra-needs'), and tracking administrative expenses. However, those job descriptions that do not relate to these functions (e.g., Camp Health Coordinator, Camp Education Coordinator, Camp Affairs Coordinator) are less detailed and explicit.

Each committee member has a specific set of responsibilities and during the sessions in the camps, the individual participants were keen to discuss each of their responsibilities. However there was not sufficient time to explore and discuss these in detail. The conversation focused on what members perceived to be the key areas of responsibility of the Camp Committee as a whole.

## **6.3 Main Challenges Faced by the Camp Level Management Structures**

During sessions with the Section Leaders, Camp Committee and Camp Leader in each camp we also enquired about the main challenges they faced in the fulfillment of their duties. It is not surprising that these would correspond to what they see as some of their main responsibilities. The responses of the Section Leaders for all nine camps have been tabulated in Table A7.1 of Annex 7. Those of the Camp Committees and the Camp Leaders can be found in the same annex in Tables A7.2 and A7.3 respectively. In reviewing these tables, it is important to remember that the challenges identified in the tables are not exhaustive, but what respondents in the various sessions identified as top of mind when asked about the challenges they faced as managers.

Table 6 below presents a composite picture of the main challenges identified by all three levels. It only retains those that are most common across all camps when all three levels (SL, CC and CL) of the camp management structures are considered. More detailed listings of challenges as identified by SLs, CCs and CLs are provided in Tables A8.1 to A8.3 of Annex 8.

**Table 6 Composite Picture of Main Challenges**

<b>Camp Managers/Leaders' Main Challenges Common to Most Camps (as identified by SLs, CCs and/or CLs)</b>	<b>Ban Mai Nai Soi (Site 1)</b>	<b>Ban Mae Surin (Site 2)</b>	<b>Mae La Oon</b>	<b>Mae Ra Ma Luang</b>	<b>Mae La</b>	<b>Umplem Mai</b>	<b>Nu Po</b>	<b>Ban Don Yang</b>	<b>Tham Hin</b>	<b># of camps</b>
Problem solving and dealing with conflicts										8
Enforcing rules and laws and maintaining security										7
Dealing with conflicting codes of law										6
Loss of management capacity (due to resettlement or elections of new, inexperienced managers) & need for training/capacity building										6
Food rations reductions										6
Reduction in budgets of NGOs in the health sector										6
Dealing with new arrivals (both large numbers and diversity)										5
Shelter materials (and other non-food items) reductions										5
Needing to find alternate sources of income/livelihood to offset reductions (and therefore need to obtain permission to leave camp)										4

‘Problem solving and dealing with conflicts’ was identified as the primary challenge by Section Leaders in eight of the nine camps. This challenge is tied closely to ‘rations reductions’ since section leaders indicate that many of the conflicts that have arisen of late, be they conflicts within households or between households, have resulted from these reductions (substance abuse and crowded quarters are some of the other causes of conflicts identified).

It is noteworthy that most of these challenges, from ‘dealing with conflicting codes of law’ to ‘needing to find alternate sources of income/livelihood outside the camp’, are largely due to factors and circumstances over which refugee leaders have essentially no control. Not surprising then, that they find these challenging.

With respect to ‘conflicting codes of law’, the KRC and KnRC have worked hard at revising their own camp rules to ensure that they are consistent with Thai law and international laws and conventions. This understandably takes time and is not easy. It is wise that the RCs start from their own customary laws and practices as a foundation since these are what most of the people in the camps are familiar with. These are the norms they learned growing up in their communities. In any society, laws are a codification of societal norms and they tend to follow, not lead the evolution of that society. As efforts are made in the camps to align traditional practices and norms with Thai and international laws, retaining the support and understanding of the refugee leadership (both formal and informal such as CBO leaders, religious leaders and community elders) is paramount. Because most of current leaders are perceived as legitimate and command the respect and moral authority of a majority of the camp population, they have a critical role to play in helping the population to understand, endorse and adopt any revised norms.

The same kind of approach is required in promoting the various international covenants and rights conventions such as the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. Close to 50% of the population of the nine camps are below the age of 18. And the problems of unruly youth and youth gangs are on the



increase in many of the camps.<sup>58</sup> It is more challenging when the camps have both a high number of unregistered refugees involving a mix of ethnic backgrounds. While promoting children rights is laudable, of equal, if not greater, importance would be to invest program resources in order to channel the capacities and energy of such youth in a more useful and productive way.

As external observers, this is one of the things that is most striking about the context in which these refugee management structures operate. They are vested with an incredible amount of responsibility but have virtually no financial resources at their disposal and very little say in where external service providers, like international NGOs, direct their resources.<sup>59</sup>

Many of the challenges listed in Table 6 involve other key parties which have the authority to change things, the resources to lessen the constraints or the capacity to influence and encourage changes in other parties. Concerted dialogue between concerned parties could bring about the alleviation or the elimination of some of these challenges. This would be welcomed by the camp management structures as it would lessen the heavy load they currently bear. We have no doubt that the RCs and CCs would also be happy to participate in any such dialogues and be willing to contribute positively to these.

With respect to the loss of experienced managers, this will in all likelihood continue. There will likely be a decrease in attrition due to resettlement, but there will continue to be the arrival of new people into governance and management positions. New skills and capacities will be required within camp management structures, especially if prospects of an eventual return to Burma were to firm up. So there will continue to be an ongoing need to invest resources into training and capacity building.

## **7 PARTICIPATION, REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP SELECTION**

### **7.1 Processes Used in the 2010 Elections**


The process of choosing leaders for the refugee management structures is complex and multi-phased. From the perspective of an external observer, its intent appears to be to strike a balance between giving the population a democratic voice in selecting their leaders, and ensuring some continuity and experience within the structures.

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<sup>58</sup> This was raised as a concern during the evaluation in at least four camps: Ban Mai Nai Soi (Site 1), Mae Ra Ma Luang, Mae La and Nu Po.

<sup>59</sup> Some NGOs, such as Solidarité, are quite good in consulting with the RCs and the CCs with respect to their programs, but this is not across the board. We were also told, that when the NGOs in the education sector realized that the whole sector would have fewer resources at their disposal, they consulted with the RCs and CCs to determine how best to deal with this sudden decrease in resources.

**Figure 7.1 Graphic Representation of 2010 Camp Committee Election in Karen Camps**



One of the ways this is done is through the use of ‘colleges of electors’<sup>60</sup> with mixed membership to elect the Camp Committees and the Refugee Committees. For instance, for the election of the Camp Committees a balance is struck by ensuring that the ‘college of electors’ is composed of the out-going Camp Committee members (approx. 15), five representatives for each section selected by the section,<sup>61</sup> and a larger number of Section Candidates elected (secret ballot) by the eligible voters<sup>62</sup> in the section (three candidates per 100 eligible voters). If we use Mae La Oon as an example, this would mean 5x13 sections = 65 representatives and approximately 120 candidates.<sup>63</sup> This college of electors, composed of 200 members in our Mae La Oon example, would then elect by secret ballot (from the Section Candidates and those out-going members of the CC interested in running for election again) the 15 people<sup>64</sup> to sit on the new Camp Committee. Once the 15 have been chosen, they determine also by secret ballot who among them will occupy the five positions on the Executive Committee.<sup>65</sup> This new Executive Committee, together with the Camp Committee Election Commission, then allocates CC subcommittee positions and administrative duties to the remaining ten members.

The Refugee Committee also involves a similar ‘college of electors’ composed of mixed membership.

<sup>60</sup> This term is not used in documents describing the processes. It is the term we use - to describe our understanding of what took place in the 2010 elections. A description of the election process can be found in TBBC July to December 2011 Programme Report, Appendix E, pp. 147-149

<sup>61</sup> It is not clear from the documentation whether these section representatives are chosen by the population or by the Section Committee.


<sup>62</sup> According to documents, eligible voters are all UNHCR-registered individuals that are 20+ years old.

<sup>63</sup> The number of registered voters in Mae La Oon is about 9,000. The number of adults 18 or older is about 4,635, and an estimate of those 20 or older would be about 4,000. This would give about 120 as the total number of section candidates ((4,000/100) x 3).

<sup>64</sup> Of the 15 there has to be a minimum quota of five female positions.

<sup>65</sup> Chairperson (or Camp Leader), Vice Chairperson (or Deputy Camp Leader), and the 2 to 3 Secretaries.

**Figure 7.2 Graphic Representation of 2010 Karen Refugee Committee Election**



For example for the election of the Karen Refugee Committee in 2010 the ‘college of electors’ was comprised of the following: the members of the out-going Refugee Committee (up to 15), members of the Community Elders Advisory Board (CEAB) (up to 15), candidates selected by each of the seven Karen camps (20 candidates),<sup>66</sup> and five representatives from each of the seven Karen camps (up to 35 representatives though some of the representatives might have been chosen as candidates for their camp). So the ‘college of electors’ would consist of as many as 85 people who then elect among the 20 candidates the 15 people to sit on the Refugee Committee, and then among these 15 who is to sit on the new Executive Committee (EC). The new EC then allocates respective duties to the remaining ten RC members.

At the camp level, the election is organized and overseen by a 15-member Camp Committee Election Commission (CCEC) that is appointed by the Refugee Committee or the out-going Camp Committee. The individuals are chosen for their prior experience in election processes and/or in camp administration; respected religious or other community leaders might also be included in the number. The CCEC responsibilities include explaining the process and rules to the community, designing the candidate application form, receiving the applications, approving the ballot design and overseeing the voting (including assistance to illiterate voters). The CCECs are supported and guided by the CEAB.

At the RC level, it is the CEAB that assumes the functions of an Election Commission.

At the zone and section levels, a similar process is used for the election of leaders at these levels with eligible voters from the zone or section free to submit their name (or that of another eligible person) as a candidate and participating in the election of the members to sit on the Zone or Section Committee. It is the newly elected Cam Committee that is responsible for organizing the elections at the zone and section levels.

<sup>66</sup> The largest camp (Mae La) chose 5 candidates, the 4 medium size camps (MLO, MRML, UM and NP) chose 3 each, and the 2 smaller camps (BDY and TH) chose 2 each.

## **7.2 Refugees Awareness and Understanding of the 2010 Elections Processes**

During ‘general refugee population’ sessions, participants were asked about their understanding of how their leaders are chosen.

For the most part, what participants described corresponds to what has been outlined in the previous section. These election processes took place almost two years ago and therefore the recollection was not very detailed. Given that the process is quite complex, it is not surprising that members of the population do not have a detailed recollection.

However, in most camps participants recalled that there was a nomination process using forms and eligible voters could submit their candidacy or recommend someone else, that eligible voters got to vote on who would be put forward as Section Candidates for the Camp Committee election, and that they got to vote for members of their Section Committee, including their Section Leader.

There were a few differences from the process described above:

### **1) Who actually got to vote?**

In the four camps (MRML, ML, BDY, TH) where participants indicated who got to vote, all four indicated that it was only one representative per household that voted, and not all eligible voters. We note that these four camps are all camps under the KRC. We do not know whether this was the practice in the other Karen camps or in the camps under the KnRC. The practice is not consistent with the process described above, nor is it consistent with most common democratic practices where all adults have the right to vote.

### **2) Who were the eligible voters?**

The three Tak camps were clear that only UNHCR-registered refugees had the right to become candidates and the right to vote. This is consistent with what is described above. However, in both the southern most camps (BDY, TH), participants indicated that all residents, both registered and unregistered, got to vote. This seems to have been what participants in Site 2 and MLO were also indicating, but it is not as clear.

Participants in many of the sessions indicated that the process to identify their leaders that was used in 2010 was an improvement over the past. Reference was also made in some of the other sessions (with specific categories of refugees), to the fact that refugees had a say in the selection of their leaders and that if they were not doing a good job, they could select different leaders in the next election.

## **7.3 Challenges with Current Structures and Election Processes**

We see a number of challenges facing the current processes in terms of representativeness and democratic practice:

### **7.3.1 Giving Unregistered Refugees the Right to Vote**

This is in accordance with Thai policy. Since the RTG does not formally recognize the right of these people to be in the camps (no registration papers issued), then they should not benefit from any of the rights accorded to those registered. In practice, however, the unregistered new arrivals did vote in some of the camps<sup>67</sup> in the last election.

Currently five of the nine camps have about 50% of their population that is unregistered, and of the remaining four, three have more than a third of the population unregistered. These people already face more serious challenges because as unregistered people they are not able to leave the camp, and if they do

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<sup>67</sup> The evaluation team is aware that this was the case in Ban Don Yang and Tham Hin.

it is at the risk of being sent back across the border if caught. But since they comprise such a large percent of the population, it is critical for the viability of the management structures that they participate in them and be allowed to elect people that will represent their perspective.

We believe that this is also in the best interest of the RTG. It is the RTG that favored, from the outset, a management approach that involved the refugees themselves. We suspect that their reason for doing so was because they believed that such refugee-based structures would best be able to administer these communities in a peaceful and orderly way. It is also for this reason, that the unregistered people should be given a voice and a say in any new election. If in the future, SLs and CCs are only elected by registered people, they will lack both legitimacy and representativeness. This is particularly problematic in camps where a substantial portion of unregistered people are not part of the majority ethnic group (such as in the three Tak camps). As an evaluation team we noted considerable discontent and latent tension in at least one of the Tak camps, Umpiem Mai, and would not be surprised to find similar tensions present in other camps.

### **7.3.2 Ensuring All Adults Get to Vote**

As noted above, in KRC camps, the practice seems to allocate only one vote per household. This practice can easily lead to over representation of men's perspective in how the votes are cast since often the man of the house will be considered the household head and be the one to vote. Also the varying perspectives of the different adult members of the household are not given expression.

### **7.3.3 Representation of Different Sub-Groups of the Population at Different Levels**

In this section when we refer to different sub-groups of the camps' populations we are speaking of three specific sub-groups – women, people from ethnic or religious minority groups, and youth.

#### **Women**

In the 2010 elections, women were given a minimum quota of five places on Camp Committees that consist of up to 15 members (e.g., ML and some of the medium size camps). Some of the smaller camps had smaller committees so the number of places 'reserved' for women was correspondingly less. The intent was to ensure that women perspectives would be adequately represented. In KRC's review of its election procedures, it noted that while an increased number of women stood for elections, this did not necessarily lead to more women actually being elected. To somewhat offset this shortfall resulting from the electoral process, CCs hired a number of women into CC staff positions. CMSP figures indicate that at the CC level 38% of people receiving stipends (i.e., CC members and staff) were women at the time of the evaluation.<sup>68</sup> In some camps, such as Site 2 and TH, at least half of CMSP stipends are paid to women (54% and 50% respectively), while some camps have not achieved the 33% target aimed for (MRML: 30%; UM: 26%; NP: 30%). Interestingly, Site 2 and TH also have the largest number of women being paid stipends at the section level (50% and 58% respectively) whereas when all nine camps are taken together only 21% of stipends are paid to women at the section level. The refugee Camp Leader in both Site 2 and TH are also women. As part of the review of election procedures in preparation for the 2013 elections, the KRC and KnRC should examine what conditions led to this higher representation of women in Site 2 and TH and identify what measures could lead to a higher representation of women in the other seven camps.

It might also be useful to reflect on how to ensure representation and a voice for other special categories of the population, such as minorities and youth.

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<sup>68</sup> During this evaluation, the sessions held with the Camp Committees consisted mostly of 11 to 12 participants. In total we met with 99 CC members (not counting the three zonal leaders that joined the ML CC session) of which 29 were women, or 29% of the participants which is lower than the 38% of women receiving stipends at the CC level, but participants in these sessions consisted mainly of CC members and not staff. The CC session in BDY included 5 women. Those in Site 1, UM and Nu Po included 4 women. There were only 3 women in MRML, MLO and ML, 2 women in TH and 1 woman in Site 2.

### **Minorities**

The way the current system is organized, it is very unlikely that representatives of minority groups will make it onto the Camp Committee. It is easier for minority groups to be represented at the Section Leader level if they have sufficient numbers and concentrate in specific sections such as with the Muslim population in the three Tak camps. It is much less likely that minority representatives will make it onto the Camp Committees. These will tend to be dominated by the majority group within the camp.

While majorities rule in democracies, certain measures are also taken to ensure that the rights of minorities are protected and measures usually taken to ensure that minorities have a voice and consideration is given to their specific needs.

Each camp faces different challenges in this respect, so it is unlikely that one approach will suit all situations. While the three Tak camps have substantial Muslim minorities, these Muslim minorities also wield significant economic clout and seemed to have been able to ensure that their voice is heard and their concerns addressed (e.g., difficulties in access to education or access to work opportunities, discrimination and/or intimidation by members of the majority groups *vis-à-vis* a minority person, etc.). Members of other minority groups, however, have more difficulty having their voice heard. In order to address this, the Camp Committee in Mae La Camp set-up a minorities advisory committee. This provides a channel of communication between these smaller minority groups and the Camp Committee. Possibly a similar mechanism could work in other camps, but as a management structure responsible for all the population in the camp the Camp Committee needs to find ways to communicate with and hear from these segments of the population that are faced with specific challenges<sup>69</sup> (e.g., language barriers) and are often poorly understood.

In camps where minorities comprise a significant segment of the population,<sup>70</sup> it would even be advisable to include some form of minority representation<sup>71</sup> on the Camp Committees.

Given that ethnic minorities account for about 14% of the combined population of the seven Karen camps, it would also be advisable to give serious consideration to some form of minority representation on the Karen Refugee Committee. It is our understanding that the current Karenni Refugee Committee involves at least one non-Karenni member, and if that is the case, it would be a good example to emulate.

### **Youth**

Because youth are not adults, they do not get to vote and therefore cannot use the ballot box as a way of having their views represented or addressed. However, with almost 50% of the population<sup>72</sup> below the age of 18, youth account for a large segment of the camp population. Some of the camps have seen the emergence of youth gangs which concern both the population as well as the leadership of the camps. There is an incredible amount of energy and capacity among this segment of the population, especially those in their adolescent years. And there is a need to channel this energy and capacity in positive and productive ways.

Channels of communication need to be opened and mechanisms found to directly engage youth. In our sessions, some interesting suggestions were made such as the idea of holding a forum to listen to their

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<sup>69</sup> In MRML, the CC noted that most of the Burmese-speaking population are in Section 13 which has its own Section Committee. The CC makes extra efforts to work with this SC given the special nature of the population of that section (a mix of former 1988 students and more recent arrivals).

<sup>70</sup> Minority groups account for more than 15% of the population in four camps. In descending order they are UM at 25.3%, NP at 22.1%, ML at 16.1% and Site at 15.8%.

<sup>71</sup> This would probably be best done through the election of a special representative by members of the minority population, or a representative of a minorities' advisory group if such a mechanism exists.

<sup>72</sup> In UM, youth account for only 42% of the population. However in all other camps, they account for between 44% and 51% of the population.

concerns and them to come up with activities that could benefit both themselves and the community as a whole. Providing support to youth organizations which have become almost moribund with the departure of their leadership through resettlement was another interesting suggestion. Others are mentioned in Annex 4.

## **8 SPECIFIC DIMENSIONS OF CAMP MANAGEMENT**

### **8.1 Protection and Access to Justice**

In 2006, prior to undertaking the IRC/UNHCR Legal Assistance Center (LAC) project, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) undertook an important and in-depth study on the protection environment in three of the nine refugee camps and an examination of issues related to access to justice and the rule of law in these settings. It was not really feasible for us to undertake as a comprehensive investigation as this earlier report since ‘protection and access to justice’ was only one of many dimensions this evaluation was mandated to look at.<sup>73</sup>

#### **8.1.1 Dealing with Serious and Sensitive Situations**

Our focus was gaining an understanding of how camp management structures perceived their role in dealing with serious and sensitive situations involving, for example, violence or sexual assault. We noted a heightened awareness of the types of crimes and how these should be processed, and a heightened concern about the need to support survivors and to enlist various parties in the provision of such support. In some instances, we also noted an awareness of the need to ensure confidentiality regarding certain sensitive cases.

We observed a broad awareness and concern among camp management structures regarding specific aspects and challenges related to ‘protection and access to justice’ in the camps. This heightened awareness and concern is a direct result of efforts undertaken by various parties in the camps in the last few years: the work of the IRC/UNHCR LAC project in some of the camps (e.g., Site 1 and Mae La, and more recently Nu Po and Umpiem Mai), and various trainings provided by UNHCR on refugee rights, and CBO and NGO programs related to sexual gender-based violence and children rights.

Unless otherwise noted, the following observations apply to all nine camps. There is:

- A clear sense of what issues are dealt with at what level: section, zone, camp or handed over to the Thai justice system via Thai authorities.
- An awareness that, because the camps are on Thai soil, any serious crimes involving a refugee from their camp (be it in or outside the camp) is to be dealt with by the Thai justice system and according to Thai law.
- An awareness of the types of serious crimes that must be handed over and dealt with by the Thai justice system.<sup>74</sup> Both the KnRC and the KRC have a set of camp ‘rules and regulations’ that help provide a framework for people operating within the camp management structures. In KRC’s current revised set of *Rules and Regulations for Camp Residents* there are 39 rules.<sup>75</sup> Of these, 12 relate to crimes that require the matter being immediately handed over to the Thai authority.

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<sup>73</sup> In the earlier study, 2,299 residents in Site 1, Site 2 and ML were surveyed on the sole focus of ‘protection and access to justice’ (i.e., barriers to accessing justice, challenges to the rule of law and other protection issues).

<sup>74</sup> The serious crimes mentioned by groups in all camps were murder, rape and sexual violence, human trafficking, forestry offences. Others crimes mentioned in only some camps include: possession and dealing in hard drugs, child exploitation, causing serious body injury or mental harm, production and sale of alcohol, etc.

<sup>75</sup> This set of 39 rules is part of a revised set of rules that the KRC has been working on to ensure that it is in line with Thai law. The earlier set only had 33 rules. This revision is still on- going and should be completed within the current year. In this undertaking, the KRC is in dialogue with the UNHCR, the IRC/UNHCR LAC project, and people familiar with Thai law and the Thai justice system.

Another three involve giving an initial warning to a perpetrator, providing education with respect to the infraction and why it is deemed a crime, but a repeat infraction would result in the matter being handed over to the Thai authority. With respect to the KnRC set of rules, 17 crimes<sup>76</sup> require handing the matter over to the Thai authority.

- An understanding that with respect to sexual violence a multi-sectoral approach should be used and to involve different actors:
  - o For instance, the Section Leaders are aware that when they are faced with an issue involving women in a domestic or sexual violence situation, they will involve Section Security, Section Social Affairs as well as CBOs (KWO or MWA if Muslim women are involved in Karen camps; or KNWO and WCC in Karenni camps, and SGBV program staff) to assist with the situation and provide support and counselling. Situations of serious violence are passed on to the camp level (camp security, camp justice).
  - o Similarly, at the camp level, Camp Security, Camp Justice, Camp Social Affairs as well as relevant CBOs would be involved. In cases of rape or alleged rape, the matter would be handed over to the Thai justice system (often via LAC in camps where LAC is present). In all camps, either KWO or KNWO operate a safe house where women survivors can receive protection, support and counselling. Respondents in most camps also mentioned the need to involve the NGO responsible for health to conduct a medical exam<sup>77</sup> and provide medical support to the survivor.

The incidence of serious crimes varied considerably from camp to camp based on what we were told. For instance, in BDY and Site 2, we were told that there had not been any serious crimes in the past year or two. However, in Site 2, instances of domestic violence were quite common and most often related to alcohol abuse by the husband. In MRML, MLO, ML, UM and NP, references were only to past crimes (dating back to four or five years) and no mention of any specific recent crimes. In BDY, we were told that in the past year the camp had to deal with a rape, an attempted rape and a serious domestic violence incident where both wife and husband suffered injuries. In Site 1, during the session with the CBOs, we were told that there had been 11 instances of rape<sup>78</sup> in the past year.

As noted earlier in this report, section leaders report an increase in the incidence of domestic violence. They identify substance abuse (related to prolonged encampment and lack of a future) as most often a direct cause. They indicate that recent cuts in rations have also given rise to more conflicts both within households and between households, and that some of these conflicts have led to physical violence.

However, significant challenges remain. For instance:

- The notion that there has to be a separation between the executive and judiciary functions of democratic government is still not fully understood or accepted in all camps. A deep sense of frustration with the new approach was expressed most clearly by the Camp Committee in Umpiem Mai. UM is one of the new camps where the LAC project is being implemented. However, even in Mae La where the LAC project has been operational for many years, not all leaders fully understand or support this notion. While some might understand and be willing to accept the principle, the concern is with how this can be done.
- Many within the camp management structures (SLs, CC members) feel that their responsibility for maintaining security, order and peace within the camp is being undermined by their inability to apply camp rules to youth under the age of 18. They are convinced that if youth, individually

<sup>76</sup> The KnRC rules also include crimes related to the possession of weapons and the production of explosives.

<sup>77</sup> This was not mentioned explicitly in Site 1, Site 2, BDY and TH. In MRML, the CC indicated that the camp does not have the ability to test whether a rape has occurred.

<sup>78</sup> We understand that many of these were 'statutory rapes': i.e., involving refugees girls under the age of 18 entering into intimate, though consensual, relationships.



or in gangs, are allowed to break the law (e.g., get into fights, carry arms, substance abuse, thefts, etc.) with impunity and without sanction then the situation will deteriorate very rapidly in the camp and camp residents as a whole will suffer.

- The KRC and KnRC have invested considerable effort at revising and updating the existing camp ‘rules and regulations’ to ensure that they are aligned and consistent with Thai law. Alignment with Thai law is important since, ultimately, for serious crimes, it is Thai law and the Thai justice system and its interpretation of these Thai laws that would apply. However, the Refugee Committees are very wise to want to adjust their existing ‘camp rules’ since these have been the rules that have been used to administer ‘justice’ and ensure a ‘rule of law’ in the camps for many years. They are likely to be better known and understood than Thai law which has only been introduced to the camp leadership in recent years and is still not well known and understood within the larger population.
- In the process of revising the set of camp rules, there has been an attempt at suggesting that certain terms such as ‘law’, ‘crime’, ‘article’ or ‘punishment’ not be used at all by the Refugee Committees in their set of camp rules as these should only relate to Thai law. There appears to be a misunderstanding that more than one code of law cannot be present simultaneously, when actually this occurs in many jurisdictions. Most countries will have a constitution which is the supreme law, and then there will be a national code of law that comes under the constitutions and cannot in any way contradict the constitution. There are often, in some countries, other levels of jurisdiction such as provinces or states and most countries have municipalities. These states or provinces often have their own assemblies that are empowered to enact laws within their areas of responsibility, and as long as these laws are not in contradiction with the national code of law, they are as valid and enforceable as the national code. Municipal councils will also generally adopt a number of municipal by-laws and codes (e.g., building codes, sanitation codes, etc.) that will govern municipal services and determine what can be done and how within the municipality. As long as such codes and by-laws are consistent with and not in contradiction of codes of law at higher levels they are also valid and enforceable. So, in principle, there is nothing problematic with the RCs and the camps being governed by a distinct set of rules as long as they align and are not in contradiction with Thai law.
- In practice, given their particular nature, camps and camp communities require a specific set of rules that deal with their specific circumstances. For instance, given the crowded nature of the camps, camps require very clear and enforceable rules to manage waste, to ensure sanitary facilities and to minimize the possibility of uncontrolled fires.

While refugee leaders spoke of certain criminal cases that had been successfully prosecuted by the Thai justice system, it seems unlikely that the Thai justice system will be in a position to absorb a large number of criminal cases involving refugees. Therefore, we believe that, with respect to access to justice, continuing to strengthen the camp justice system remains imperative.

### **8.1.2 Abuse of Power**

A few instances of milder forms of abuse of power by SLs or CC members were raised in various sessions with refugees. For example, some instances of favouritism or discrimination were mentioned. Favoursing a friend, a relative or someone from one’s ethnic groups is a misuse of one’s power and authority. In Nu Po, one participant noted that his/her group had to give some ‘betel nut money’ to a CC member in order for that person to pay attention to their request. This is an example of petty corruption. But is also an abuse of power in that one is using one’s position to gain a favour.

In Umpiem Mai, as noted earlier, we observed some fear on behalf of participants to speak openly in a public session. While this was not the case in all groups, the very fact that a number of people were fearful of speaking up in some groups is an indication that these people believe that power could be used against them which suggests that it probably had been misused in such a way in the past.

In order to address the problem of power abuse and misuse, the KRC and the KnRC have developed Codes of Conduct. Both Codes of Conduct were developed separately but cover much of the same ground. Their intent is to ensure that individuals working as committee members or as staff for the KRC or KnRC (and related bodies) use their power and perform their duties in a responsible and ethical manner. For both the KRC and the KnRC, the Code of Conduct applies to members of the Refugee Committee, to members of Camp Committees in all camps, to the staff in the Camp Management Program and the Camp Management Support Program (and in the case of KnRC to the staff of the Thai-Burma Border Football program), and to Camp Justice and Camp Security staff in all camps.

Code of Conduct Committees have been set up at both the Refugee Committee level and at the camp level. These committees have the responsibility of overseeing their respective Codes of Conduct and receiving complaints. There is some awareness among the camp population that these Codes of Conduct are in place and that complaints can be addressed to them. The evaluators did not meet with any of these Code of Conduct committees, so we do not have data on the number of complaints they have received and how these have been addressed and resolved.

## **8.2 Program Activity Coordination and Data Sharing**

### **8.2.1 At the Camp Level**

Generally each camp holds a monthly meeting that involves the CC and representatives of various NGOs and CBOs working in the camp. These meetings provide a venue where information can be shared on activities that are taking place and being planned. These are often limited to the sharing of broad information and are not so useful in terms of working out specific details related to a particular activity. With respect to particular activities, often separate ad-hoc meetings are held between the particular NGO and the appropriate member of the CC. The CC also calls special meetings with concerned parties for planning and enlisting support for specific activities or to deal with specific issues.

On the CC, there are Health Coordinator and Education Coordinator positions with the primary responsibility to interface with the NGOs that are providing services in these sectors in the camp. Camp level Health and Education Committees are also mechanisms to share information and coordinate efforts in each sector.

Sessions with CC members and with the CLs reveal that from their perspective different NGOs have different attitudes towards the CC. Some NGOs will not attend the meetings and will often plan and carry out activities with very little reference to the CC. Some will not bother to request a meeting but will just show up in the camp and expect to be able to meet with the CL or certain members of the CC on the spot. Other NGOs, however, are very good in consulting and working with the CC.

More recently, following an initiative by CCSIPT, there has been an effort to ensure that some of these monthly coordination meetings (or that part of the meetings) be used to step back from the day-to-day planning of discrete activities and take a more strategic approach. We understand that the purpose of these sessions is to reflect on the overall situation in the camp, understand how it is evolving and identify gaps or needs that are not being addressed.

The camp is the obvious entity for the purposes of planning and managing of services to the population, but many of the key services (health, education) are provided by NGOs that focus on a particular sector of

expertise and across many camps. Understandably, their concern tends to be limited to the delivery of quality services in their particular area of expertise. As they deal with reductions in budget, their sectoral focus will tend to become even more pronounced, when from the perspective of the overall wellbeing of the population there is a need to reassess which needs are most critical and how resources should be allocated accordingly.

This responsibility naturally falls on the camp management structures, but the Camp Leader and Camp Committee do not have access to significant programming funds that could be directed to what they see as areas of priority need or important gaps that are identified. They have very little say and must rely on moral suasion to influence how the NGOs allocate their resources. If NGOs are faced with significant difficulties they will sometimes turn to the camp management structures (RCs, CCs) to consult on the best way forward. We understand that this happened in the education sector when, due to budget reductions, the NGOs involved in education realized that they would no longer be able to support education in the camps as they had done in the past. TBBC also consulted with the RCs and CCs when its funding was reduced and it realized there would have to be reductions in the level of food and non-food items provided. Not all NGOs have proceeded in this way. Some, when faced with budget reduction and the realization that they are no longer in the position to support certain programs or activities, turn to the CC and expect the camp refugee management structures (SLs, CC) to take on the responsibility of the activity or program but without any resources to do so.

Regarding data, the refugee management structures at the camp level (SLs and CC) gather detailed data primarily regarding camp population and on food and non-food items (reception and distribution). This data is kept at the Camp Committee office. It is updated on a monthly basis. On a monthly basis this information is shared with the Refugee Committee as well as with TBBC.

### **8.2.2 At the Overall Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Level**

In terms of overall coordination of the humanitarian response to the Burmese refugee situation, this occurs in different ways, in different places. The key agencies and mechanisms involved are the OCDP, the CCSDPT, the RCs, TBBC, UNHCR and the DHAWG. Their roles and functions in coordination were described in section 4.2 above.

While considerable coordination is taking place, when all is said and done, there does not appear a clear place (or clear entity) where the responsibility to decide and the mandate to act rest. The more collegial approach that has characterized the humanitarian assistance to Burmese refugees has, to date, been effective. This has been so because the community of stakeholders has been able to maintain a shared analysis and understanding, and a general consensus around what needed to be done and the approach to be used. However, as soon as such a general consensus no longer exists, the limitations of such a collegial approach begin to appear.

When trying to understand how the overall coordination of humanitarian assistance works, another puzzle is figuring out where and how the refugee-based management structures, and in particular the Refugee Committees, interface with the parties involved in ensuring the overall coordination of assistance. Are they consulted, and if so how? Should they not have a place at the table?

## **8.3 Service Delivery and Monitoring**

The refugee management structures have a direct role in camp security, maintaining detailed camp population records, the reception and distribution of food and non-food supplies and the maintenance and upkeep of basic camp infrastructure (e.g., roadways and paths within the camp, camp buildings such as warehouses, camp committee office, etc.).

With respect to the maintenance and upkeep of camp infrastructure, given that the camp committee has very minimal financial resources, it must rely primary on building supplies provided by TBBC and on voluntary labour from the camp population.

While a Camp Health Coordinator and a Camp Education Coordinator that sit on the Camp Committee and have the responsibility to oversee camp education activities and camp health activities respectively, their role is more to serve as the main point of contact between the Camp Committee and their respective camp committees (education and health) and the NGOs working in these sectors.

Chosen from among the 15 people elected to the Camp Committee, the Health Coordinator and Education Coordinator do not necessarily have backgrounds or training in public health or education respectively. It is not their function to monitor and ensure that services provided are up to standard, nor, for the most part, do they have the technical competence to do so.

## **9 CURRENT MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES AS PERCEIVED BY OTHERS**

### **9.1 Thai Camp Commanders and Other Local Officials**

On the whole the TCCs report maintaining good relations and open communications with the refugee Camp Leader and the Camp Committee. The issue of language poses a problem in some instances (e.g., NP) so that interactions have to occur through the help of an interpreter. However, overall relations are facilitated by the fact that some of the Or Sor<sup>79</sup> are ethnic Karen/Karenni and a number of Or Sor are also married to refugee women. Two of the TCCs are themselves married to Karen women (MRML and MLO). The shared cultural affinities facilitate communication.

The TCCs also report that the refugee-based structures to manage the camps are working well. Some note that the refugee leaders are able to take care of the welfare of the population and maintain good order much more effectively than if it was left to the Thai military or officials from the MoI to take on this responsibility. That being said, some of the TCCs noted areas that remain a concern for them. For instance the TCC for Site 1 was concerned about the risk of fire within the camp and felt that the CC could do better at introducing measures to minimize the risk of accidental fires. The Site 2 TCC noted that while the CC was composed of good people that it has suffered considerably from the loss of experienced people to resettlement. In MLO the TCC believed that part of the task of the CL and CC was to prepare the population for an eventual return to Burma. In Nu Po, the TCC was concerned about the emergence of youth gangs and violent confrontations taking place between gangs from different ethnic groups and believed not enough was being done by the CC (and the NGOs) to deal with this matter.

A number of the TCCs also believed that the structures and democratic processes used to choose the leaders was a good thing (TCCs in Site 2, MLO and NP talked about this explicitly). They noted that most of these refugees were in the camps because they had fled a repressive military regime and that this was good preparation prior to an eventual return to Burma.

With respect to the movement of refugees in and out of the camps, this is one aspect of the official RTG policy that all TCCs acknowledged was difficult for both them and the refugee management structures to enforce. Some of the TCCs (Site 1, BDY) have instituted more rigorous control measures for entry and exit of the camps, but all TCC recognize that there are a number of refugees that leave, for instance, to work in nearby communities and this is deemed 'acceptable' if it is in certain specific communities in

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<sup>79</sup> As noted earlier in this report, 'Or Sor' is the transliteration of the Thai acronym for Territorial Defence Volunteers. It is the expression most commonly used by all who live or work in the camps.

close proximity of the camp. Some Thai Camp Commanders note that some policies are a challenge to implement given that the camps are not set up as fenced-in prisons with security perimeters, and that the camps should not be set up as prisons since refugees are not criminal convicts.

More often, though, other officials, such as the military operating in the area or forestry officials responsible for protecting the forest reserves where almost all of the camps are located are of the opinion that the TCCs are being too lax in enforcing RTG policy and Thai laws, especially as regards movement of residents in and out of the camps. The negative impact of the presence of these camps on the local environment is considerable. For UM and TH, there are significant concerns about who actually are the people in the camps and how many are actually legitimate refugees (i.e., fleeing war or political repression).

## **9.2 Non-Government Organizations (including TBBC)**

During the field data gathering period, meetings were held in six different locations<sup>80</sup> to which representatives of NGOs working in the camps (including TBBC) were invited to share their perceptions and suggestions with regard to the camp management structures.

Since some people were unable to attend these meetings, four other representatives were able to share their perspectives in separate meetings or over the telephone. In all, we were able to speak to 20 different representatives of 12 different agencies providing services in all main sectors: protection, health, sanitation/environmental health, education, food assistance/nutrition, livelihoods, camp management.

Almost all of the representatives we spoke to indicate having a good working relationship with the camp management structures (primarily the Camp Committee or particular members of the CC) in the camps where they operate. Most have been working with the refugee camps for many years and commented positively on the changes that had been taking place over the past few years:

- clearer division of roles and responsibilities and explicit job descriptions for people occupying positions within camp management structures;
- more democratic processes for the election of refugees into leadership positions;
- the introduction of Codes of Conduct for elected representatives and staff in management positions.

However they also noted that significant challenges remain:

- The elections in 2010 resulted in many new people occupying positions for which they have had no prior experience, so they are still learning their new role and responsibilities and still require training and support to develop the capacities needed for their new functions;
- Third countries resettlement has also lead to the loss of the experienced leaders;
- In some camps, there has been less of a change-over in people occupying leadership positions; in these camps, the challenge is bringing about changes in attitudes as many of these people still hold to traditional notions of leadership and authority, and to practices that are not always transparent;
- While the election of representatives to Camp Committees is a good thing, this does not necessarily lead to the choice of people with various technical backgrounds (e.g., one of the 15 people elected to the Camp Committee will be given the position of Camp Health Coordinator; such a person will not necessarily have any experience or training in the field of public health);
- While noting that the 2010 election process was an improvement over past practices, there is considerable education work that needs to take place with the refugee population as a whole in preparation of the next elections in 2013;

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<sup>80</sup> Meetings were held in Mae Hong Son (for NGOs working in Site 1 and Site 2), Mae Sarieng (for NGOs working in MLO and MRML), Mae Sot (for NGOs working in ML), Umphang (for NGOs working in UM and NP), Sangklaburi (for NGOs working in BDY) and Suan Pheung (for NGOs working in TH).

- While the introduction of Codes of Conduct (CoC) is a positive development, some representatives noted that the ability of the CoC Committee to carry out its mandate remained a challenge in at least one particular camp with which they are familiar.

Most NGOs are favourable to the basic philosophy or principle that favours people participation and control over their own lives. In practice, however, they often come up against situations which make this challenging to accomplish. One representative noted that NGOs are often critical of the refugee leadership which they see as not very participatory and top-down, but NGOs themselves are quite top down. For most NGOs, most of the authority rests with the Country Director in Bangkok and while the field representative is responsible to coordinate and work things out, he/she has very little freedom to manoeuvre or operate beyond the NGOs clearly established guidelines.

Most NGOs operate within quite strict practices and must follow quite detailed plans and budgets with limited room to deviate from these. NGOs that operate in more technical areas such as in the health sector also have various protocols, norms and standards that they must respect. While, in principle, health sector NGOs would be open to collaborate with the CC in planning health related activities, there is often no one on the CC that has the technical background or competence to contribute knowledgeably to such a process. This raises the question whether the CC should be only composed of elected representatives or also include certain positions that are filled by people who are hired on the basis of the specific technical knowledge, experience and skills they would bring to the position. Another way of addressing this need for technical knowledge and expertise would be to have technical advisors in staff positions who are hired by and answerable to the CC. Such people would not change at every election, thereby helping maintain this important advisory capacity. The loss of such qualified people to 3rd country resettlement would remain an issue.

A number of representatives noted that they can understand the frustration that must be felt by members of the CC who have been given certain responsibilities but have very little authority or control over anything and have virtually no financial resources at their disposal. Yet when an NGO faces cuts in its budget, it is to the CC that it turns for help in resolving the situation they face. Some CCs have demonstrated the ability to come up with reasonable criteria to help NGOs make decisions about what to cut when faced with a decrease in budget.

TBBC held consultations with the KRC and KnRC as well as all the CCs when it implemented the first cut in rations. Further consultations were being held during the period of this evaluation regarding further cuts that would come into force in February 2012. Similarly the NGOs in the education sector held consultations when faced with significant shortfall in that sector. None of these consultations have been easy, but they demonstrate that there is a willingness to engage and the ability to contribute constructively in order to try to minimize the negative impacts of such cuts on the population.

In the health sector, choices can be starker with life and death consequences: do we continue funding the immunization program (which statistically saves many more lives over time) and cut the budget for referrals (which almost always has to do with life-threatening injuries or illnesses), or the reverse? While such decisions are not easy, they are decisions community leaders are often faced with. There is no reason to believe that the refugee leadership would not be able to engage and contribute meaningfully with health sector NGOs to these kinds of decisions. While, members of the CC might not have all the technical expertise to usefully contribute to the planning of programs and activities, if presented with various options and the pros and cons of each, there is no reason they could not provide some guidance and help indicate what they believe should be the priorities (i.e., in terms of resource allocation) for the maximum benefit of the camp population.

Many NGO representatives acknowledged that building competent and capable refugee-based camp management structures is challenging. When asked where the responsibility for this should rest, they were of the opinion that it should not rest solely with TBBC (representatives of TBBC at all levels of the organization were also of this opinion). However, few had any clear ideas about alternatives. People recognized that they all have some contribution to make in how they work and interact with the management structures, but it was not clear that their role should be any more than that.

### 9.3 Community-Based Organizations (CBOs)

A total of 91 individual representatives of various Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and camp committees participated in the CBO sessions in the nine camps. As indicated in Table 9 below, a large majority of these (79%) were from organizations representing women (KNWO, KWO), youth (KNYO, KYO) or students (KSU, KSNG). These six organizations often had more than one person attending the same session, usually because they were involved in distinct programs or activities within their organization. The evaluation sub-team for Mae Hong Son also met with six representatives of the Karen Women's Organization (KWO) at their headquarters in Mae Sarieng.

CBOs cooperate closely with the CCs in the camps and are often called upon to assist the CCs, and certain NGOs with various tasks and function such as community mobilization, nutrition and health education (women and student groups), psycho-social counseling and SGBV counseling and support (women organizations), and special events, cultural activities and sports activities (youth organizations). Some of the CBOs, especially (KNWO and KWO) are also often asked to sit on various camp committees.

**Table 9 Participation in CBO Sessions**

Name of Community-Based Organizations	Ban Mai Nai Soi	Ban Mae Surin	Mae Ra Ma Luang	Mae La Oon	Mae La	Umplai Mai	Nu Po	Ban Don Yang	Tham Hin	Total #
	# of participants									
Karenni National Women's Organization (KNWO)/ Karen Women's Organization (KWO)	4	4	4	3	2	1	3	6	5	32
Karenni National Youth Organization (KNYO)/ Karen Youth Organization (KYO)	1	-	4	4	4	2	3	6	5	29
Karenni Student Union (KSU)/ Karen Student Network Group (KSNG)	-	2	-	3	2	2	-	-	2	11
Representatives of 9 Other CBOs <sup>81</sup> and 2 Committees <sup>82</sup>	2	2	-	-	4	6	5	-	-	19
<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>91</b>

Clearly the CBOs are a means to mobilize various segments of the camp population, a venue to provide refugees with opportunity to learn basic planning and organizing skills and mechanisms to deliver specific services. As civil society organizations they are both training grounds for refugee leadership (and potential future camp leaders) and a different means to hold camp management structures accountable to the population.

In the CBO sessions, the feedback received aligned itself closely with the feedback gathered in various refugee sessions. Where refugee sessions noted instances of bias or lack of fairness on the part of certain leaders, the CBO session would also raise this as an issue. Similarly with the concerns raised in one or

<sup>81</sup> The other CBOs that participated were: BWU (2), EFCG (1), KNED (1), KNHD (1), KHWa (2), MWA (2), MYA (2), NEFCC (1) and PKLCC (2).

<sup>82</sup> The Camp Committees that participated were: Child Protection Committee (3) and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Committee (2).

more camps of leaders being disrespectful or not attentive to others when being spoken, of certain leaders getting drunk or otherwise setting a bad example (by not following the camp rules and regulations), or of some leaders in one camp having the tendency of abusing their authority and being overly harsh.

However, while noting that there are clearly areas where improvements are required, on the whole, the CBOs believe that the current refugee management structures are working satisfactorily. Efforts to strengthen these structures and build the capacity of managers and leaders should continue, but there is no need to replace the current structure with an alternate structure.

Areas that were highlighted as requiring improvements (in addition to the ones noted above) were:

- to ensure better representation of women on the CCs;
- to ensure that communication channels are working better and that the information and messaging is consistent (from the outside world to the CC, from the CC to the zonal leaders and SLs/section committees, and from the SLs/section committees to the population;
- to provide better support and oversight of SLs; and
- to ensure that all camps are clear as to the current camp ‘rules and regulations’.

## **9.4 UNHCR**

The UNHCR did not become involved with the Burmese refugees in Thailand until 1997.<sup>83</sup> Following the arrival of the first groups of people fleeing fighting in 1984, the RTG had hoped that their presence in Thailand would be temporary. It did not invite the UNHCR to become involved in order not to “internationalize” the situation according to one UNHCR representative. This changed in 1998, when the UNHCR was approached by the RTG to visit the border and in 1999 an agreement was negotiated that gave the UNHCR quite a narrow mandate that focused on protection and registration, and, in the mid-2000s, resettlement.

These arrangements are quite unusual as the UNHCR, along with its protection mandate is often expected and takes on an important role in the overall coordination of humanitarian assistance. While in recent years, the UNHCR has collaborated with the donor community and the CCSDPT in the coordination of the humanitarian assistance to Burmese refugees (e.g., the work with the CCSDPT on the Strategic Framework for Durable Solutions), its primary efforts have been on its protection mandate and the rights of the individual refugee, and less on the community of refugees as a whole and the management of the camps.

In line with its protection mandate, the UNHCR has actively supported ‘access to justice’ work in part through its support to the IRC LAC project as well as support to SGBV work in the camps. This latter is in response to a heightened concern within the UN system about sexual exploitation and abuse, and therefore the need to proactively address such issues. Through this work, the UNHCR has been working with and providing training in conflict resolution and protection to the Refugee Committees and the CCs. And through the LAC project, the UNHCR is supporting the efforts at separation of the ‘executive’ from the ‘judiciary’ within some of the camps and establishing the interface between the Thai justice system and these camps (initially in Site 1, Site 2 and ML; in the past year UM and NP have been added).

The UNHCR’s engagement with the refugee-based camp management structures has been tempered by its continued concern about reprehensible activities and role of non-state actors (e.g., KNPP and KNU), in the border area and their potential to exert influence over and interfere with the camp management structures. The UNHCR does not suggest that the RCs and CCs are directly supporting or abating such

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<sup>83</sup> As of 1994, the UNHCR had a roving protection officer visiting the border. But the RTG remained resistant to the UNHCR having a role until 1997 following a change in government and serious fighting on the border.



activities,<sup>84</sup> but recent incidents indicate that the potential for influence and interference by non-state actors is real and on-going monitoring and vigilance is paramount. Its concern about the rights of the individual refugee also leads it to focus on 1) the need to ensure the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps, 2) issues of impartiality and access to justice and 3) the need to ensure both democratically representative structures and a clear separation between the executive and the judiciary (to prevent conditions of abuse of power). Some of these issues have been addressed by this evaluation.

Given recent changes inside Burma and the potential creation of conditions that would allow for the safe return of refugees, the UNHCR will be called upon to play an increasing role with the current humanitarian situation. It will need to engage even more closely with these management structures both in helping prepare the population and in facilitating the many different processes that an eventual repatriation and settling into Burma will entail. Making further contributions to building the capacity of these enabling management structures is imperative. The sooner this is undertaken, the better it will serve the interests of the refugee population as a whole as well as facilitate UNHCR's enhanced role. In this regards, one area of contribution that would be particularly beneficial is the explicit recognition of these structures as the legitimate governance and management structures of the refugee population. This is an area for which the UNHCR could take some leadership in advocating with the RTG. In doing so, it should also advocate that the RTG make explicit the responsibilities and authority that it has devolved to these structures (RCs and CCs), and the terms that govern the relationships between these structures and the RTG agencies and representatives. Making these things explicit would contribute considerably to the removal of many areas of ambiguity, lack of transparency and lack of clear accountability, all of which lend themselves to arbitrariness, manipulation and abuse.

## **10 CAMP RELATIONSHIPS WITH NEIGHBOURING THAI COMMUNITIES**

When the Thai government first allowed small groups of refugees to establish small communities in encampments in Thailand near the border with Burma, it was with the assumption that these would be temporary, possibly only for a few months until the end of the dry season offensive of the Burmese army. Soon, the RTG realized that this was not the case. The numbers were increasing from year to year, and when armed forces began attacking across the border, the refugees were moved into the current camps both for their own security and for the security of the border (to allow Thai authorities to more readily manage these large numbers of people).

The presence of the camps in the vicinity of Thai communities – some of the camps of the size of towns, and one camp, Mae La, the size of a city – has had considerable impacts on these communities both positive and negative. Some of the impacts are on the local economy and the environment. Others are more in the legal, administrative and socio-cultural domains.

The following pages summarize the impacts that were mentioned by Thai officials living and working in the areas where the camps are located and by villagers, shop owners and other community members living in communities that are in the vicinity of the camps.

### **10.1 Economic and Environmental Impacts**

Many people living in the communities in the vicinity of all nine camps benefit from significant economic advantages. As indicated in Table A9.1 (Annex 9), the most common advantage is access to relatively cheap but quality labourers who help with various seasonal activities on farms and plantations. With

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<sup>84</sup> Or for that matter supporting on-going military activity inside Burma: when representatives were asked if they believed that the camps were somehow being used to support the groups fighting inside Burma, they acknowledged that there is no evidence that the camps are being used for combatants to be treated and rest before returning to combat.

regards to certain camps, other industries located at a greater distance from the camps, such as tourism and fishing, also benefit from this access to relatively cheap labour.

The trade that takes place between the camps and the local communities also provide additional income to both shop owners and simple villagers located near many of the camps. And the access to relatively cheap goods due to the presence of the camps was also identified as a significant benefit by communities near at least four of the nine camps. For communities near some of the more remote camps such MLO and MRML, the road improvements undertaken to give suppliers access to the camps has meant easier access to markets to these communities both to purchase goods from larger centres and to sell produce.

These positive impacts are considerably offset by the overall damage done to local forest cover as well as to the quantity and diversity of forest fauna and flora. All the camps are located in or near protected watershed or national park areas<sup>85</sup> thereby heightening the seriousness of this damage as well as the concerns of Thai authorities. Recent cuts in rations of both food items and building materials has exacerbated the problem as many refugees clandestinely leave the camp and try to supplement their rations by produce from the local forests. Indirectly, the RTG policy of temporary shelters also contributes to the problem since the roofing materials used will seldom last for more than couple of seasons before having to be replaced. Allowing the use of slightly more lasting as well as less flammable materials would be more economical, less of a fire hazard as well as of enormous benefit to the local environment. And this would not significantly change the rudimentary and temporary nature of household shelters in the camps.

Another negative impact that is common to all the camps are thefts carried out by certain residents of the camps in the gardens and fields of the communities that are located near the camps.<sup>86</sup>

## **10.2 Administrative, Legal and Socio-Cultural Impacts**

With respect to other types of impacts, it is clearly the access to emergency medical attention and health services that is appreciated the most by certain remote Thai communities located near the camps. For communities located near MLO and MRML, the greater access they have to government services in the district centre in Mae Sarieng due to better year round road access is also a positive impact (see Table A9.2 of Annex 9).

However, on the negative side, Thai authorities, particularly with respect to the camps located in Mae Hong Son province, identify increased administrative loads due to the presence of the camps both related to general administrative matters as well as added load on the Thai justice system. Community members, on the other hand, are more concerned about security and basic law and order issues due to the presence of the camps nearby and the perception that there is significant movement of refugees in and out of the camps.

On the whole, the four camps located in Mae Hong Son province seem to have a more positive relationship with the communities located in the vicinity. This can be explained in part by cultural affinity between the local Thai-Karen/Thai-Karenni population and the camp population, as well as marriages that have taken place between members of neighbouring Thai communities and camp residents. For some community members, they perceive the camp community as just one amongst a number of communities located in their area.

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<sup>85</sup> In Annex 6, the reader can consult Table A6 which identifies a number of characteristics of the camps and their local setting.

<sup>86</sup> The evaluation did not gather detailed statistics on the incidence of theft in neighbouring communities. However such thefts were raised as one of the negative impacts of the camps by Thai community respondents for all camps. Such incidents are normally brought to the attention of the TCC via the village headman who would then bring it to the attention of the CC.

There is less of a sense of harmonious relationships between the camps in Tak province, where as in the case of Ban Don Yang and Tham Hin, there has always been a considerable amount of back and forth across the Thai-Burmese border in those areas so the presence of the camps does not seem all that anomalous. However, the large amount of new arrivals over the past few years in the Tak camps and in Tham Hin has been noted by the local authorities as well as by local community leaders and there is a strong sense that many of these new arrivals are not legitimate refugees but people taking advantage of the presence of the camps to get access to third country resettlement or to conduct commerce. This is eroding the degree of sympathy felt by the local population towards the refugees and the level of tolerance to the continued presence of the camps.

It is also noteworthy that there is a quite a broad negative sentiment of the local population towards the people working in the camps that is in large parts due to how drivers of various international agencies conduct themselves on the roads: often driving very fast, with apparent disregard to the people living near the roads (raising large clouds of dust) or also using the roadways (on foot, bicycles or in small farm vehicles). While the support to local community projects have been noted and appreciated such good will gestures are being undermined by the behaviour on the road of many of their staff.

## **11 MEETING INTERNATIONAL NORMS**

### **11.1 Humanitarian Principles and “Do No/Less Harm” Principle**

The humanitarian principles refer to the ‘humanitarian imperative’ principle, neutrality and impartiality.

#### **11.1.1 Humanitarian Imperative Principle**

*“Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable in the population, such as children, women, the displaced and the elderly. The dignity and rights of all those in need of humanitarian assistance must be respected and protected.”*

The current camp management model has been quite successful in ensuring that this principle is being respected by both the refugee management structures and the humanitarian agencies<sup>87</sup> providing assistance over the years.

With cutbacks in rations, this is proving to be more challenging. At the time of the evaluation, further reductions in rations were being planned for February 2012, and discussions were underway between the TBBC, the RCs and the CCs to identify the most vulnerable households in order to ensure that such households are provided with sufficient rations while other households receive a reduced ration.

Where there should be a concern that the ‘humanitarian principle’ is, or could be, threatened is with the situation of the unregistered refugees. The large number of unregistered refugees (in some camps they account for about 50% of the total population being served) is putting significant pressure on limited resources at a time when many donor agencies are reducing their support. Without screening to determine which of the unregistered refugees are legitimate ‘refugees’ and should receive support, and which are not, the whole of the camps’ population are being forced to make do with these reduction in rations and services.

In order to keep track of new arrivals (NA), all NAs are noted by section leaders that then provide a list of these NAs to the New Arrival Committees (NACs) set up by the CCs. The NACs will conduct ‘screening’

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<sup>87</sup> The Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group adopted a set of guiding principles and Operating Guidelines in June 2011 in Bangkok to guide their work and interventions along the Thailand/Burma border. These Operating Guidelines are an adaptation of the Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct and the Good Humanitarian Partnership Principles to the local context. The guiding principles and operating guidelines include all four principles discussed in this section.

interviews with all NAs using pre-set questions to verify that they meet certain new arrival criteria developed by the RCs to determine whether the NAs should be eligible for food rations and non-food items. The refugee management structures do not consider the NACs to be alternative mechanisms to determine whether these NAs have a legitimate claim to asylum. They would prefer not to have to deal with this responsibility but have put in place these mechanisms to deal with the fact that the RTG's PABs have not completed the screening of any of the large number of new arrivals since 2005/2006.

The NACs operate from the premise that all NAs have the right to asylum and to rations unless their responses during interviews clearly indicate that they are job-seekers, resettlement seekers or that they are from neighbouring Thai villages. Once NAs have successfully completed their NAC interview, a list of accepted people is given to the CC and TBBC. TBBC does a further verification, take their photos and eventually issues them a ration book. NAC statistics<sup>88</sup> for the period of August 2010 to June 2011 for all nine camps indicate that of the 17,138 NAs enumerated by section leaders, only 13,544 (79%) presented themselves to interviews. The others presumably chose to leave the camp rather than show up for the NAC interview. Of those that showed up for their interview, 13,263 (98%) were accepted while 2% were determined to be job-seekers, resettlement seekers or Thai villagers. TBBC reports that there is a further significant drop in number in terms of NAs who show up to receive their ration book. The way these structures are operating is consistent with the humanitarian imperative and the asylum-seekers right to asylum. It is not the role of such mechanisms to determine the legitimacy of any asylum-seekers claim. This remains the responsibility of the RTG's PABs, and, if the RTG was to request its involvement, it is a responsibility that could be shared with the UNHCR.

The legitimacy of the large number of currently unregistered refugees remains a significant issue with respect to the humanitarian imperative principle. When asked about the number of NAs and unregistered refugees, CC members and CLs believed that a considerable number of these were in the camps for other reasons than fleeing fighting or political persecution. For example, in UM, they believed that as many as 60% were there for business opportunities or resettlement reasons. In ML, the camp leader believed that as many as 20% of the numbers in his camp were there for such reasons. This underlines the urgency of arriving at an understanding with the RTG to process the large number of unregistered refugees (62,000 people or 45% of the camp population).

If a significant percentage of the current camp population do not have legitimate grounds for being in the camps, then this is putting unwarranted pressure on the resources available. While the measure mentioned above (targeted support to the most vulnerable) is addressing to some extent this concern with respect to food rations, this does not address the problem of reductions in non-food rations or the decreases in services provided (education, health, etc.) that the legitimate refugee population is experiencing.

### **11.1.2 Neutrality**

*“Humanitarian agencies must not take sides in the hostilities or in controversies based on political, racial, religious or ideological identity (non-partisanship/independence). Transparency and openness are key issues to keep neutrality. ... Neutrality is not a justification for condoning impunity or turning a blind eye to egregious human rights abuses.”*

The current effort to provide support to Burmese refugees in Thailand is focused on providing support to people fleeing military conflict, human rights abuses and political persecution. The current refugee management structures are staffed with people who are perceived as leaders by these very populations and they expect these leaders to provide them with a safe and liveable environment in the camps but also, to the extent possible, protect them from further aggression by the Burmese military regime. But the focus of these structures is to provide for these displaced populations while in Thailand and we did not come

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<sup>88</sup> TBBC Programme Report – January to June 2011, p. 55

across evidence that these management structures are participating in on-going military action against the Burmese military regime.

The humanitarian agencies working with the refugees are deeply concerned about the plight of these populations and many are undoubtedly sympathetic to the political aspirations of the various groups within the refugee population for a democratic Burmese state where ethnic groups can exercise a certain degree of auto-determination. In this sense, the agencies are taking sides, but they are doing so in the face of the flagrant human rights abuses against these populations over the past 25 years. So in this sense, they fall within the conditionality of the application of this principle, that ‘neutrality’ should not condone impunity or turn a blind eye to egregious human rights abuses.

### **11.1.3 Impartiality**

*“Aid is delivered to all those who are suffering; the guiding principle is only their need and the corresponding right. Human rights are the basis and the framework for an assessment of needs. This principle includes both the proportionality to need (where resources are not sufficient, priority is always given to those most affected) as well as the principle of non-discrimination (no one should be discriminated against based on their sex, age, ethnicity, identity, etc.).”*

For the most part, the principle of impartiality is being respected in the Burmese refugee camps by both the refugee management structures and the humanitarian agencies providing aid. Significant efforts have been deployed over the years to be aware of the various groups and sub-groups within the population and to differentiate their needs.

As noted above, a recent new effort has been undertaken to identify the more vulnerable households since food rations are being cut significantly for a second time in three years and some households will have more difficulty to cope. In this way the proportionality of need is being addressed.

While some instances of discrimination have been noted in this evaluation, for the most part there is no evidence of systematic and intentional discrimination operating within the camps.

However, particular areas of concern have been noted and these require attention:

- **Situation with unregistered refugees**

Unregistered refugees do not have refugee status. It is likely that a number of these would not pass any refugee status screening process and therefore would have no legitimate claim to the rights, protection and aid accorded the refugees. However, many of the unregistered refugees probably do have legitimate claims to refugee status. Currently none of these have this and therefore suffer from discrimination: with a few exceptions, they do not have the right to vote for the people that will occupy SL or CC positions, they are cannot obtain camp passes to leave the camps, and are much more vulnerable than other refugees if they leave the camp clandestinely since they are returned to the border rather than the camp.

- **Minorities**

While for the most part, religious and ethnic minorities indicate that they are being dealt with fairly, there are instances where this is not the case. The Muslim minority in the Tak camps has been able to ensure that its needs and interests are being addressed because of the considerable economic interests that it controls and therefore the influence that it wields in the camps. However, other minorities face more significant challenges, and with the exception of Mae La, there is no mechanism for these people to voice their concerns and particular needs. This is critical, since their numbers are not significant enough for them to be able to elect one of theirs to

a position of leadership at the section or camp level. We noted earlier in the report that Umpiem Mai is a case of particular concern in this regard.

#### **11.1.4 Do No/Less Harm**

*“Although aid can become part of the dynamics of the conflict and may even prolong it, humanitarian organizations must strive to “do no harm” or to minimize the harm they may be inadvertently doing simply by being present and providing assistance. .... aid can be an indirect part of the dynamics of the conflict because it creates jobs, gives incomes in form of taxes ... aid can exacerbate the root causes of the conflict by securing rebel activities.”*

Concerns have been raised in the past that, given inadequate or insufficient controls over the distribution of rations, it was difficult to ascertain that none of the humanitarian assistance was making it into the hands of armed members of the Karen and Karenni resistance. These concerns were made most notably in the 2008 ECHO report.

Since then, new measures have been introduced by TBBC and the refugee management structures to ensure much tighter and more transparent controls over the reception and distribution of rations. In the past few years, the ration levels have also been cut a number of times so that an almost universal complaint heard in all nine camps was that the reduction of food rations generally and rice in particular was one of the most important challenges of living in the camps. The quantity of rations provided to CCs for special needs (e.g., to mark special occasions such as religious holidays or to assist needy NAs until such time as they obtain ration cards) has also been reduced. Given these significant reductions in rations and the added controls it is far less plausible than it once might have been that such camp rations are somehow making it into the hands of the resistance.

So given this, is the presence of these nine Burmese refugee camps in Thailand, contributing to the dynamics of the conflict or to its prolongation by securing rebel activities?

From information gathered during the evaluation we also note the following:

- Some of the camp residents have family members (e.g., husband) fighting inside Burma. This was mentioned in two of the camps but informants could not indicate how wide spread a practice this was. That family members benefit from the relative safety of a refugee camp would certainly be of succor to the combatant, but this does not constitute a contribution to the conflict and such support has to be provided to conform with the humanitarian imperative principle. On the other hand, if the medical facilities in the refugee camps were being used to care for combatants that had been wounded so that they could return to the ‘front’, then this might be considered direct support to the conflict. While the evaluation did not conduct a systematic visit to all the medical facilities, the evaluators did not observe any instances of medical facilities being used in this way.
- RCs, Camp Leaders and CCs are aware of some the activities of non-state actors such as the KNU and the KNPP. They note having on-going communication with these political entities for the purpose of sharing information. While many are sympathetic to these organizations, refugee leaders were quite clear that their mandate and responsibility is for the refugee population inside Thailand and it is the needs of this population that are their primary concern and the basis of decisions that they make. They state unequivocally that they are not being directed, nor do they receive financial support from these political entities.
- The RCs have, however, provided some in-kind support (in the form of rice) to groups that help patrol the border, in the vicinity of the camps, on the Burmese side of the border. This was done in order to protect the camps against attacks by the Burmese army or other armed rebel groups (e.g., in Site 1 some houses were burned down in 2005 by Burmese military, in Mae La, the

presence of Border Guard Force/DKBA on the border since 2009 is a concern) since very little, if any, protection was being provided by any other party. In ensuring that such protection was in place, refugee leaders were responding to the requests of the refugee population. The in-kind support was seen as a contribution to ensuring the security of the camps and their populations. TBBC was aware and had approved the supply of some rice for this purpose. TBBC took it upon itself to approve this form of support since it believed that ensuring the security of the refugees in the camp justified this action. However, because of the increased concerns being expressed by donors, TBBC met with the RCs in 2009 and informed them that TBBC would be phasing out (by the end of 2011) this form of support in order to respect the wishes of the donor community and not jeopardize the critical humanitarian support being provided to the camps.

- The UNHCR indicates that non-state actors (e.g. KNPP and KNU) are present and active along the Thai-Burmese border. Some of these activities include extra-judicial killings, cross-border abductions and human trafficking which are direct infringements on the basic rights of asylum-seekers. While the UNHCR does not suggest that the refugee management structures are directly supporting or abating such activities, it believes that such non-state actors continue to have a strong influence and the potential to interfere with the structures. It therefore believes that continued monitoring and vigilance are required to ensure the civilian and humanitarian nature of the camps.

#### **11.1.5 Other International Norms**

Because of various training courses that people in management positions (Section Leaders, Camp Committee members, Camp Leader) have received and their on-going interaction with various international organizations (UNHCR, TBBC, various NGOs, etc.), there is a considerable degree of knowledge and understanding of various international norms and human rights that must be respected. Since, for most in the camp, their main reason for being there is because they were fleeing a regime where basic human rights were not respected, refugee leaders are positively disposed to abide by and respect international standards and norms. Of the four principles discussed above, the humanitarian imperative and impartiality (non-discrimination) are the ones they are clearest about and do their best to put in practice. They are also, for the most part, aware of the international community's concern about neutrality and the 'do no/less harm' principle.

Many individual refugees are also familiar with human rights and in particular their right to speak up and be treated fairly and equally. This is particularly the case with refugees that have received training or who have a higher level of formal education. Refugee leaders in camps with a large number of new arrivals note that one of the challenges they face in dealing with these newer members of the population is that a number of them come from more urban areas, or are more educated and, as a result, are more inclined to 'demand' certain services and rights.

Refugee leaders (SLs, CC members and CLs) and even a number of refugees from the general population, while aware of the need to respect and promote human rights, also feel that these rights have to be balanced with community members responsibilities towards fellow refugees, i.e., they cannot exercise their rights at the expense of others. In all but Site 2 and Ban Don Yang, concerns were raised by refugee leaders that increased human rights training and especially training re child rights has made their task of maintaining peace and order in the community more difficult. In particular, that it has become more difficult to control youth gangs (raised as a significant concern in Site 1, Nu Po and Mae La) since some youth believe they can act with impunity because they believe that, as minors, they cannot be penalized or detained.

The challenges of navigating various codes of law (Karen/Karenni customary law, Muslim law, Thai law and international law) is also proving a challenge in most of the camps. In Mae La and Site 1 and Site 2,

where the Legal Assistance Centres (LAC) were first introduced by IRC (with UNHCR support), there is a greater understanding of the need for a clear separation of the judiciary from the executive. In Nu Po, and in particular Umpiem Mai, where the LACs are just being introduced, there was not a good understanding of the rationale and importance for such a separation of the judiciary from the executive, and a high degree of frustration with this new approach. Camp Committee members, and especially the Security-in-Charge, believed that their authority and therefore their ability to fulfill their roles and responsibilities, was being seriously undermined.

## 11.2 UNHCR's 'Community-Based Approach'

The UNHCR's 'community-based approach' is based on five guiding principles: 1) rights-based approach; 2) meaningful participation that relies on age, gender and diversity analysis; 3) empowerment; 4) ownership, solutions and sustainability; and 5) transparency and accountability.

These five principles and how they are being applied in this context are examined in the following table.

**Table 11 How Current Model Aligns with UNHCR Community-Based Approach**

Guiding Principle <sup>89</sup>	How it is applied in the current refugee-based camp management model
<p><b>Rights-based Approach</b></p> <p>A rights-based approach is founded on the principles of <i>participation</i> and <i>empowering individuals and communities</i> to promote change and enable them to exercise their rights and comply with their duties.</p> <p>It identifies rights-holders (accounting for diversity), as opposed to beneficiaries, and seeks to strengthen their capacities to make claims; and identifies duty-bearers and seeks to strengthen their capacities to satisfy those claims.</p>	<p>Adopting a refugee-based camp management model was in part driven by a belief that the refugee camps, when they were initially constituted, involved an amalgam of natural, self-governing communities and that to the extent possible these self-governing processes should be retained within the camps that were being set up, rather than transforming the camp populations into passive beneficiaries.</p> <p>In recent years, additional efforts have been undertaken to ensure that the management structures are representative of their population and that leaders are chosen democratically.</p> <p>The arrival of large number of new arrivals since 2007 is a challenge to this principle, since new arrivals, for the most part, do not currently have the right to vote, and do not have the same degree of protection as registered refugees.</p>
<p><b>Meaningful Participation</b></p> <p>(based on age, gender and diversity analysis)</p> <p>The full and equal involvement of all members of the community in decision-making processes and activities that affect their lives.</p> <p>Meaningful participation will often require special efforts to ensure that those traditionally marginalized (e.g., women, children, older persons, persons with disabilities and minority groups) are given support and specific opportunities to contribute.</p>	<p>Considerable investment has been made by both the management structures, TBBC and service providing NGOs into needs assessments in order to ensure that the diversity of the population and its needs are well understood and responded to.</p> <p>A number of refugee-run community-based organizations (CBOs) that focus on the needs of special groups (women, youth, minorities, etc.) have also emerged and are supported in their work by the camp management structures. Places of congregation and worship for different faith have also been allowed to flourish.</p> <p>Registered refugees (but not, currently, non-registered) chose the leaders and people that occupy camp management positions. Allocation of resources to the population is, for the most part, done in a non-discriminatory manner. Individual refugees have access to their leaders, and there are also opportunities for information/consultation sessions between leaders and the community (mostly at the section level).</p>

<sup>89</sup> Information in this column is drawn from Chapter 2 – The context, concepts and guiding principles (pp. 11-26), A Community-based Approach in UNHCR Operations, UNHCR, January 2008 (<http://www.unhcr.org/47ed0e212.html>)



Guiding Principle <sup>89</sup>	How it is applied in the current refugee-based camp management model
<p><b>Empowerment</b></p> <p>The process by which individuals in the community analyze their situation, enhance their knowledge and resources, strengthen their capacity to claim their rights, and take action to achieve their goals.</p>	<p>The refugee management structures have provided the refugee with mechanisms to identify the challenges faced on a camp-by-camp basis, establish priorities with respect to the needs of the population and interface with the international community to negotiate how such needs can best be addressed. CBOs have also provided specific segments of the refugee population with the means to organize themselves around issues of particular concern (e.g., women groups, youth groups) and network with like-minded groups outside of the camps and between camps.</p> <p>As well as accessing services and resources within the camp, many refugees also venture outside the camps to gain access to additional resources and/or income to complement what is available within the camp. While it is difficult to put an accurate figure on the true size of the camp economy, it clearly involves considerable resources beyond what is provided directly by the international donor community and the RTG.</p> <p>The Muslim minority has played a major role in the market economy of the three Tak camps and has generated considerable wealth in so doing. This has made it easier to ensure that their particular needs as a religious minority are met. The challenges faced by other minority groups are more significant.</p>
<p><b>Ownership, Solutions and Sustainability</b></p> <p>Ownership is achieved when persons of concern assume full responsibility for the continuation of the work and manage the activities and services they consider priorities. (Support and assistance from external actors might still be required, however, because of an absence of resources or opportunities.)</p> <p>Sustainability involves building on the capacities and skills of community members to manage representative and fair structures that can respond to both immediate and long-term protection risks and needs, and to develop solutions while upholding individual rights.</p>	<p>Through the camp management structures, refugees play an important role in ensuring that, within the camps, they live in peace and security in a clean and orderly place. While their basic livelihood needs (food, shelter, clothing) are being met through contributions from international donors, the management structure ensures that these contributions are, for the most part, provided to all refugees in a fair and non-discriminatory fashion regardless of sex, ethnic background, religious affiliation or socio-economic status. Through these structures, refugees have developed their human resources policies, codes of conduct, disciplinary procedures and complaint mechanisms. All of this contributes to a protective environment for the refugee population. This experience, ways of doing and the skills that have been developed in the process are all things refugees will be able to take back with them to Burma and put to the service of their new community context when repatriation becomes possible.</p> <p>With respect to economic sustainability, access to land where refugees can grow some of their own food (or produce shelter materials) is limited. And access to alternate sources of income outside the camps is also very limited, and for the most part 'illegal' (against official RTG policy).</p> <p>The camp management structures only have limited input in how budgets are allocated and priorities set re the provision of health care to the population. While the provision of health care involves the mastery of considerable technical knowledge this should not preclude the involvement of the refugee population in consideration of various options and the identification of priorities.</p>
<p><b>Transparency &amp; Accountability</b></p> <p><u>Transparency</u> refers to the provision of accessible &amp; timely information to stakeholders and the opening up of organizational procedures, structures and processes to their assessment.</p> <p><u>Accountability</u> is the process through which an organization makes a commitment to respond to and balance the needs of different stakeholders in its decision-making processes and activities, and delivers against this commitment.</p>	<p>The efforts to clarify, standardize across camps, and make explicit the management structures, job descriptions and election processes have contributed to greater transparency and accountability.</p> <p>The RCs, the management structures within the camps (leaders and committees at different levels) and the TBBC have strived to ensure that the refugee population is provided with timely information. In some camps this have been quite challenging given the many different languages spoken by the refugee population.</p> <p>Regular meetings (on a monthly basis at the camp level) are held to facilitate the sharing of information and the coordination of activities between various stakeholders (e.g., between the CC and the TCC, between the CC and the NGOs and CBOs working in the camp). The recent introduction of community forums as a way of providing the population with opportunity to speak directly to their leaders has also been well received and proven to be an effective means for feedback.</p> <p>At the intra-camp level, the RCs also hold regular meetings of all the camps under their responsibility and an RC rep will visit each camp on a regular basis.</p> <p>In terms of service provision, there are also regular meetings of the CCSDPT standing committees which brings together the various service providers in various fields (health, education, etc.). At an overall, strategic level, there are also various encounters that take place between the RTG, the UNHCR, the donor community, and the CCSDPT.</p>

### **11.3 IASC's Plan of Action on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse**

Some of the core recommendations for the IASC's Plan of Action called for the following:

- Agencies and parties involved have clearly defined principles and standards of behaviour (codes of conduct, staff rules & regulations) re sexual exploitation and abuse and are promoting and enforcing these.
- Basic health and psychological care is being provided to survivors.
- Survivors have access to mechanisms for recourse and redress.
- Managers are tasked with promoting a culture of protection in which exploitation and abuse is not tolerated and reports of possible violations are treated seriously and confidentially.

While it was not feasible for this evaluation to undertake a complete compliance audit of IASC's Plan of Action, it is clear that a lot of effort has been invested since 2003 by agencies involved with Burmese refugees to ensure protection from exploitation and abuse.

For instance, with the support of the US Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, the CCSDPT has supported its member agencies and their partners in initiatives to prevent and respond to cases of sexual abuse and exploitation of refugees perpetrated by members of their humanitarian staff. All member agencies are required to abide by the Prevention of Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (PSAE) Code of Conduct, and an institutional PSAE mainstreaming checklist (a self-auditing tool) and guidelines for gender-based violence (GBV) interventions are tools that members agencies use to assist them in their efforts in this regard.

Contractual agreements between TBBC and all its partners, be they the Refugee Committees (via the Camp Management Project) or refugee-based CBOs, also require that all persons receiving stipends through these agreements abide by their internal codes of conduct as well comply with the CCSDPT PSAE Code of Conduct and its protocols.

Regarding the core recommendations for the IASC's Plan of Actions the evaluation observed the following:

- Both the KRC and the KnRC have Codes of Conduct that applies to all elected and appointed members of various committees as well as all the personnel working under the refugee camp management structures; these Codes of Conduct specifically state that elected officials, committee members, and staff will not sexually abuse (commit a sexually violent act) or threaten to sexually abuse others, or use their position of power and of control over resources to seek sexual favours from or take advantage over others.
- Both the KRC and the KnRC have in place Code of Conduct Committees that see to the monitoring of, and compliance with, the respective Codes of Conduct.
- While some of the CBOs and NGOs that we met referred to guidelines or codes of conduct in this regard, we did not actually see these and do not know whether they have their own distinct codes of conduct or whether they rely on the CCSDPT PSAE Code of Conduct.
- It became clear through the various encounters with Section Leaders, Camp Committees and CBOs in all nine camps, that the issue of sexually gender-based violence (SGBV) has been the focus of attention and training in the past few years. There is a very high degree of awareness of the issue among all groups with whom we raised it, and a common understanding about how to proceed if incidents of rape, sexual violence occur.
- All the camps have in place emergency safe-houses or shelters for survivors of sexual violence and domestic violence. These are usually managed by the women-focused CBOs (e.g., KWO and MWA in the seven Karen camps, and KNWO in the two Karenni camps), or by the SGBV program staff of international NGOs. Their role as part of the first intervener group appears to be clear and explicit.

- Cases involving rape or alleged rape are brought to the Thai justice system via the Camp Committee and Thai Camp Commander. Where there is a Legal Assistance Centre, the Centre is usually involved also. Less serious cases of domestic violence are handled within the camp. The women-focused CBOs and/or SGBV program staff resident in the camp provide support and counselling.

We did not obtain any reports or camp based statistics regarding the incidence of sexual abuse or aggression, sexual exploitation, or the threat of sexual abuse/aggression. As noted earlier in this report (Section 8.1.1), in the 43 group sessions<sup>90</sup> (involving 545 refugees) concerns related to this were raised three times. In one instance, a participant in the UM ‘women’ focus group session raised gender-based violence as a significant challenge; she had not experienced gender-based violence personally, but was speaking from her awareness of the issue as a refugee staff member with an NGO running an SGBV program. The two other instances involved two women in separate youth sessions (ML, UM). One raised the danger of being aggressed if walking out outside the camp or in Section 16 of the camp (ML), and the other talked about fear of being aggressed by drunken men (UM). In both these cases, the threat of sexual aggression was not initially raised as of particular concern by women youth when asked about the challenges or threats they faced as young women in the camp. These particular dangers or fears were expressed after the facilitator further probed the group and asked explicitly whether there were concerns of this nature.

While any act of sexual aggression is one too many, the data gathered during this evaluation suggests that rape and acts of non-domestic sexual aggression are not wide spread and endemic in the camps.<sup>91</sup> However, as note earlier in this report (Section 8.1.1), the incidence of domestic violence appears to be more widespread and on the increase. Most often these incidents of domestic violence are associated with the use and abuse of alcohol or other drugs by male household members.

We are aware that an area of increasing concern of the international donor community is whether the particular constraints of encampment – with its limits of freedom of movement, geographic isolation and the rationing of food and non-food items – have given rise to transactional sex.<sup>92</sup> Since the cutbacks in food rations was raised in 29 of the 43 group sessions<sup>93</sup> and eight of the nine camps, this issue of food rationing and its impacts was discussed with the refugees at some length. Transactional sex was not raised as one of the coping mechanisms refugees adopted to survive and provide for their families. However, in two of the Section Leader sessions, transactional sex was raised as a concern or as a source of violent conflict: in Site 1, a Section Leader indicated that one of his challenges was to try to prevent girls in his section from being enticed by money, nice clothes or job opportunities by Thai youth or by refugees who worked outside the camp; in MLO, regarding incidences of sexually-based violence, one Section Leader noted that there are cases of adultery due to lack of money where either the husband or wife engage in sex with someone who is better off financially.

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<sup>90</sup> 16 sessions with general refugee population and 27 sessions with specific sub-groups (one each with minorities, women and youth groups in each camp).

<sup>91</sup> The one exception to this was Site 1, where CBOs indicated that there had been approximately 11 rapes in the past year. It was explained that a number of these cases were cases of statutory rape since they involved women youth under the age of 18 who were willingly involved in relationships and did not perceive that they had been raped. However, given the age of these women youth, they were in violation of Thai law which does not allow marriage before the age of 18.

<sup>92</sup> In other refugee contexts (e.g., Haiti), studies have found that when food rations are decreased, there can be an increase in transactional sex.

<sup>93</sup> 14 of the 16 ‘general refugee population’ sessions raised decreased food rations as a major challenge. Only in Tham Hin and one of the groups in MRML was this not raised. The focus groups sessions with minorities in 7 of the 9 camps (all except Mae La and Tham Hin) and with women in 7 of the 9 camps (all except MRML and Tham Hin) also raised decreased food rations as a major challenge. It was raised by only one of the sessions with youth: Site 1.

It is possible that income<sup>94</sup> is earned through transactional sex outside of the camps, but this did not come up in the information gathered by the members of the evaluation team that were gathering information from neighbouring communities and Thai officials living or working in the vicinity of the camps.

## **11.4 Transparency and Accountability**

Beginning in 2003, considerable effort and resources have been invested in studying and understanding how the existing refugee-based management structures operated at the time, and then supporting a process in close collaboration with the RCs and CCs to clarify and standardize structures, roles and responsibilities, election processes, Codes of Conduct, etc. and then providing funding for stipends and basic administrative costs so that these structures could operate in a transparent and accountable way. The *quid pro quo* to receiving this support was that management structures operations would be above board and open to scrutiny.

This is the way the refugee management structures continue to operate and be financed. The administrative costs budget, which is the part of the camp management budget under the direct control of the CC, amounts to between seven and eight Thai baht per month per refugee in the camp. In the medium size camps the monthly administrative budget amounts to between ThB 110,000-145,000/month. In one of these camps more than 50% of this amount has to be handed over to local Thai Camp Commander.

The CCs in some camps (Site 2, MRML, MLO) have been taxing shop owners amounts that vary between ThB 20 to ThB 200 per month (depending on the camp and the size of the shops) and this is used to support community projects (e.g., in Site 2 it has been used to repair infrastructure, in MRML to supplement teachers' salaries). However, these do not constitute significant sources of income.

However, in some of the camps, large amounts of money are involved in the camp passes issued by TCCs for a fee (e.g., in ML and UM it is ThB 150/pass;<sup>95</sup> in UM there are 16 sections so if, on average, two passes per section per day are issued, the fees collected for passes would amount to ThB 144,000/mo.). Usually it is the refugee management structures (the CC and in some instances, SLs) that are responsible for collecting these fees, but there is no paper trail as to what happens with these funds.

Even larger amounts of money are involved in payments for electricity used in two of the camps (ML and UM) that are connected to the Thai electric grid without any paper trail. We are told that the rate being charged for this electricity is three to four times higher than the going rate charged by the Provincial Electricity Authority to its users. The refugee management structures are not involved in the collection of these fees.

The issue of concern in these last two examples is that it is difficult to establish and maintain a culture and practice of transparency and accountability when the same degree of transparency and accountability is not expected and enforced by all concerned parties involved with the camps. Such negative examples and practices risk eroding the exemplary efforts in this regards that have been undertaken to date within the refugee management structures.

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<sup>94</sup> The number of shops, and the large number of goods on sale in these shops, are an indication that many refugees have other sources of income: remittances from family members in Thailand or in 3rd countries, income from employment opportunities outside the camp. It is conceivable that transactional sex could be another source of such income.

<sup>95</sup> There is not a set rate for such fees across all nine camps. While in ML and UM it is ThB 150/pass in NP it is only ThB 20/pass.

## **12 BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF CAMP MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES**

### **12.1 Capacity Building Efforts to Date**

A lot of effort has been expended and progress has been made since the Refugees Committees and TBBC first began to look at the camp management structures in 2003:

- camp level structures (e.g., Camp Committee, Section-level committee, etc.) have been clarified and for, the most part, standardized across camps;
- within these structures, clear positions have been identified and for each position written job descriptions describing the role and responsibilities have been developed;
- election processes were clarified and revised to make them more democratic and representative, and elections held in 2010; these election processes are currently under further review in preparation for new elections in 2013;
- management training and capacity building activities were carried out by the TBBC (CMP and CMSP) for all positions holders within the camp level structures as well as at the refugee committee level (Tables A7.1 and A7.2 in Annex 7, providing a listing of the trainings SLs and CC members identified as having received during sessions with these groups);
- other targeted training has been provided by other organizations (UNHCR, NGOs) in specific areas such as refugee and human rights, Thai law, SGBV, PSEA, etc.;
- Codes of Conduct have been adopted by both RCs and apply to all positions within the structures and all staff that work for these structures; CoC committees have been put in place at both the camp and RC levels;
- other separate camp level committees have been established to provide support and guidance in specific areas such as child protection, dealing with new arrivals, etc.

It is important to note the significance of TBBC's role and contribution in this regard. TBBC has always been very clear in its commitment to the empowerment of the refugees in managing their own affairs. From the outset, it engaged the refugee leadership and has worked closely with this leadership and established a mature partnership relationship with this leadership and existing management structures. As it became clear that, given the substantial resources at stake, it was important to put in place more rigorous controls and checks and balances, TBBC raised these concerns with the refugee structures and worked with them to bring about changes. These have been adopted wholeheartedly by the RCs, because there is a good understanding of what is motivating these changes (in large part because TBBC played the very helpful role of 'cultural interpreter' and context interpreter between the donor community and the RCs), but also because TBBC has always remained transparent, and clear in its commitment to refugee empowerment.

It is such strong relationships of trust between TBBC (and its CMSP staff) and the refugee management structures that has made possible the introduction of substantial structural improvements and check and balances, even as TBBC was, in its role as camp supplier of food and non-food items, in fact reducing the amount of direct control the management structures had over the control and distribution of supplies.

### **12.2 Current Challenges**

While there has been significant progress in all the areas mentioned above, significant challenges remain.

#### **12.2.1 High Turnover of People in Management Positions**

The challenge of the high rate of turnover of people in management positions has already been mentioned in this report. The high turnover has resulted both because of a number of people in management positions having resettled to third countries as well as because of new people being selected as SLs or as members of the CCs during the 2010 election.

Table 12 below gives a sense of how significant this turnover has been. It is based on an incomplete sample as it refers to only those SLs and members of CCs that participated in the evaluation sessions. However, it does give a rough indication of the magnitude of the turnover.

Two thirds of the SLs and 60% of CC members have been in their positions for three years or less, indicating that there is a very significant number of new people in such management positions. This was quite noticeable in some camps where a number of younger people occupied positions within the CCs (this was less noticeable at the SL level). One advantage of having younger people in such positions is that often they will have benefitted from more formal education than their seniors. Younger people might also more readily adopt new ways of doing things than their elders. The disadvantage is that they would generally have less practical management experience than more senior people. Interestingly, in most camps, there is a mix of younger and older people in management positions.

**Table 12 Years of Service in a Management Positions<sup>†</sup>**

	# Yrs in Position	Site 1	Site 2	MRML	MLO	ML	UM	NP	BDY	TH	Partial Total	%
<b>Section Leaders<sup>96</sup></b>	<b>3 yrs or less</b>	n/a	12	n/a	11	7	5	7	n/a	7	<b>49</b>	67
	<b>&gt; 3 yrs</b>	n/a	-	n/a	2	5	7	5	n/a	5	<b>24</b>	33
	<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>		
<b>Camp Committee Members<sup>97</sup></b>	<b>3 yrs or less</b>	7	8	6	10	5	n/a	6	3	8	<b>53</b>	60
	<b>&gt; 3 yrs</b>	6	-	5	1	6	n/a	5	9	4	<b>36</b>	40
	<b>Total #</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>		

<sup>†</sup> Based on participants in evaluation sessions only.

New elections are scheduled for 2013 and this is very likely to lead to further changes in the composition of people holding positions in the management structures. So those responsible for supporting and building the capacity of camp management structures must function with the understanding that on-going capacity building will be required. Efforts in this area will continue to be required and funding for such will also be needed.

Because there is always turnover in democratically elected governance structures, there would be good reason to envisage distinguishing between people occupying positions in governance bodies (elected and representative) and staff that report to these governance bodies that are hired by them but are chosen for their more technical or professional knowledge and competence. Building the technical and professional capacity of staff takes time and is costly, so it is important that there not be a major turnover in such people every time there is an election. Building the capacity of people occupying governance positions will always be required, but doing so is less time consuming and costly.

### **12.2.2 Building the Capacity of Managers**

One of the main approaches to capacity building of the CMSP has been the provision of training in various subject matters (leadership, community mobilization, problem solving, planning,

<sup>96</sup> Some of the participants in the Section Leader sessions in some of the camps were not Section Leaders but held other positions on the Section Committee: in Site 2, 8 of the 12 participants held other positions; in MRML, 1 of the 10 participants was a Section Affairs; in BDY, 2 of the 12 participants were Section Secretaries.

<sup>97</sup> Some of the participants in the Camp Committee sessions in some of the camps were not CC members: in Site 2, 1 of the 8 was a CMSP staff member; in ML, 3 of the 12 participants were the three Zonal Leaders.

communications, monitoring and evaluation, etc.). While such training sessions are useful, what many SLs and CC members noted has been the lack of follow-up and on-going support. Classroom training is useful to introduce basic concepts, but most managers learn their trade through experience and by support and guidance from more experienced managers that act as sounding boards, coaches and counselors to more junior managers.

With the exception of the Camp Management Coordinator and the Capacity Building Manager, most of the CSMP staff members are quite young with little management experience of their own, so they are not in a position to play this role of sounding boards, coaches and counselors to those that are new to their management positions. A different strategy must be used that draws on experienced managers to be in such a support role. This should include more direct support from the RCs to the camp level and from the CC level to the Zone and Section levels. To ensure that members of the RCs spend more time in the camps, resources are needed.

TBBC and CMSP should also engage agencies involved in the Burmese refugee effort and challenge them to think about how one might draw on the management experience of their most seasoned managers in this capacity building effort.

### ***12.2.3 New Areas of Capacity Building Required***

Developments in Burma have been very much in the headlines of late. While it is still too early to say when conditions will be ripe for the safe and orderly repatriation of refugees to Burma, the likelihood of this occurring now seems more hopeful than ever.

The existing refugee management structures will have an important role to play in the planning for this eventuality and in helping the camp population to prepare itself for such a return. They will also likely be involved in various processes to ensure a smooth transfer of the population back to Burma, and possibly also in the reintegration of the population into new communities.

Whole new areas of skills and competencies will be required for such work, and the building of such capacities will need to be undertaken imminently. As noted earlier, since UNHCR will be a main player in preparation and implementation of any repatriation, it would be critical for the UNHCR to play an increasing role in building the capacity of the refugee management structures so that they can be mobilized and assist with this work.

### ***12.2.4 Where to House the Responsibility for Camp Management***

Another important challenge is who is to take responsibility for Camp Management.

Starting in 2003, TBBC took upon itself to find the wherewithal to examine this whole area and find the resources required to support this. Because the TBBC had built strong relationships of trust with the Refugee Committees and because some of the areas to be addressed had to do with the distribution and controls over supplies, TBBC was probably best placed to play a bridging role in this area. It included the resources required to support this work to its overall budget, and included a fourth programme objective<sup>98</sup> to its programme so TBBC donors have de facto been supporting this work.

However, TBBC does not necessarily believe that this should be part of its mandate. Representatives of TBBC indicated to the lead evaluator that they would welcome sharing this mandate or handing it over to some other agency. The question of where to house the work in support of camp management structures

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<sup>98</sup> Specific Objective 4 – Support mutually accountable community-based management which ensures equity, diversity and gender balance. TBBC Programme Report, July to December 2011, p. 1xx

including capacity building efforts was put to many of the stakeholders, and no one had any clear or obvious viable alternative candidates.<sup>99</sup>

We believe that there continue to be good reasons to keep TBBC as the lead agency supporting camp management. For one, TBBC (and CMSP staff) has developed very strong relationships and bonds of trust with the RCs over the years and such strong relationships are crucial in fostering change in some of the more sensitive nature areas involved in this work. Furthermore, since we are entering a period of major transition (given changes taking place in Burma and the impact this is likely to have on the refugee situation), we believe it would be unwise to transfer this responsibility to another party at this time.

An even more important question is: where should the oversight of camp management and camp management support be located? In the absence of overall humanitarian assistance coordination agency (what the CCCM model in Section 3.3.2 refers to as the Camp Coordination Agency), currently some strategic framing of what is at stake is provided by the CCSDPT-UNHCR Strategic Framework for Durable Solutions in which one of the eight sectors is the Camp Management Sector. In this document, three agencies are identified as being the key concerned agencies: IRC, TBBC and UNHCR. What is not clear is who is mandated (or would be willing to take on the mandate) to provide the strategic leadership for this work and ensure some oversight. While we believe that IRC, TBBC and UNHCR could jointly frame and provide leadership to this work, we also think it critical that some guidance and oversight of this work rest with the Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group (or a specific donor member that is so mandated by the group; most likely the donor member willing to invest financial resources for this work).

We also note that a number of other agencies participate in the CCSDPT Camp Management Working Group. Building broader ownership of this work and recognizing its importance are critical. Even better would be a commitment by all concerned to actively support the refugee management structures in the fulfillment of their responsibilities.

## **PART 3 – LESSONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION**

### **13 LESSONS**

Three overarching lessons arising from this assessment are worth noting:

- 1) *There is deep potential for self-governance and self-management in refugee communities.* The experience of the camp management system in the refugee camps along the Thai border shows that refugee management structures can work. This is true at the level of the individual camp. And it is also true, in this experience at least, at the supra-camp level, where refugee structures established common camp mechanisms and policies, provided guidance and leadership, and negotiated with outside stakeholders, including local governments, donor agencies and service providers. Moreover, the experience reviewed here showed that refugee management structures can adapt to changing conditions and needs over time. In fact, in many ways, they function very much as resilient eco-systems. To be sure, refugee management structures also experience stress and must be regularly revised, retooled and otherwise strengthened. At its most general level, enabling refugees to exert as much control as possible over their own lives and livelihoods through self-management is an important affirmation of the essential humanity of refugee populations.
- 2) *Shared values and vision, and mutual trust, form the foundation of effective refugee camp management.* Early on in the case reviewed here, efforts were made by the major stakeholders to

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<sup>99</sup> The only suggestion made by one of the international NGOs was the possibility of having this work located as a special program under the CCSDPT.



develop a common vision and set of values upon which the camp management model would be built. One of these values, in particular, was transparency. Furthermore, there were equally serious efforts made by the parties to establish and maintain mutual respect and trust. In combination, these factors provided the bedrock upon which many gains were made by the camp management system. Over the past five years, it is evident that, because of both internal and external dynamics, the shared values and trust among the actors had weakened. This weakened state requires key changes and improvements in the system. However, if such changes are made in a forthright and timely manner, it is very likely that the camp management system will emerge stronger and will continue to provide value to refugees, government agencies and other development actors alike.

- 3) *Camp management and governance skills and experience may promote nation-building in the repatriation effort.* This is less of a lesson and more of an expectation. The building of leadership skills in political decision-making and in public administration through the hands-on experience of camp management could serve refugee populations and receiving communities well. Assuming that issues related to region and ethnicity can be managed in an orderly and peaceful manner as refugees return, it is likely that refugee leaders with camp management experience would be qualified to run for public office or take up appointments as government officials in their locality. In other words, camp management structures have functioned as “public administration schools.” And, for the broader refugee population on the Thai border, camp management structures have animated an experience of citizenship—narrowly defined, but quite real nonetheless. Both of these experiences—of public leadership and of citizenship—will be carried into and will hopefully strengthen Burma’s transition process.

## 14 RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of these findings and lessons, it is recommended that:

### 14.1 At the Camp Management Level

- 1) All NGO service providers working in the camps consult fully with refugee management structures, as the legitimate governance structures of the refugee population, in decisions related to priority setting, program planning, program implementation and budget reductions. *Lead: NGO service providers.*
- 2) All agencies working in the camps should participate in the monthly coordination meetings at the camp level and strengthen the strategic role of these meetings in identifying gaps and emerging needs and how these can be addressed in a timely fashion. *Lead: Camp Committees.*
- 3) While continuing to require that the RCs and CCs meet the highest standards regarding the protection of each and all refugees and the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps, UNHCR actively advocate with the RTG that:
  - (1) the RTG explicitly recognize the RCs and CCs as legitimate governance and management structures of the refugee (*aka* displaced persons population); and
  - (2) the RTG make clear and explicit the responsibilities and authority that it has devolved to the RCs and CCs in the day-to-day running of the camps (*aka* temporary shelter areas) and the terms that govern the relationships between these structures and RTG agencies and representatives. *Lead: UNHCR*
- 4) The RCs and CCs ensure that all adults in the camps (as determined for feeding numbers), registered or unregistered, be given the right to vote in the 2013 elections. (If the RTG continues to object to unregistered residents voting, then the camp structures should find other ways of ensuring that the voice and concerns of this constituency are heard). *Leads: Refugee Committees and Committees.*

- 5) The RCs, CCs and election committees at both the camp and RC levels take the necessary measures to ensure that the current minimum quota of 33% women on camp management structures is met and, preferably, surpassed. This includes measures to offset, minimize or eliminate deterrents to women's participation (e.g., long hours away from home).<sup>100</sup> *Leads: Refugee Committees and Camp Committees.*
- 6) The RCs and CCs institute mechanisms, including direct minority representation or minority advisory bodies, to ensure that the voices of ethnic and religious minorities are heard and that their special needs are given due consideration. *Leads: Refugee Committees and Camp Committees.*
- 7) The RCs and CCs should put in place mechanisms (e.g., a camp public forum) for consulting youth about their ideas and concerns, encouraging young people to participate in activities that would benefit youth and the community as a whole. *Leads: Refugee Committees and Camp Committees.*
- 8) UNHCR, RTG and IRC/LAC, in collaboration with the RCs, i) support a clearer identification and delineation of the roles and responsibilities of the various parties with respect to protection and access to justice; and ii) strengthen the capacity of the camp justice system and camp security in their complementary roles of maintaining peace, order and the rule of law and dealing with petty crimes and infractions of camp rules. Furthermore, that these parties endeavour to find the necessary resources to expand these 'protection and access to justice' activities to all nine camps from the current five. *Leads: UNHCR, RTG and IRC/LAC.*
- 9) UNHCR, RTG and IRC/LAC continue their support of the RCs to revise and roll out an updated set of camp rules and regulations as soon as possible, and ensure that the roll-out includes an effective process of public education of the population in the camps about the nature and purpose of these rules and regulations and how they must be consistent with and remain subservient to overarching Thai law. *Leads: UNHCR, RTG and IRC/LAC.*

## **14.2 At the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Level**

- 10) In the context of the transition process beginning in Myanmar, and the associated priority of refugee repatriation, the Donor Humanitarian Actors Working Group (DHAWG) invest in a facilitation process that would identify and then rectify any dysfunctions in the workings of the complex of agencies operating at this level. *Lead: DHAWG and lead donor agency.*
- 11) The effectiveness and efficiency of the DHAWG itself be enhanced through the establishment of a small secretariat that would provide the donor community with ongoing support, coordination, continuity, timely information and independent analysis. *Lead: DHAWG and lead donor agency.*
- 12) The Refugee Committees be formally recognized as the legitimate representatives of refugees in the nine camps and be formally involved in the planning and priority setting processes of the DHAWG. *Lead: DHAWG Chair.*
- 13) DHAWG formally endorse the leadership role played by TBBC with respect to supporting and strengthening the refugee management structures, and ensure that adequate financial resources are earmarked for the capacity building and general operations of these structures and that an appropriate agency is engaged to provide oversight of the camp management dimension of the humanitarian assistance. *Lead: DHAWG and lead donor agency.*

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<sup>100</sup> Recommendations 5, 6 and 7 focus on the formal refugee management structures and do not explicitly speak of the role of CBOs. The evaluation team recognizes that there are a number of CBOs currently active in the camps and that, as civil society organizations of the refugee population, they play an important role in the provision of certain services, allow refugees to organize and build capacity and leadership in certain areas and, within democratic settings, often play an important role as critiques and watch-dogs of formal management and governance structures. The current CBOs in the camps are important resources and structures that the CCs and RCs should draw on, where appropriate, in responding to these recommendations.

- 14) UNHCR be requested by the DHAWG to take on a leadership role on behalf of the donor community in developing a coordinated approach in preparation for the repatriation of Burmese refugees. *Leads: DHAWG and UNHCR.*
- 15) In the context of transition planning for the repatriation of refugees, DHAWG commission a more detailed strategic analysis of ways and means in which the camp management model, and in particular, its experience, lessons, tools and capacities can make an optimum contribution to Burma's nation-building efforts over the next five to ten years. *Lead: DHAWG and lead donor agency.*

We propose that the *Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand* take responsibility for animating and tracking action related to the nine recommendations at the camp management level. We further propose that the *DHAWG* as a whole take responsibility for tracking action related to the six recommendations at the humanitarian assistance coordination level and that it identify within its membership an agency or agencies to take the lead for each of the recommendations where such is not identified.

## **15 CONCLUSION**

The evaluation found that the camp management system has generally worked well and is a valuable model of participation and administration of refugee affairs. Its structures are generally regarded as legitimate and effective by the refugee population. But the system is under stress and steps must be taken to strengthen it at both the camp level and the broader coordination level, to strengthen the system and improve the environment within which it operates. As a tool for the well-being and governance of the 140,000 refugees in the camps along the Thai border, the camp management system is worthy of further investment and improvement. It is also likely to prove to be a valuable touchstone for the nation-building efforts, including the repatriation process, by the people and institutions of Burma in the years ahead.